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Foreword
The global governance of the Internet is an ongoing, complex, contested, and 
unfinished project. In its early days, Internet governance could be charac-
terized as a classic example of private authority in global governance, but as 
this book masterfully demonstrates, as the Internet’s commercial and political 
salience increased over time, its governance evolved into a composite arrange-
ment of public and private actors interacting in different multi- stakeholder 
initiatives. The governance of the Internet is more analogous to the global 
governance of the environment than it is to the governance of global trade. 
It is a regime complex with different governance and institutional arrange-
ments in different issue domains and with no clear hierarchy among them. 
While the domain has become increasingly securitized in recent years, the 
emerging and highly imperfect governance of cybersecurity is only one aspect 
of contemporary Internet governance. In a regime complex like Internet gov-
ernance, the nascent governance in one issue domain such as cybersecurity 
will invariably have implications for the governance of other important issue 
domains, such as freedom of expression and liberty, privacy and surveillance, 
fair access, and the global digital divide.
In this important new book, Roxana Radu situates the global governance 
of the Internet historically and traces its origins from the seemingly ad hoc 
assignment of domain names by private actors in the 1980s through its com-
mercialization in the 1990s to the ongoing series of global multi- stakeholder 
governance arrangements over the past two decades. As a participant in many 
key, formative meetings, she not only describes the historical development of 
governance arrangements, but also contributes to current policy debates on 
Internet regulation and digital developments. She identifies watershed mo-
ments defining power dynamics in Internet governance, proposes an original 
framework of analysis for mechanisms of governance at work across time in 
Internet policy, and offers a detailed analysis of the praxis of governance and 
how it evolves over time in light of the interaction between various instru-
ments, actors, and logics at work. In that sense, the book translates global 
governance theory ideas and operationalizes core concepts, offering the first 
comprehensive study of Internet governance mechanisms at the global level.
The book shows how steering mechanisms come into being through 
various channels and individuals operating within a transnational policy net-




period of time (more than forty years). It also adds a new dimension to the 
investigation of governance articulation by examining anchoring practices in 
Internet governance. As such, it provides an important building block for a 
broader research agenda dedicated to the emergence of governance in new 
issue domains, refining our understanding of the genesis and structuration 
processes involved.
The current governance of the Internet is far from ideal from many dif-
ferent vantage points, but that does not mean that it is ungoverned or ungov-
ernable. It simply means that the normative quality of the existing governance 
arrangements is deficient in some important respects, whether we are con-
cerned with inclusivity, transparency, effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability, 
or fundamental fairness. This book makes a significant contribution to the 
ongoing debate about how the Internet should be governed. We need to 
understand the history of Internet governance, its evolution, its constant ex-
perimentation, and its past failures in order to participate in an informed way 
in the project of improving the quality of Internet governance today. With its 
historical overview, its comprehensive treatment of the subject, and its ana-
lytical framework for understanding the mechanisms of governance at work, 
this book provides a critical first step in this important project.
Thomas Biersteker
The Graduate Institute, Geneva
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On the Internet, everything we love and everything we hate has a name. It 
also has a number or a string of 0s and 1s making it technically viable. And, 
more often than not, it comes with a price tag, whether visible or disguised 
as data value. Since the 1980s, the infrastructure for our digital traces and 
digital legacies has continued to grow, scientifically and politically. In a few 
decades, it evolved from the purview of one government to the globalizing 
world to become the most influential means of communication, the biggest 
global market, but also the largest mass- surveillance tool ever devised. Digital 
flows are estimated to add about 15 to 20 per cent of the global GDP annu-
ally (WIPO 2015) and data- driven businesses have made Internet companies 
the most profitable in the world. Indisputably, the Internet is now a global 
domain of power.
Hundreds of governance instruments are at work to regulate the digital 
aspects of our lives, from connectivity to online behaviour on social networks. 
Our well- being, our relationships, our health, and our labour are all affected 
by the billions of Internet- connected tools around the world. Recent dis-
cussions around algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI), the ‘Internet of 
Things’, and smart cities refocus attention on device- to- device communica-
tion, as in the early days of networking. Some of the current debates are rem-
iniscent of the struggles to find a legal and ethical framework for technical 
advancements in the early 1990s. Understanding the answers given then and 
the continuous contestation will help us better respond to the dilemmas we 
are confronted with today.
The governance of the Internet transcends the conventional boundaries 
among state, market, and user interests. Alongside formalized efforts that can 
be easily categorized, ‘complicated, little understood and often improvised 
processes of governance’ (Schmitter 2010, 85– 6) characterize the field. How 
these two types of processes emerge, develop, and coexist in Internet gov-
ernance (IG) is the focus of this book. In this exploration, the Internet is 
analysed as a nascent policy domain around which political commitments, 





Drawing on international relations (IR) and Internet governance scholarship, 
I explore how rule- making is achieved for a field in constant evolution. To 
dissect the complex arrangements of global policies, norms, and standards 
in the making, power dynamics are analysed along three axes: mechanisms, 
actors, and practices of governance. Each one of these presents tacit or explicit 
power differentials and tensions that structure ongoing negotiations. In this 
study, they are put in perspective through a periodization exercise, which runs 
from the early days of networking experiments in the 1970s to 2018.
Today, most Internet users are located in China (772 million) and India 
(481  million). Combined, the two countries have almost 40 per cent of 
the world’s youth online and lead the smartphone market (Nilekani 2018). 
Although nearly half of the globe’s population is now online, important vari-
ations in the patterns of access and use persist: the large majority of people 
in the world’s forty- six poorest nations remains unconnected and only 5 per 
cent of the world’s estimated 7,100 languages are currently represented on 
the Internet (Broadband Commission for Digital Development 2018; 2015). 
To become the global backbone for political, legal, commercial, and social 
life, the network underwent transformations in scope, size, and scale, setting 
into motion the greatest technical collaboration in modern history and trans-
forming into an authoritative policy space ever more crowded.
Currently, one in three Internet users is under eighteen (Livingstone et al. 
2015), experiencing the broad societal changes triggered by the widespread 
use of the Internet: new patterns of communication (instant delivery, (micro)
blogging, citizen journalism, automatic translation tools, etc.), tele- work, 
autonomous driving, social networking, sharing culture (Benkler 2006), 
or crowdsourcing. Novel art forms, business models (largely based on big 
data analytics and behavioural targeting), e- participation, digital currencies, 
and smart wearables reconfigure the relationship we have with technology. 
Independent of our age, the everyday Internet use is concentrated around the 
visible components of the World Wide Web: social media, email, file trans-
fers, peer- to- peer sharing, dating apps, or online transactions. In these inter-
actions, the functioning of the Internet remains invisible; ‘for hundreds of 
millions of users around the world, the Internet is indeed governed without 
governors’ (Sylvan 2014, 36).
But this is no longer the case for policymakers, as the salience of IG grew 
exponentially. Network controls, cybersecurity and privacy concerns, the in-
creased power of private intermediaries, and an emerging cyber- diplomacy 
agenda have raised the profile of this field to a scale comparable to environ-
mental politics or global health. A ‘political construct in progress’ (Brousseau 
and Marzouki 2013, 371), the Internet was understood as a mechanism for the 
projection of power, both hard and soft (Carr 2015), but also as a technology 
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of disruption (Demchak 2003; Milan 2013; Dencik and Leistert 2015). 
Because of its dual use, the Internet presents, on the one hand, opportunities 
for strengthening governance mechanisms using digitization, non- stop com-
munication, ease of access to information, online delivery, as well as through 
the potential nurturing of communities of practice. On the other hand, it can 
undermine or interfere with efforts by different actors to govern, via the use of 
extensive surveillance, real- time information leaking, fraudulent and criminal 
activities, or cyber- attacks. This tension— juxtaposing personal freedoms and 
empowerment, societal well- being, and destabilizing practices— remains at 
the core of the various visions put forward for governing the network.
But as more and more of the Internet technical specifications come under 
the spotlight with global debates on universal access, net neutrality, or en-
cryption, the societal changes they bring about are also called into question. 
Developed and developing countries alike are confronted with processes of 
Internet- induced adjustment and complexity management. As discussed 
throughout this book, a number of governance arrangements emerged spon-
taneously, out of informal interactions, but consolidated into institutional 
mandates, practices, and shared expectations, showing hybridity at work 
across modi operandi and across time. Moreover, rapid technological advances 
and specific sets of local issues have permeated the global sphere, continu-
ously transforming the meaning of IG.
The global governance literature, with its diverse research traditions, pro-
vides a useful starting point for unpacking the complexity of global Internet 
arrangements. Parallel to analyses of new policy dilemmas (Fyfe and Crookall 
2010)  and ‘super wicked’ issues (Levin et  al. 2009), complex governance 
systems are understood in IR as embedded in and entangled with societal 
values and power positions that they reinforce, mediate, or contest. While 
this has not translated directly into a research agenda on the governance of 
new technologies, it has inspired a number of IG studies to pursue a hol-
istic understanding. Alongside the focus on formal attributes of institutions,1 
more emphasis has been placed in recent years on studying informality in IG 
processes, with an increasing degree of empirical and theoretical sophistica-
tion (Flyverbom 2011; Epstein 2013; Chenou 2014).
Adding to the transformations in governance, the digital age restructured 
global governance and the problematique of power in a two- fold manner. 
Not only has it created new loci of power outside the purview of a powerful 
hegemon, but it has created and perpetuated a transnational policy network 
1 Ziewitz and Pentzold (2014, 311) note that IG research is ‘closely tied to policy discourses and 
has developed a corresponding focus on the role of more or less institutionalised stakeholders at the 
national or transnational level’.
4 Introduction
4
(Biersteker 2014)  comprising experts from different fields, countries, and 
backgrounds acting both formally and informally. The relations among inter-
national organizations, their constituencies, and other stakeholders have 
altered as the Internet fostered the development of horizontal networks 
(Castells 1996, 469), which have supplemented, rather than replaced, the 
existing hierarchies.
Navigating Global Governance
The reality of governance existed avant la lettre. More than two decades after 
its popularization in IR studies, the ‘global governance’ concept remains ra-
ther permissive and broad. It was mainstreamed in the early 1990s with the 
establishment of the United Nations Commission on Global Governance and 
the strong academic impetus to move away from the narrow analysis of the 
interstate system to broader interactions between governance actors, spaces, 
and mechanisms (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
For policymakers, it was closely linked to the ‘good governance’ priorities 
spearheaded by the World Bank (Weiss 2000; Gisselquist 2012). ‘Internet 
governance’ is among the newest topics added to the international agenda, for 
which global governance scholarship provides the most extensive, but also the 
most diverse, set of perspectives. I take this as the starting point for the ana-
lysis of emerging issue areas for which an institutional architecture is not en-
tirely solidified, but rather continuously negotiated and contested. Normative 
dimensions at the core of contemporary governance— responsibility, legit-
imacy, and accountability— extend to IG naturally, making the reflection on 
the mechanisms at work more enticing.
Historically, new technologies played an essential role in shifting govern-
ance debates from the domestic to the international level. With the laying of 
the first transatlantic connection of copper cables for telegraphic signals in 
1858, cross- border communication and collaboration became a permanent 
feature of international relations (Thiemeyer 2013). By the mid- twentieth 
century, the Frankfurt School placed a central emphasis on the use of tech-
nology for the subjugation of the masses by the modern state and opened 
the door for critical theories that account for the transformation driven 
by information and communication technologies (ICTs). In the words of 
Kranzberg (1986, 545), technology is ‘neither good nor bad; nor is it neu-
tral . . . technology’s interaction with the social ecology is such that technical 
developments frequently have environmental, social, and human conse-
quences that go far beyond the immediate purposes of the technical devices 
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and practices themselves’. Debates in science and technology studies (STS)2 
neatly parallel predicaments in IG, as technological determinism and social 
constructivism tenets surface regularly in the discourses of politicians, busi-
ness leaders, civil society, or technical community representatives.
In this study, global governance is understood as ‘a set of authoritative rules 
aimed at defining, constraining, and shaping actor expectations in a pur-
posive order, generally implemented through a set of mechanisms recognized 
as legitimate by relevant actors’ (Biersteker 2010).3 This goal is accomplished 
through a plethora of laws and regulations, but also through institutional dia-
logue, transnational policy networks, social practices, and informal ways of 
bargaining and negotiation. When applied to the Internet, the global govern-
ance framework presents us with a ‘bricolage’ picture: this emerging issue do-
main is currently run through a combination of frameworks of coordination, 
rhetoric and modelling, constraints and inducements, as well as routine inter-
actions (Sylvan 2014). Authoritative decision- making for this domain may 
come as part of intergovernmental processes, yet not exclusively: it is often 
implemented through technical standards and protocols, business practices, 
legal precedents, and everyday routines.
Since the 1920s radio connection revolution, the spaces, objects, and 
subjects of international governance have mutated continuously. As a sub-
stantial preoccupation, the Internet became an object of governance around 
1983, when the Internet protocol suite— the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP)— started to be implemented widely. 
Concerned with the changes in state- based institutions, global governance 
scholars have— at the time of the Internet boom— paid little attention to the 
way in which the Internet gets to be governed and generates an institutional 
architecture as a global domain. Yet the constitution of a system of rules for 
the Internet is not only relevant for how the field evolves, but also for under-
standing the global ordering that emerges with it.
Internet Governance under the Magnifying Glass
As an emerging field of study (deNardis et al. 2013), IG can be easily cir-
cumscribed to the fragmented global governance architecture, understood to 
be ‘an overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or 
2 STS designates a branch of information science investigating the relationship between scientific 
knowledge, technological systems, and society, and its social, political, and cultural implications. 
Sismondo (2010) offers an expansive introduction to the field.
3 The emphasis on authority and legitimacy is also strong in Cutler et al. (1999) and in Gupta 





active in a given issue area of world politics, comprising organisations, re-
gimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations and decision- making 
procedures’ (Biermann et al. 2009, 15). But this delineation remains incom-
plete without an in- depth look at the specificities of this new domain in inter-
national affairs, built around the core tension of power- sharing arrangements. 
So far, IR theories have dealt primarily with power contests in physical spaces 
and have not yet provided satisfactory answers to the challenges posed by vir-
tual spaces (Choucri 2012, 5).
The Internet encompasses both narrow and broad questions of govern-
ance (Solum 2009). The former refers to the management of technical aspects 
and basic infrastructure, whereas the latter covers public policy and ethics. 
Understood broadly, ‘Internet governance would be more or less equivalent 
to “law and politics” at least in the “wired” and “wireless” (or more developed) 
nations’ (Solum 2009, 49). For a long time, a strong emphasis was placed on 
studying the institutions governing the Internet standards and protocols, as 
well as the domain name system, with their specific organizational processes 
and functioning. Yet framing Internet governance as ‘technical only’ obliviates 
related socio- political implications and minimizes the latent political stakes.
Adopting a broad understanding of the Internet is thus a prerequisite for 
studying its evolution. Throughout this book, I refer exclusively to the vis-
ible part of the Internet, which most users know, access, and use daily. The 
non- indexed section of the Internet, also referred to as the ‘deepweb’— a term 
coined by computer scientist Mike Bergman in 2000— or ‘darkweb’, remains 
relatively obscure to the majority of users, although it is assumed to be several 
times bigger than the searchable web.4 This hidden side of the World Wide 
Web is not covered by regular search engines, and access to it generally re-
quires the use of circumvention and anonymity technology. The darkweb is a 
space of self- regulation, where state control is rather limited.
Encapsulating different approaches, ‘Internet governance’, just like the 
governance concept before, became a catchword that denotes a plethora of 
actions ranging from legal provisions to routine practices. While most IG 
scholars recognize the complexity and heterogeneity of the field, the ma-
jority focus on specific processes such as co- regulation, standard- setting, or 
cybersecurity governance (Marsden 2011; DeNardis 2014). In the IR litera-
ture, there has been an overwhelming focus on the myriad manifestations of 
4 The non- indexed web includes: dynamic web pages, blocked sites, unlinked sites, private sites 
(with access via login credentials), non- HTML/ - contextual/ - scripted content, and limited- access 
networks. The latter generally use sites with domain names that are not managed by the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and may employ non- standard top- level 
domains requiring specific Domain Name System (DNS) servers to resolve adequately.
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new forms of governance. This had been pursued at the expense of calling 
into question the emergence of governance and grounding its articulation 
historically. This trend has not only overshadowed explanations of continuity 
and change in key processes, but also questions of agency, as pointed out 
by Biersteker (2014), Bulkeley et  al. (2014), Nolke and Graz (2008), or 
Whitman (2005). A similar tendency could be observed among the scholars 
of Internet governance; very few have engaged with longitudinal studies that 
reveal dynamic interactions. The Bourdieu- inspired ‘turn to practice’ outlined 
the significant role of routines and thus helped open up the universe of silent 
power dynamics. Praxeological approaches recast the agency debate in empir-
ical terms, rather than conceptual only.
To navigate this space theoretically, the following chapters revisit key 
underexplored concepts such as governance emergence and articulation, dis-
cussed as fundamental phases in the constitution of a new domain of power, 
which appears as decentralized, in flux, and cross- sectoral. Being a field under 
construction, the Internet poses two main challenges to the researcher: the 
conceptual understanding of how governance comes into being and becomes 
articulated, and the observation of governance patterns and power dynamics 
as they present themselves in practice. IG is thus constituted as a field of 
action that has specific praxis, structuring the positional and dispositional 
logics of its actors.5 Theorized this way, it offers clues for understanding the 
ambiguities and tensions driving its evolution.
Global Governance— The Enactment Thesis
Governance does not exist in abstracto. With the partial exception of norma-
tive inquiries, discussions about governance cannot elude the relational and 
the practical side of it, that is actions and outcomes. In that sense, govern-
ance is not simply happening in the background; it is enacted. When people 
act, events and structures that would not have existed otherwise are set in 
motion. Enactment reconfirms a direction of action or breaks away from an 
established perspective. Interactions are thus key: it is through them that both 
meanings and actions are formed. At the global level, such interactions struc-
ture the space and the activities in which actors engage.
Governance theories encompass relational and societal facets of power. At 
the macro- level, there is often an implicit reference to ‘power over’ (control, 
5 Bourdieu (2000) asserts that one’s position does not cause action necessarily, but occupying a 




dominance) à la Nye (2011), whereas in micro- interactions the ‘power- to’ as-
pect is brought forward, enabling individual autonomy and freedom. Outside 
the nation- state structure, power is modelled through ideas, values, and ex-
pertise that shape the context, conditions, and nature of social interactions 
and actions. These create systems of rule in which formal and informal gov-
ernance can be exercised. Barnett and Finnemore (2005, 179) present power 
not only as the ability to regulate behaviour, but also to constitute the world 
in particular ways and to define the problems to be solved. The ‘power to’ 
and ‘power with’ (Slaughter 2011)  approach— dominant in constructivist 
studies— highlights sources of authority such as knowledge, stamina, or 
intellect. The Internet is a field of power that cuts across these analytical 
distinctions: the creation of authoritative technical standards and protocols 
is one such example of simultaneous ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ instances.
The central focus of global governance studies— the growing capacity of non- 
state actors to permeate and challenge the inter- governmental structure(s)— 
showed its limitations in the marked absence of a systematic understanding of 
how governance worked in practice for a new domain such as the Internet. Nye 
talked about ‘cyber governance’ (2014), using the regime complex theories for 
mapping related activities. Levinson (2015) applied De Burca’s et  al. (2014) 
global experimental governance framework to Internet governance, highlighting 
the difficulty of finding an appropriate conceptual framework for integrating 
developments in this emerging field. Despite the important contribution of 
Bourdieu and of scholars following in his footsteps, very little cumulative pro-
gress can be reported on the study of global fields of action in international 
relations. In focus for regime theorists, the structuration6 of new issue domains 
remains a theoretical concern, rarely anchored empirically.
Understood as relational, the act of governing focuses on associations and 
interplay, rather than on separate units. If ‘entities are already entities be-
fore they enter into social relations with other entities’ (Jackson and Nexon 
1999, 293), the perspective remains static. To conceive of them as dynamic 
requires an implicit acceptance of ‘enactment’, the act of bringing structures 
and events into existence and setting them in action, while simultaneously 
designing ‘limitations’ to avoid unwanted directions (Weick 1988). The 
Bourdieu- inspired preoccupation with capturing everyday activities initiated 
the so- called ‘turn to practice’ in IR. More than simple actions or behaviours, 
practices embody social organization and hierarchy and render communi-
ties cohesive. Dominant practices thus represent enactments of ‘constitutive 
rules’, defining conduct and basic rules of thumb. They are performed by 
6 Structuration is understood here as the formation and articulation of an issue domain, different 
from the terminology used by Giddens in his post- empiricist ‘structuration theory’ (1984).
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individuals and by networks recursively and obtain structural meaning in 
time, through their insertion in a sociopolitical context. As such, habits shape 
discourses and activities, shifting the focus of attention beyond individual 
agency to systems of meaning embedded in structures and reproduced regu-
larly without questioning the rationale behind.
So far, IR studies dedicated to new issue domains remained by and large 
abstruse regarding the emergence of governance and how it is achieved in 
practical terms as both actors and instruments of governance proliferate. The 
general tendency was to study one approach in isolation from the others with 
a focus on the ‘novelty’ of interactions and, in particular, on an emergent in-
stitutional characteristic (Biersteker 2014). Despite the consensus around the 
density and diversification of policy formation and implementation mechan-
isms, our tools for empirical investigation are slow to adapt to (better) cap-
turing this reality.
Amidst ongoing policy debates regarding the future of the Internet, it 
is timely to revisit the origins and evolution of this fast- developing policy 
domain that Levinson describes as an ‘ecosystem’, a setting where ‘multiple 
stakeholders can interact and where conflicting interests and even conten-
tious collaborations can arise’ (2008, 1). This study opens up an important 
agenda for discussing emerging issue domains such as Internet governance 
by combining analyses of governance mechanisms and actors with dominant 
practices.
Research Focus, Central Question, and Argument
What is at stake for how the Internet continues to evolve is the preservation of 
its integrity as a single network. In practice, however, its governance is neither 
centralized nor unitary. It is piecemeal and decentralized, with authoritative 
decision- making coming from different sources simultaneously. Historically, 
the conditions of their interaction were rarely defined beyond basic technical 
coordination, due at first to the academic freedom granted to the researchers 
developing the Internet and, later, to the sheer impossibility of controlling 
mushrooming Internet initiatives. In 2018, more than 160 organizations and 
entities contributed to creating rules for the global Internet. Cutting across 
sectoral interests, Internet governance is (re)negotiated in numerous fora by a 
variety of players, including governments, UN bodies, civil society organiza-
tions, businesses, technical and academic experts, as well as end- users.
The research question asked here aims to elucidate these relations in 




governance emerge and get articulated globally in new issue domains? This 
inquiry is both theory- and practice- oriented. Its first objective is to present 
governance structures in interaction, rather than as static. In doing so, it re-
sponds to calls for understanding dynamic systems of rule as they come into 
place in dense global governance configurations. It draws on an ulterior prob-
lematization of enacting governance in hybrid contexts, while unpacking the 
historical origins of contemporary global arrangements beyond ‘an idealised 
and constructed past’ (Biersteker 2014, 3). Providing an empirically grounded 
analysis of Internet governance in a longitudinal perspective is the second ob-
jective of this study and a key contribution to the IR literature.
IG is neither a homogenous object of governance, nor of study. It can be— 
and in fact is, in daily coordination activities— decomposed along a number 
of dimensions, be they institutional mandates or thematic clusters, with spe-
cific governance arrangements for each. The analytical difficulty in breaking 
apart this umbrella term stems from the constant state of flux, the vast scope 
of inquiry, and the high socioeconomic and politico- military stakes associated 
with this field. The association of the two terms, ‘Internet’ and ‘governance’ 
has been a subject of contention from the outset. Long negotiations around 
definitional issues, such as the principle of common, but differentiated re-
sponsibilities and high- impact disclosures (2013 Snowden revelations, the 
2010 WikiLeaks), merged with rapid technological developments to make 
the complexity of the field reach new heights.
This book takes an initial inroad to a novel research agenda which trans-
lates global governance theory into praxis for a highly contested power do-
main. The increasing density of Internet governance arrangements presents 
a number of analytical challenges and opportunities for IR theory. On the 
one hand, it pushes for an interdisciplinary understanding of nascent issue 
domains reflecting cross- sectoral concerns and global positioning struggles, 
in particular between the developed and developing countries. On the other 
hand, it opens the door for re- assessing underexplored dimensions for the 
enactment of governance, namely its emergence and articulation. With this 
in mind, I aim, in what follows, to provide a convincing account of the way 
in which Internet governance emerged and is continuously articulated via 
different mechanisms by an increasing number of stakeholders enacting dom-
inant practices. To achieve this, I deconstruct the evolution of the Internet 
from its early days to date, exploring the meaning of governance at different 
points in time and its effect on the structuration of a new global field. Based 
on an in- depth historical and empirical analysis of the governance patterns 
observed, I argue that the specificities of IG give us critical insights for theor-
izing about the lifecycle of new issue domains.
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Present dynamics have a historical dimension, the study of which is es-
sential for a holistic understanding of the field. With Bourdieusian inspir-
ation, I explore the genesis and structuration of a global domain in a dynamic 
manner. Constituted, at a minimum, by a set of issues, mechanisms, and 
practices, discursive and non- discursive, a field brings together actors in dis-
tinctive interaction modes. Analysing its evolution over time gives us a better 
understanding of how governance is enacted, not least through performativity. 
In that sense, the ‘reality of governance’ is not given, but achieved through 
instruments, processes, and outcomes, as well as through our studies, presen-
tations, or policy briefs.
Method
To uncover the evolution of Internet governance as a global field of power, 
the analysis undertaken here starts with the antecedents of the network of 
networks, situating the 1970s ARPANET developments and the initial group 
of scientists and governmental employees expanding internetworking under 
contract with the US Department of Defense. The end- point of the research 
is September 2018, providing an extensive observation space for the enact-
ment of governance. With more than 311 authoritative instruments of gov-
ernance at work— ranging from intergovernmental treaties to voluntary codes 
of conduct— the complex picture that IG presents us with poses a number of 
methodological challenges to the researcher.
Among these, the cross- sectoral nature of the Internet and the ongoing 
technical and political developments call for the use of a mixed- method, 
qualitative approach, relying on an in- depth historical analysis and an ex-
ploration of a self- constructed dataset of governance mechanisms spanning 
1969– 2015. In addition, I make extensive use of textual analysis and partici-
pant observation to further explore political tensions, dominant practices, 
and community formation patterns. Over the last seven years, I was directly 
involved in more than two dozen global IG processes and meetings and this 
facilitated detailed discussions and interactions with IG experts, as well as the 
observation of community practices.
In the constructivist tradition, I take methods to be integral to the nor-
mative construction of knowledge. The research design adopted here is 
adapted to the deconstructive analytical framework I propose in Chapter 2, 
highlighting three key dimensions of governance that provide a dynamic per-
spective. Accordingly, the governance actors, mechanisms, and anchoring 




governance patterns:  (1) the early days of the Internet, dominated by in-
formal governance and governance through technical standards (1969– 94); 
(2)  the boom of the commercial Internet, with private actors and business 
practices flourishing (1995– 2004); and (3)  the decade of global regulatory 
arrangements, featuring hybrid configurations (2005– 15). For each of these, 
I explore the interactions between actors and forms of governance as they are 
formed and consolidated in time.
The dataset of governance instruments provides a unique vantage point, 
allowing for charting the IG domain and subareas of interest as they emerge. 
The entries in the dataset are further categorized into mechanisms of govern-
ance enactment and compared longitudinally. On this basis, the historical 
analysis and the relevant insights from participant observation and textual 
analysis provide a cohesive picture of a rather difficult- to- grasp, evolving do-
main. This involves tracking modalities of governance and actors in inter-
action over a long period of time, and mapping the emerging patterns and 
shifts in a variety of ways. The analysis focuses on governance instruments 
as outcomes of international processes, reviewing experiences over time in 
six subdomains constitutive of the field: infrastructure and critical resources, 
cybersecurity, legal issues, digital economy, ICT for development, and civil 
liberties.
In addition, a set of grounding practices are investigated in this study 
as the depiction of governance in everyday activities (what people do). 
Methodologically, the challenge is to make the invisible visible, namely 
the anchoring of activities in meanings that are specific to the communi-
ties implementing them. Meaning- making thus becomes dependent on the 
hidden assumptions, underlying logics or courses of action that are power- 
laden. Just like the choice of governance instruments, the practices that 
dominate over time represent normative and value expressions. Calling their 
origin into question is the critical endeavour contributed to here.
Structure of the Book
The analysis of the Internet as a global issue domain is both challenging and 
enticing. Its politically negotiated system of rules, built on technical features 
and power sensitivities specific to the field, is explored here in five chapters, 
followed by concluding remarks. Aiming to shed light on contemporary dy-
namics of governance, this book addresses both scholars and practitioners. It 
provides a fresh perspective on the structuration of a nascent field of global 
governance, a timely addition to the study of international affairs.
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The next chapter explores the global governance scholarship and its cross- 
fertilization with the study of Internet developments. Clustered around three 
prominent themes in international affairs— varieties of governance, sources 
of authority, and praxis— the chapter scrutinizes scattered, often implicit pro-
posals on the emergence and articulation of governance. It links these to more 
recent attempts to study the Internet as part of distinct repertoires, identifying 
the genesis and structuration of new issue domains as a marginal focus in the 
literature. Based on a deconstructive approach, it provides a guiding frame 
that distinguishes between three key dimensions for the enactment of gov-
ernance: mechanisms, actors, and anchoring practices. Methodologically, this 
translates into a complex research design combining historical and empirical 
analysis, subsequently detailed.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 each investigate a specific period in the evolution of 
IG as a global domain, starting with the origins. The three phases covered 
by the dataset are:  the 1970s to 1994, 1995– 2004, and 2005– 15. In the 
early days the Internet was a rather homogenous domain, closely linked to 
computer science and networking experiments. The rules designed for its 
management were function- and efficiency- driven. Starting in 1983, dif-
ferent forms of governance, combining public and private initiatives, begin to 
profile, largely around an active community of professionals in the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) network. Until the expansion and com-
mercialization of the Internet in the mid- 1990s, the predominant governance 
route was that of standards and protocols making networks interoperable. 
In a path- dependent trajectory, Internet services remained exempted from 
regulation. Chapter  3 thus sets the stage for the long- term analysis of the 
evolution of the field.
Chapter 4 delves into the salient role of corporate actors in Internet pol-
icymaking as the network became private and global. Market dynamics drove 
the development of the field and the digital economy shifted attention to 
the potential of the network in the neoliberal understanding. From the mid- 
1990s to mid- 2000, three major shifts occurred in Internet governance ar-
rangements:  they grew in size, scale, and scope. A number of rules for the 
technical management of the network were defined during this period and 
the bodies in charge consolidated their institutional structure. The emergence 
of political contestation also dates back to this period, when the positions of 
developing countries on key IG issues started to consolidate.
The governance of the Internet faced a reflexive turn throughout the 
World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) decade (2005– 15), explored 
in Chapter  5. Concerns for authority, legitimacy, and accountability— 
expressed by different stakeholders— became central to the evolution of the 
field. A  number of challenges, stemming from three diverse sources, were 
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embedded therein. First, questions were spawned by the modus operandi 
of the sui generis institutions, such as the international technical bodies 
exercising public governance functions to ensure the continuous functioning 
of the Internet. Second, demands resulted from the gradual adaptation of 
intergovernmental organizations with core or tangential interests in the field. 
Third, the role of private intermediaries was called into question as their fi-
nancial and political power rose steeply. Their relation to governments was 
also probed, particularly after the 2013 Snowden leaks.
Chapter  6 locates authority and agency in Internet governance, thus 
disentangling the power threads in the field and in the community enacting 
it. Starting with a longitudinal, comparative perspective of the governance 
trends identified in previous chapters, it discusses the changing role of Internet 
companies and influential states in post- 2015 developments, zooming in on 
market dynamics, cyber norm debates, and artificial intelligence strategies. It 
further analyses community formation patterns in IG, presenting the internal 
dynamics of decision- making and the perpetuation of core values among 
newcomer groups. Against the continuous expansion and diversification of 
the field, this section traces the many continuities that structure a now ma-
ture field of power.
The final chapter concludes, highlighting the outcomes and the contribu-
tions of this book to IR and IG, theoretically and empirically. It clarifies how 
the findings of this research fit in the ongoing policy debates and in the global 
governance scholarship and reflects on the value of the research agenda pro-
posed here. Last but not least, the closing chapter offers analytical directions 
for future explorations of governance emergence and structuration in new 
global fields.
Negotiating Internet Governance. Roxana Radu © Roxana Radu 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford 
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 Deconstructing Internet Governance:   
A Framework for Analysis
At the core of governance debates is the conceptualization of power, diffused 
and commanded in novel ways with the advent of new technology and new 
actors. In one of the shortest definitions ever given, governance is ‘order plus 
intentionality’ (Rosenau 1992, 5), representing a political act with forms of 
inclusion and exclusion and, inherently, an expression of power. Its use with 
reference to the Internet carries the same meaning, exposing an intricate net-
work of hierarchical and social relations, only comparable to the complex 
technical architecture on which it relies. Despite the plethora of writings on 
globalization and technological change, a more refined look at governance is 
required in order to understand nascent global domains, in particular their 
genesis and structuration.
Part of broader governance transformations, Internet policy- making re-
mains polycentric and in flux. Metaphorically, Ziewitz and Pentzold refer to 
Internet governance (IG) as a ‘difficult horse to catch’ (2014, 306). Studying 
its institutions, rule systems, and steering mechanisms remains particularly 
challenging due to an ever- increasing number of processes spanning global 
and regional levels. The tendency to study modes of governance in isolation 
partially explains the limited engagement with this in international affairs. 
Its direct effect on the foundational international relations (IR) scholarship 
is the false assumption that problem- solving drives institutional interactions 
in an undifferentiated manner. I propose below an analytical framework that 
challenges the idea of the Internet as a homogenous object of governance by 
distinguishing among three key dimensions for observing variation: mechan-
isms, actors, and practices of governance.
The deconstruction exercise undertaken here serves two purposes: first, it 
positions central elements required to understand the emergence and articu-
lation of IG and delineates its evolution phases. Second, it underscores how 
the governance concept is a broad, yet powerful analytical framework for 
exploring the multifaceted ways in which regulatory arrangements come into 
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being, in addition to decision- making processes and coordination proced-
ures. The deconstructive analysis used here strips the concept of its ideo-
logical connotations in a first phase and adds the context, power dynamics, 
and actors in a second phase. After exploring the global governance literature 
in search of tenets that provide useful insights for the present analysis, this 
chapter elaborates on the framework of analysis in use and the research design 
guiding this study.
Global Governance Repertoires and the Internet
The asymmetric concentration of technology in the West, the birth of the 
Internet in the American context, and the evolving space for regulatory input 
were at first considered in isolation, rather than as part of broader trans-
formations in governance. Until recently, limited attention was paid in IR 
to the way in which global priorities permeate daily operations, regulatory 
standards, and action plans. This was partly due to a split in the way govern-
ance was conceptualized. Reflecting on this polarization, Graz (2014) dis-
tinguished between functional and structural theories of governance. At the 
core of functional theories is the drive to ‘get things done’ and find solutions 
to concrete problems. Focusing on the exercise of power through practices, 
functional governance theorists generally investigate coordination and com-
petition, decision- making processes, and institutional design. They tend to 
converge around forms of steering and regulation1 similar to or distinct from 
governmental operations.
In line with the critical tradition in International Political Economy (Shields 
et al. 2011; Cohen 2014), structural theories of global governance address 
complex interconnections, sites of authority, and power relations among 
actors, analysing underlying ideologies, as well as market and state system 
transformations; they make normative claims about the reconfiguration of 
objects and subjects of authority and question governing epistemologies and 
inclusion/ exclusion mechanisms. Accountability, democratic practices, and 
inclusiveness at the global level are also explored. Interrogations on the role of 
technology in supporting, advancing, and reinforcing ideologies, while dom-
inant in science and technology studies, remain rather limited in IG (excep-
tions include Mueller 2004; deNardis 2009; Chenou 2014; Carr 2016).
1 Baldwin et al. (1998) assert that there are three distinct concepts of regulation: (a) authoritative 
rules; (b) efforts of state agencies to steer the economy; and (c) mechanisms of social control (widest 
sense). Throughout this book, regulation is predominantly understood as authoritative rules.
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The diversity of approaches that attempt to explain contemporary govern-
ance processes cannot be disconnected from the modalities employed. Early 
influential work on global governance focused— almost exclusively— on 
formal mechanisms; subsequent writings provided a more nuanced approach 
by integrating informality and everyday practices. Twenty- five years after the 
seminal work of Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) on ‘governance without gov-
ernment’, a number of limitations and blind spots constrain the theoretical 
expansion of this promising agenda. In pointing out how governance is dif-
ferent from government, the majority of studies have been modelled on the 
state/ non- state actor dichotomy (Stoker 1998) and processes that are most 
visible in a number of issue areas, emphasizing similarities and differences 
with governmental ordering (Graz 2014, 5).
A granular approach to ‘changing modes of governance’ emerging in the 
2000s (Pierre 2000; Kooiman 2003; Pierre and Peters 2005)  revived the 
debates by introducing a dynamic perspective. It inspired a diversity of ap-
proaches: transnational new governance (Abbott and Snidal 2009), ‘public– 
private partnerships’ (Boerzel and Risse 2005, 2010; Andonova 2010, 2014), 
‘multistakeholder initiatives’ (Jerbi 2012; Raymond and deNardis 2015; 
Radu et al. 2015), or transnational policy networks (Biersteker 2014). This 
added to the complexity of understanding formal mechanisms, and provided 
a basis for cumulative knowledge on the inner workings of global governance. 
Importantly, these endeavours also noted the degree of informality within and 
outside formal decision- making and shifted attention to what is not directly 
observable and remains largely non- codified in global policymaking. Relying 
on non- binding forms of cooperation and selected membership (no mandate 
or formal entitlement), informal governance dominates IG processes, but re-
mains largely understudied.
The mechanisms through which informal governance emerges originate 
either with networks or with processes. In the first category, elites design and 
impose or interact strategically to reach the expected outcomes; in the second, 
decentralized processes with a plethora of actors require coordination mech-
anisms, one- stop- shops as focal points, bargaining or repeated interactions 
bargaining (Knight 1992). Guy Peters (2007) proposes to divide informal 
governance into soft law, networks, partnerships, co- production, multilevel 
governance, and open method of coordination. Broadly understood, informal 
governance refers to the ‘operation of networks of individual and collective, 
private and public actors pursuing common goals’ (Christiansen et al. 2003, 
7). Some of these elements are also employed in the norm- building literature, 
where human agency, indeterminacy, chance occurrences, and favourable 
events are generally explored to explain emergence, primarily through process 
tracing or genealogy.
18 Deconstructing Internet Governance
18
Building on the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the norms cre-
ation dimension is emphasized in global governance discussions of ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ and ‘organizational platforms’. This is consonant with the 
‘networked governance’ approach applied to Internet security by Mueller 
et al. (2013) for the identification of interdependent actors that opt for col-
laboration or for unilateral action in the absence of overarching authority. 
Defining, enforcing, and reproducing norms stands at the basis of governance 
articulation, which can take numerous forms and shapes. Various governance 
mechanisms co- exist simultaneously, making the process of designing norms 
highly complex and oftentimes hybrid, with multiple sources of authority 
involved. Opening up IG to the conditions of its formation permits an in- 
depth tracing of the individuals behind influential proposals that later on 
consolidate into powerful institutional forms.
A useful analytical tool to distil the multidimensional governance concept 
is the distinction between what is observable through concrete outcomes and 
what remains invisible to the public eye. Understanding that technology, just 
like the regulatory infrastructure on which is it built, is not neutral, allows 
for a methodically sound investigation of formality and informality. The first 
comprises the mechanisms set in place by decision- makers, be they hard or 
soft law instruments. The latter captures the role of actors beyond what can 
be quantified and power dynamics that are reproduced in everyday practices, 
sometimes without a conscientious acknowledgement of the effects.
This vantage point bridges a number of disciplinary approaches and per-
mits the exploration of key dimensions from the (meta)theoretical repertoires 
of global governance that best explain how the Internet evolved into a field of 
global power. These elements inform the analytical framework presented sub-
sequently. For each research stream, I also explore, where available, related, 
oftentimes implicit hypotheses on the emergence and articulation of govern-
ance and assess their relation to IG developments and writings.
Varieties of Governance
Formal outcomes of international negotiation processes, in particular treaties 
and conventions signed and ratified by states, have been meticulously studied 
post- Second World War. The focus on transnational cooperation and imple-
mentation of international law surfaced early on, exhibiting a plethora of 
governance means applied outside the domestic sphere. Born out of a mili-
tary project of the US government at the end of the 1960s, ARPANET, the 
precursor of the Internet offered little of interest to scholars of global gov-
ernance, but set in motion the greatest revolution in telecommunications 
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and subsequently in socio- economic affairs. To be understood as a new and 
influential policy field, the Internet needed to reach a global scale. It now 
accounts for structural changes in power distribution, power perception, and 
behaviour shaping, but does not fit swiftly into a single theoretical stream. 
The many instances of private initiative and cooperation across stakeholder 
groups stand at odds with the statist perspective, while governance arrange-
ments mixing the formal and the informal escape a streamlined theorization.
The international regime theory, developed in the 1980s, provided new 
impetus for the analysis of global institutional arrangements. Its contribu-
tion to disentangling modalities of governance is significant here for two 
reasons: first, it pinpointed the complex process around establishing rules, 
norms, and principles to be adopted by a wide range of actors; second, it 
provided the terminology for issue- areas, which constitutes a starting point 
for this study. Krasner defined international regimes as ‘sets of implicit or ex-
plicit principles, norms, rules and decision- making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’ (1983, 
19). According to him, ‘principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision- making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice’ (Krasner 1983, 2). Formally, the members of international regimes 
were sovereign nations (generally treated as monolith entities), yet implemen-
tation of actions governed by international regimes could and often was con-
ducted by private entities (Young 1982) and usually constrained elites within 
states (Puchala and Hopkins 1982).
Regimes assigned power to collective units, which develop, agree, enforce 
rules and establish institutions. In early approaches, agency was eluded as 
emphasis was placed on regime principles, rather than on the role of specific 
organizations or individuals. Critiques pointed out the degree of ‘imprecision 
and woolliness’ (Strange 1983) surrounding the regime theory and the im-
plicit risk of tautology: ‘theories about regimes have run into trouble when 
the same theory explained the origin, as well as the maintenance or the de-
mise of a regime’ (Smith 1987).
Newer strands of research, expanded to ‘regime complexes’, address up-
front the role of active leadership (structural, intellectual, charismatic) in pro-
moting cooperation (Keohane and Victor 2010). For Raustiala and Victor 
(2004), a regime complex represents an ‘array of partially overlapping and 
non- hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area’. Orsini et al. re-
fine this to understand a regime complex as ‘a network of three or more inter-
national regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping 
membership; and generate substantive, normative or operative interactions 
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recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed ef-
fectively’ (2013, 29). Mueller, Mathiason, and Klein (2007) and Nye (2011) 
subsequently applied this understanding to the governance of the Internet.
Mixing norms, institutions, and procedures of both formal and informal 
nature, Nye (2014) takes this further and reflects on ‘the regime complex for 
managing global cyber activities’. However, his analysis and similar attempts 
to apply the regime complex framework to IG remain oblivious of organ-
izational infrastructure and stop short of defining the relevant ‘nodes’ in the 
networks constituting regime complexes (Levinson and Marzouki 2015). The 
other major limitation is the difficulty in explaining how regime shifts occur. 
Helfer suggests that regime shifting works by ‘broadening the policy spaces 
within which decisions are made and rules are adopted’ (2009, 39), but it re-
mains unclear how this applies across various IG subfields.
Despite its shortcomings, the regime theory literature needs to be cred-
ited for its contribution to the development of the ‘issue area’ concept as a 
deliberate cluster of concerns. In early theorization, regimes were originally 
established to regulate single issues (fishing, money, radio frequencies, etc.) 
rather than issue domains. As seen earlier in the discussion on regime com-
plexes, the boundaries of an issue domain are rarely clearly delimited, and 
different groups may disagree on what could be included under a certain 
label, meaning that the process of contestation is continuous. Changes in an 
issue domain are rarely tackled convincingly by regime theorists. As any other 
evolving process, issue development is affected by internal and external fac-
tors that cannot be properly captured in a static theory. A dialectic approach 
is thus more adequate. The tenets discussed above remain incomplete without 
a clear picture of how they come into play in the constitution of a global field 
of power. This book sheds light on how such dynamics get established and 
articulated over time in ruling the Internet.
The complexity of existing orderings gets more difficult to distil as their 
mixed nature allows for strengthening the public or the private character 
of organizations in ways that best suit the case at hand. The same entity 
might be treated as public for some purposes and as private for some other. 
Moreover, informal governance arrangements, a well- established form of co-
operation at the international level, are often obscured in the theorization 
of governance regimes. For Abbott and Snidal (2000), they represent transi-
tory arrangements on the path to legalization, whereas for Biersteker (2014) 
and Pauwelyn et  al. (2013) they are a permanent feature of contemporary 
governance. Non- binding forms of governance (‘soft law’) and sector- specific 
policy communities foster information exchange, clarify legal and technical 
matters, have the potential to table solutions and narrow down policy op-
tions, as well as extend the reach of agreements that can be rubber- stamped 
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in formal processes. Conversely, they render processes of policy inclusion nar-
rower through selective participation and constraints through pre- decisions, 
while increasing the potential for rule fluctuation, non- codification abuse, 
and deficient accountability.
A global policy space is made up of relations that can be observed and 
those that are hidden to the public eye. In the Bourdieusian tradition, the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion are intrinsic to the structuration of the 
field2 and, thus, to its hierarchical disposition. The IG field is seen here as a 
setting in which agents situate themselves via social positions. Shaped by the 
interactions taking place, the field is structured according to rules that are 
specified in the process of constructing the domain, but also based on the 
agent’s habitus and capital, be it social, economic, or political. For Bourdieu, 
power and class relations structure internally the system of social positions, 
thus turning the field into an arena of struggle for the appropriation of dif-
ferent forms of capital.
He makes an important distinction between the vertical and the horizontal 
organization of a field. While the first is a hierarchical dimension of structur-
ation, the latter is a transversal one, applying across different subfields with 
equal purchase. Both are forms of power that can be observed in the consti-
tution of new issue domains, in particular as they undergo differentiation to 
become independent or autonomous spaces of rule- making. To situate these 
dynamics, a broader perspective on the IG shifts is needed, revealing the ex-
tent to which this new domain is influenced by global ordering trends, regu-
latory or deregulatory.
As a sociopolitical, hybrid space, the Internet we know today comprises 
different modes of governance instituted at the global level, including tech-
nical decisions, private business policies, and international regulatory ar-
rangements, as well as formal and informal mechanisms and practices that 
become authoritative in the everyday operation of the network. Having clari-
fied the varieties of governance presented in the literature, authority sources 
and practices are discussed next as concrete ways to develop and implement 
norms and principles for regulating a new issue domain.
State and Private Authority
Conceptualized either as a unitary actor or as an elaborate network, the state 
re- surfaces at junction points in IG discussions. Contrary to dynamics in 
other international domains, state control is highly contested in the Internet 
2 Bourdieu’s field concept is used in this analysis interchangeably with ‘domain’ to refer to the 
relations established for creating a global system of rules for the governance of the Internet.
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arena, where new governance arrangements emerged in quasi- private setups 
like the Internet technical standards and protocols or the allocation of do-
main names. Operations critical to the functioning of the Internet remain 
exclusively in private hands, including submarine cable production and de-
ployment, Internet access provision, and the majority of services and products 
available on the web. Alongside the public Internet, many private Internet 
spaces developed, such as Intranets, estimated to be ten times larger than the 
public network (Brown and Marsden 2013).
The ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Rhodes 1994) predicted a complex pro-
cess through which state functions were privatized, devolved, eroded, or 
transferred at supra- national (EU) or international levels. In such situations, 
governments engaged in cross- sector partnerships, entering constellations 
of actors and decision- making processes in which they were not endowed 
with final authority, though they could (re)turn to the position of regulators 
(Majone 1996; Higgott et al. 2000; Moran 2002). The ‘retreat of the state’ 
(Strange 1996)  suggested the enabling cooperative mechanisms of meta- 
coordination, namely rules, frameworks, and regulation of externalities. 
Closely related was the thesis of ‘state orchestration’, with governments acting 
as incentivizers, initiators, or implementers (Abbott et al. 2015; Jerbi 2015).
Internet governance studies have long been explicitly concerned with the 
role of the state and its multiple transformations in a hybrid environment. 
Celebrating the multiplicity of regulatory frameworks and mechanisms in 
place, their novelty and the characteristics of the actors involved in these 
processes oftentimes eluded the substance of governance debates and power 
positionings. Institutional design— and later on the focus on broadly defined 
stakeholder participation in decision- making— shifted attention towards 
the state as a catalyst, funder, or partner (van Eeten et al. 2014). Novel, yet 
fragmented governance arrangements are generally preferred as a focus of re-
search: voluntary schemes such as the Global Network Initiative (Jerbi 2015), 
institutional innovations like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) or the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (Mueller 
2004; Antonova 2007; Malcolm 2008), transnational state networks on 
cybersecurity or child online protection (Livingston 2013), multistakeholder 
initiatives and public– private partnerships (Schmidt 2014), or crowdsourcing 
initiatives (Radu et al. 2015).
Territoriality, a key concept for state- centric approaches, saw a gradual 
shift in meaning, from exercising control over hard borders to control-
ling networks and soft borders (Biersteker 2014). Unlike what early cyber- 
libertarians proclaimed, the Internet was not ‘unbound with respect to 
geography’ (Goldsmith and Wu 2006, 58) and sovereign principles domin-
ated technical specifications, in particular through the laying of cables and 
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the use of location- sensitive software. Examples abound: complete Internet 
shutdowns occurred in 2011 at the request of governments amidst mass pro-
tests in Egypt, Libya, and Syria; ‘cyber- sovereign’ China created its own ver-
sion of the network; and the United States only ended its oversight over the 
ICANN in September 2016.
At the other end of the spectrum, private rule- making processes were 
studied, among others, by Risse (2006), Boerzel and Risse (2005), Pattberg 
(2005), Kirton and Trebilcock (2004), who laid the foundations for a plur-
alistic understanding of spheres of authority, with insights from sociology, 
history, political science, and economics. Forms of private governance dis-
cussed in the literature range from corporate social responsibility (Vogel 
2005), voluntary instruments (Ruggie 2004), and industry self- regulation 
(Webb 2002)  to user- generated or Web 2.0 content regulation (O’Reilly 
2005). Non- state actors actively involved in world politics may be motivated 
by ‘universal values or factional greed, by profit and efficiency considerations, 
or the search for salvation’ (Ruggie 2004, 509).
As a key problematique in contemporary governance studies, the prolif-
eration of private actors and the diversification of their means of action is 
also relevant for this study. Private initiative is a dominant causal explanation 
for how governance comes into being, as well as for the structuring of par-
ticular configurations of governance (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 
2002; Bjola and Kornprobst 2010), generally perceived as more flexible and 
innovation- fostering. Originally, Cutler et  al. (1999), Haufler (2001), and 
Hall and Biersteker (2002) investigated how governance functions formerly 
performed by states became privatized and outsourced to private actors. Hall 
and Biersteker identified three types of private authority— market- based, 
moral, and illicit— through which ‘non- state actors cooperate across borders 
to establish rules and standards of behaviour accepted as legitimate by agents 
not involved in their definition’ (Nolke and Graz 2008, 2).
Hall and Biersteker also draw attention to the ‘the reversibility of private 
authority’ (2002, 213), discussing how the state might supersede the private 
arrangements and how authority might be undermined in a salient polit-
ical situation. Their book does not offer a single answer to the question of 
when reversibility occurs, noting that allowing or limiting private authority 
depends on the case at hand. What the contributors to the volume agree on is 
that a reversal of authority has long- term consequences and becomes costlier 
over time. Internet policymaking, notably in the last decade, offers many in-
stances of authority being transferred back to governments, with closer super-
vision imposed, in particular on matters of cybersecurity and data protection.
Today, global governance scholars agree that authority is diffused, decision- 
making is in part privatized, and the nature of global challenges requires a 
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multiplicity of structures and means of implementation. Among these, semi- 
private, quasi- public initiatives such as the Global Environmental Facility, 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, Global Water partner-
ship, or the Anti- Spam Alliance bring together businesses, governments, 
civil society groups, and international organizations (IOs) from the outset. 
Standardization bodies performing global roles of accreditation and coord-
ination are sometimes privately owned. Law- like arrangements with private 
institutions are not uncommon, in particular in dispute resolution in IG. The 
legitimacy of these configurations rests with the work of communities, who 
reiterate their practices and routines to bring about contestation or accept-
ance and buy- in.
Praxis
Understanding how processes and actions are shaped on a daily basis required 
a change of perspective and that came about with the praxeological turn. The 
concrete observation of discourses and routines had a long tradition in soci-
ology and anthropology (Geertz 1973; Cetina 1981; Adler 2013; Autesserre 
2014), but only recently captured the attention of IG scholars (Flyverbom 
2011; Epstein 2013). Global governance- focused contributions in this trad-
ition emphasized shared practices as part of daily habits, dissecting the tacit 
understandings and knowledge that make such interactions meaningful 
(Neumann and Sending 2010; Eagleton- Pierce 2013; Best and Gheciu 2014; 
Bueger 2016; Pouliot 2016).
In world politics, routines explain actions that seem spontaneous and guide 
us through the translation of what is invisible, but authoritative (Bourdieu 
1976). They demarcate the inclusion/ exclusion lines and embedded power 
mechanisms, providing insight into organizational logics. Oftentimes, they 
become visible through the dichotomies and oppositions used:  sane versus 
mad (Foucault 1965), dominant versus dominated. In line with Bourdieu’s 
work, a practice approach pushes for identifying the modus operandi of ‘the 
field’ before defining the actors. A field is structured according to a system of 
binary oppositions (orthodox/ heterodox, sacred/ profane) and is socially con-
structed, with broadly defined limits ‘situated at the point where effects of the 
field cease’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 100).
Practice theory insists on the mutual constitution of social structure and 
action. It shifts the realm of investigation from the ideational level to the 
physical and the habitual (Swidler 2001). But how do they come into place, if 
not formulated directly as such? Bourdieu (1976) provides a partial answer to 
this: in his view, people replicate the constitutive rules not with the intention 
 
 Deconstructive Lens 25
of doing so explicitly, but by acting strategically in a space dominated by 
those rules. The role of individuals and their personal motivations are thus 
key to the exploration of nascent issue domains. Without this dimension, our 
understanding of governance emergence and articulation is incomplete.
Through praxis, regulation itself is collectively mediated and legitimized by 
the key communities whose buy- in is necessary. Functioning as socially ne-
gotiated realities, anchoring practices are foundational for the constitution of 
a global domain of action when their enactment is public and when specific 
communities identify with their embodiment. As rules change, dominant 
practices can be perpetuated, replaced, or supplemented by others. For the 
latter, a similar process of initiation is set in place, so that the addressees of 
such practices can see that ‘everyone else has seen that things have changed’ 
(Swidler 2001, 87). In explaining continuity in governance mechanisms, the 
perpetuation of routines is essential.
The research clusters discussed earlier— varieties of governance, state and 
private authority, and praxis— form a strong theoretical basis for examining 
Internet policymaking, combining analyses of power with hypotheses for gov-
ernance emergence and articulation. The insights they provide offer clues for 
critically reviewing the evolution of the field from the early day until today. 
To do that in a structured manner, a complex, original framework of analysis 
is proposed below, followed by a methodological discussion.
Deconstructive Lens
This research situates the evolution of IG amidst global governance processes. 
In doing so, it decentres IR scholarship as all- encompassing and breaks down 
the construction of governance mechanisms and power dynamics at the 
global level. The deconstructive lens applied here opens up global processes to 
the conditions of their construction, disentangling inherent ambiguities and 
social positioning over time. It also unpacks processes of meaning- making 
within communities via dominant practices, taking into account the distri-
bution of power and related discontinuities, as well as contradictions and 
equivalents in the inner workings of the field.
Initially investigating the relationship between text and meaning, decon-
structive approaches tackle the simultaneous process of undoing and af-
firming. Dismantling conceptual oppositions and systems of thought is at 
its core. Deconstruction comes to IR from linguistics, but has subsequently 
been applied across a wide number of disciplines, from anthropology to legal 
studies. In this expansion, deconstruction acquired a much broader meaning; 
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its use was also refined to reflect the many ways in which conceptual bound-
aries are drawn when applied to new contexts. At its core, this approach chal-
lenges assumptions of universality, ahistoricity, and stability.
Thinking about IG in deconstructive terms helps us to identify and trace 
tensions at the macro level, while acknowledging the fundamental ways in 
which our understanding is dependent on the visible side of governance, cap-
tured in formalized processes. Moving beyond that, this is an exercise in ana-
lysing how the social space for political struggles is structured, how outcome 
documents are produced and by whom. Such a reading of events and mean-
ings is necessarily a work in progress, in particular as the constitution of the 
IG field is ongoing.
Evolution of Concerns over Time
In spite of the regular reference to the ‘Internet’ as a single unit in everyday 
speech, this complex network is made up of a number of subfields of govern-
ance, ranging from highly technical specifications to socio- economic elem-
ents. The fast evolution towards understanding the Internet as a policy field 
meant that issues related to infrastructure and standards soon came to be 
regarded as matters of public interest, independent of the sphere of authority 
under which they were placed. While there is still a functional separation 
in the work of relevant institutions, it has become difficult to provide a dis-
crete analysis of the Internet without a close investigation of its composite 
structure.
As a first step in the deconstructive approach taken here, the singling out 
of subfields of governance allows for a topical separation of the issues under 
discussion in IG. Growing from a small network to a global political arena 
took a number of developments that were mirrored in the policy debates of 
the time, be it for protocols, digital divide, or connectivity in developing 
countries. The multiple uses of technology also forced a diversification of ap-
proaches and, recently, a cross- sectoral understanding of the issues, given that 
a strict segmentation was no longer possible in a digitized space.
Chartering the field represents a first stage in the situated analysis of 
actors, issues, institutional mandates, or key developments. Mapping exer-
cises have been particularly prevalent in IG. On the academic level, the most 
comprehensive mapping exercise was done by Jovan Kurbalija (2005) in his 
book, Introduction to Internet Governance, currently in its seventh edition. 
His classification of Internet- related issues, divided originally into five bas-
kets (infrastructure and standardization, security, legal, economic, and socio-
cultural), evolved over time to include two additional ones:  human rights 
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and development. This has been closely mirrored in the United Nations 
Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) Mapping 
exercise in late 2014, which provided an opportunity for stakeholders to com-
ment and review.
Here, I take a historical perspective of the evolution of concerns over time 
and, with inspiration from the study mentioned earlier, I provide a classifica-
tion along six dimensions. In a nutshell, the topics covered in Internet- related 
global discussions advanced from the preoccupation for interconnecting 
computers to ensuring the security of information flows. Once the Internet 
expanded globally, legal issues came under the spotlight, starting with a focus 
on protecting intellectual property rights and, later, on clarifying jurisdic-
tional issues. The e- commerce boom at the end of the 1990s launched what 
came to be referred to as the ‘digital economy’, in which the largest propor-
tion of the market had an online component. In the mid- 2000s, global atten-
tion shifted to development issues in connection with access to the Internet, 
which led to the formulation of an ‘ICT for development’ (ICT4D) agenda. 
Civil liberties also gained stronger ground during the last decade, including 
a push for considering Internet access a fundamental right and for affording 
the same protection online as offline for human rights. An overview of the 
various clusters of concern for IG is provided below.
Infrastructure and Critical Internet Resources
Technical resources were originally in focus as the TCP/ IP protocol, the do-
main name system, and the root zone came under discussion by an inter-
national group, beyond the original team at ARPANET. Instant connectivity 
is what makes the Internet so valuable, and that relies on the submarine cable 
infrastructure, the technical standards and protocols ensuring interoperability, 
and the content and applications layer that users come into contact with 
daily. Historically, a large part of the critical Internet resources was placed 
on the American territory and control was retained by the US government 
over a number of key network functions, generating important controversies 
leading to the structuration of the field.
The prerogative of the technical community working for ARPA was the 
development of open standards and protocols for improving the network, but 
as soon as this became a dominant activity for the flourishing of the private 
sector, a few technical limitations were imposed. Recently, this prolific area of 
policymaking has seen debates in three new areas: (1) network neutrality— 
the principle that all data should be treated in a non- discriminatory way on 
the Internet pipes without a differentiated price tag per service; (2)  cloud 
computing— the server farms enabling users to access and synchronize data 
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and programs over the internet beyond their local computing and storage; 
and (3) Internet of Things— the omnipresent connectivity of devices and ap-
pliances able to exchange with one another, whether in the form of smart 
watches or smart cities. Last, but not least, regulators have shown a renewed 
interest in infrastructure and critical resources and started observing code for 
their regulatory practices. A so- called ‘turn to infrastructure’ in public pol-
icymaking has been recently documented by IG scholars (deNardis 2009; 
Brown and Marsden 2013; Musiani et al. 2015).
Cybersecurity
Computer security concerns attracted public attention in the early 1980s, 
when the first cyber viruses were developed (Nye 2011, 3); by the mid- 1990s, 
‘recreational hackers’ made the phenomenon more widespread (Sommer and 
Brown 2011). Yet, cybersecurity discussions have only been placed on global 
agendas in the post- Cold War context (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009), 
gaining prominence in the late 1990s. The availability, integrity, authenti-
cation, or confidentiality of information systems was subsequently tested via 
malware, cyberattacks, probes, and even physical shutdowns, moving the 
public debates from spam to mass- surveillance.
The debate over ensuring protection online has also underlined that the 
current infrastructure of the Internet does not contain embedded security 
guarantees since, due to its original design, it was built as a network to facili-
tate access and information sharing (Markoff 2012). The rules and behaviour 
cues embedded in the written computer code did not prevent the misuse of 
such information for illicit or extortive purposes. The dangers posed by the 
virtual environment remain a major source of contention in international 
affairs; journalists and researchers highlight either the menace of a ‘digital 
Pearl Harbor’ (Bendrath 2003) or the ‘unsubstantiated nature of cyber threats’ 
(Dunn Cavelty and Rolofs 2010). A number of related subfields have thus 
come into being, such as critical infrastructure protection, cybercrime and 
cyberespionage, and child online protection.
Legal Issues
Legal issues came to be discussed on the international regulatory agenda 
when the practice of cybersquatting domain name registrations became per-
vasive at the end of the 1990s (Litman 2000). Primarily oriented towards the 
protection of intellectual property rights in the early days, the legal concerns 
expanded to regulatory mechanisms for Internet transactions, jurisdictional 
disputes, and arbitration. As a prosperous market was developing, the im-
portance afforded to legal aspects grew. Alongside copyright and trademark 
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issues, the focus included the liability of private intermediaries and the dele-
gation of legal responsibilities to non- state actors.
The role of the courts surfaced in recent years as a counterbalancing act 
to the myriad of private developments supported by an ever- more powerful 
underlying infrastructure. New technologies built on top of the Internet, ran-
ging from the Internet of Things to artificial intelligence (AI), have challenged 
traditional understanding of laws in the offline environment and continue to 
raise concern about the ability of the current global system to respond effect-
ively to novel challenges.
Digital Economy
From the mid- 1990s’ e- commerce boom to the full- fledged development of 
the digital economy, a consolidation of public trust in online services was 
essential, in part ensured technically through the use of encryption and e- 
signatures for securing transactions, but also through a number of consumer 
protection measures and competition policies. Beyond the move of commer-
cial products and services online, the Internet also facilitated the creation of 
new markets such as those for domain names, software development, or cyber 
insurance, for which specific regulation is discussed, for example in taxation. 
The most significant change in the new economy has been in digital adver-
tising and the biggest Internet companies are currently leading in terms of 
market capitalization.
Technical innovation also gave way to decentralized economic models that 
bypass the authority of a credible intermediary or a central bank, be it in the 
operation of the famous cryptocurrency Bitcoin or in the automated exe-
cution of digital contracts. ‘Sharing economy’ business models thriving on 
ease of access and network effects now compete with traditionally regulated 
services such as the taxi, hospitality, or delivery services. These novel busi-
ness models enabled by digital platforms feature a great dependence on user 
data as the most valuable asset, with their strengths residing in the real- time 
analysis of tremendous amount of (mainly cross- border) data. The new eco-
nomics is as much about digital information as it is about building monop-
olies on top of it.
Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D)
Ever since the early debates on connectivity, the role of ICTs in international 
development continued to be mainstreamed. The ideal of an inclusive in-
formation society was met in practice with highly uneven patterns of ac-
cess to technologies, only diminished via the massive adoption of mobile 
Internet across developing countries. From the early days of telecentres to the 
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empowerment of communities of innovators outside of the developed world, 
the digital revolution was closely linked to developments in e- government, 
education, agriculture, or health, also highlighted in the Millennium 
Development Goals.
When the ICT agenda came to be discussed in tandem with the situation 
of developing countries at the World Summit on the Information Society 
(2003– 05), the digital divide was singled out as the main concern. Access 
to the Internet was still unevenly distributed across countries and its con-
tent did not reflect the world’s cultural diversity. Promotion and training for 
developing e- skills, as well as multilingual, localized content became a pri-
ority. The global network enabled online education, but did not fully reach 
the vulnerable communities. The mixed impact of capacity building and 
technical assistance programmes, as well as the plethora of unsuccessful pri-
vate sector- led connectivity experiments led to renewed calls for prioritizing 
marginalized groups and areas in the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda.
Civil Liberties
Civil liberties, among the thorniest issues of the last decade in Internet- related 
discussions, became more difficult to disentangle from other issues as it be-
came mainstreamed in Internet- related activities. It incorporates topics such 
as privacy and data protection, freedom of expression, and identity politics. 
A ‘rights’ framing has been adopted across the board for addressing substan-
tive issues (deNardis 2010), also supported by the unanimous recognition, in 
the UN General Assembly, that the same rights that people have offline must 
also be protected online.
The decentralized structure of the Internet allows for mobilization in fa-
vour of democratic ideals and civil liberties at various levels. The possibility to 
document, communicate in real- time, and share information about human 
rights entitlements and abuses has altered the way in which we conceive of the 
digital environment. On various occasions, though, surveillance, deliberate 
distortions and disruptions, malicious interference, and the undermining of 
liberties- driven processes were enabled by the network. New safeguards and 
digital rights are currently under discussion, as civil liberties continue to lead 
the civil society global agenda.
Chronicling the evolution of Internet- related subtopics raises an important 
question: how do these subfields come together to form an autonomous field 
of IG? For a long time perceived as an ungoverned space, the Internet is in-
creasingly regulated by a multitude of actors, though high- impact decisions 
at different levels. The strong push to agree on specific principles, norms, and 
regulations for e- commerce or cybersecurity is indicative of broader power 
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struggles that influence the social positioning in the field and beyond. While 
different trajectories are possible for the evolution of a field, rule- creation 
practices and their subsequent redefinition or readjustment are at the core of 
governance articulation and constitute the focus of this book, based on the 
framework proposed below.
An Analytical Framework for Internet Governance
Operating at the level of setting the rules of the game, global governance 
systematically combines various dimensions of state and non- state regula-
tion and different modalities to achieve that. Various mechanisms— formal 
or informal— are deployed to create a new ordering that shapes and defines 
expectations for the actors in the field, be it by controlling, directing, or regu-
lating influence (Biersteker 2010). Drawing on three key themes ensuing 
from the review of IR and IG repertoires, I  conclude that insufficient at-
tention has been paid to how governance comes into being across different 
issue domains. In the absence of a systematic investigation of the genesis, the 
scattered explanations put forward support one of the four main assump-
tions: functional needs, powerful state thesis, private initiative, or informal 
mechanisms. Taking origins for granted has direct consequences on the way 
in which the articulation of governance is understood. This second critique is 
also pertinent here: the minimal attention paid to comprehensive, long- term, 
empirically grounded studies of issue domains only gives us a patchy, often-
times static view of the enactment of governance.
In the creation of a global field of action, the patterns of governance and 
shifts in priorities are illustrative of the extent to which global rule- making 
generates debates, requires joint effort, or relies on targeted action (e.g. spe-
cific regulatory responses). Where political decisions are required, the choice 
between equally viable alternatives will determine the main actors to pos-
ition themselves in relation to the governance space and the object of ruling. 
Unlike the rather narrow technical or business decisions, which may or may 
not be the result of negotiation across a set of institutions, the global rules 
decided in collective arenas become constitutive of the domain and (re)define 
the field- specific interplay.
The characteristics of an issue area will define the type of rules set in place 
at different points in time. As the discussion above shows, the multiple topic 
areas covered in IG discussions require differentiated approaches, resulting 
from the pursuit of different objectives, strategies, and instruments of govern-
ance. For the Internet, technical specificities determine the extent to which 
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action can be taken on the network. To move packets of data from one com-
puter to another, standards and protocols are essential. Developing in parallel 
or intersecting and evolving over time, various mechanisms of governance 
applicable to the Internet take the technical delimitations as their starting 
point. Two other dimensions are integrated throughout: actors and anchoring 
practices of governance.
Mechanisms of Governance
Despite its wide appeal, the concept of ‘mechanism of governance’ poses for-
midable difficulties to the researcher. To pin it down, I  use the soft– hard 
law continuum, recognizing that not all rules carry the same obligations or 
have the same effect. The diversity of mechanisms pursued to steer processes 
essentially describe attachments to one of the dominant features of global 
ordering, which may involve formal and informal institutions or networks, 
already in place or newly formed. Importantly, different mechanisms of gov-
ernance have funding attached to them, ranging from minimal to substantive. 
The study of mechanisms of governance presented here is based on an ex- post 
analysis of 311 authoritative governance instruments set in place between 
1969 and 2015, complemented by an analysis of current trends in Chapter 6.
To understand which mechanisms are at work for particular subfields, 
I take governance instruments as my entry point, relying on formalized out-
comes only. This gives me a uniform proxy for the approaches undertaken 
to creating rules for governing the Internet, be they legally enshrined or not. 
I subsequently cluster and categorize them to reveal the mechanisms they il-
lustrate. The database thus constructed allows for exploring the governance 
patterns, shifts, and variation over time. One of the salient differences be-
tween the global structuring and the mechanisms of governance specific to 
the Internet is that the former defines, constrains, and shapes the environ-
ment of the latter. In this study, the global context is not taken for granted; 
it is problematized to reveal the external shocks and critical junctures that 
influence the field.
A second important difference is that mechanisms operate differently 
with respect to intentionality. Technical rules serve a functional purpose: en-
suring that the network is functional and that it remains stable over time. 
Related decisions might comprise international standards, protocols, agree-
ments, and contracts for delegating particular functions to various entities. 
Private corporate policies and practices, on the other hand, embed a profit- 
driven logic and are generally based on a contractual relationship. Peer- to- 
peer agreements, exchange contracts, the management of big data, content 
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development, business plans and strategies, corporate policies, and end- user 
contracts, firmly regulate interactions among various actors and have long- 
term effects. However, unlike standards, most of these remained concealed 
by confidentiality provisions and are generally not available in the public 
domain.
The contentious, reputational, and benefactor actions that companies and 
technical bodies tackle in the public domain are the upshot of a core interest 
in participating in defining the ‘rules of the game’. The result of shorter or 
longer negotiation processes, such steering mechanisms are fundamental for 
the constitution of an issue domain. On a continuum from hard (treaties and 
conventions) to soft (declarations, non- binding resolutions, codes of con-
duct) law, the resulting mechanisms generally pertain to public policy, com-
munity formation, and field constitution.
Rather than providing ex ante a theoretical segmentation of potential IG 
patterns, I give preference in this study to an inductive approach based on 
the relations revealed by the dataset, further discussed in the research design 
section. Suffice it to say at this point that this strategy, stressing the func-
tional side of constituting new issue domains, is complemented by insights 
on power distribution captured in the historical analysis. From the literature 
review and in combination with the data recorded for this study, a tripartite 
categorization of mechanisms of governance emerged.
Legal enshrinement, covering:
 • treaties, conventions, and binding agreements;
 • court judgments, policies, legislation, directives with global or regional effects.
Institutional solidification, covering:
 • specialized bodies, ranging from developing a specialized division within 
an organization to a dedicated procedure or initiative for an emergent 
Internet- related topic;
 • strategic frameworks/ agenda/ action plans;
 • monitoring and benchmarking tools:  benchmarking, ranking, global data-
base, monitoring directory/ index).
Modelling, covering:
 • discursive actions: guiding principles, charters, codes of conduct, principles, 
dynamic coalitions documents, resolutions, high- level statements, (final) 
declarations;
 • operative guidance: recommendations, toolkits, model laws, guidelines, im-
plementation alliances, model frameworks.
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Legal enshrinement refers to instruments that have a binding effect on the 
signatories. They are generally initiated (and subsequently signed) by states or 
issued by a public authority such as a court or a supra- national body. Given 
their particular status under international law, treaties, conventions, and re-
lated agreements (e.g. protocols) are only open to state actors. In contrast, 
court judgments, directives, and binding policies and legislation may target 
private actors too, while preserving the requirement for a compulsory action.
At the other end of the spectrum, modelling is generally associated with 
non- binding commitments formally announced. Their purpose may range 
from indicating a stakeholder’s position to shaping the behaviour and trig-
gering actions by other actors (e.g. setting a standard for the sector). An 
important distinction is made here between discursive modelling, relying 
extensively on statements and declarations, and operative guidance tools, 
which consist of practical recommendations, guidelines, and model docu-
ments. Different from the legal enshrinement mechanisms, modelling instru-
ments offer more flexibility and are the result of shorter negotiation processes. 
Depending on the degree of sophistication, they might require the participa-
tion of multiple actors either at the creation or at the implementation stage 
or in both. Importantly, mechanisms focusing on modelling are open to all 
actors, from technical bodies and academia to civil society groups and cor-
porate players.
In between these two broad mechanisms we can place a third one, namely 
institutional solidification, the result of efforts to render a procedure, working 
group, or concern (more) permanent. Attaching a form of institutional de-
sign to a process leaves a trace on the global governance spectrum. Generally 
involving at least a person on a payroll, or a small secretariat, instances of 
institutional solidification can also be divided according to intentionality and 
scope of actions: specialized bodies refer to expert work coordinated in a struc-
tured manner (e.g. Committee for Science and Technology for Development, 
Article 29 Working Party); strategic frameworks, plans of action, and global 
agenda set objectives for collective work and, more often than not, have 
funding attached to them; monitoring and benchmarking tools commonly 
require iterative processes (annual rankings, global database updates, etc.) and 
require a longer- term financial commitment. The mechanisms of institutional 
solidification are open to actors aiming to position themselves uniquely, or at 
least prominently in the governance space.
Actors
Understanding who the key actors are and their position over time is 
a prerequisite for grasping governance patterns, resulting from specific 
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interactions among a multitude of actors, from individual to institutional 
ones. International organizations, states, corporations, technical bodies, and 
civil society groups, while not necessarily unitary actors, follow their specific 
logics and interests. In negotiating the global rules for governing the Internet, 
their intersubjective positioning is essential. The way in which roles are spe-
cified has an impact on power distribution and on how other actors locate 
themselves on the governance spectrum.
The coexistence of various actors in policymaking processes represents 
a key feature of contemporary governance and this is also the case for the 
Internet. The diversion of resources towards IG policies all around the globe 
is a noteworthy transformation, from the early days of the Internet as a sci-
entific project at the US Department of Defense to the myriad of social and 
political programmes currently in place. The explosion of cyber- activities has 
been met by an unprecedented financial commitment of all the actors in-
volved. In hybrid governance configurations, however, it is more difficult to 
establish where the financial power lies and, similarly, to clearly determine the 
accountability links.
Although participation in public consultation or open mailing lists 
is customary in IG (Radu et  al. 2015), decision- making generally rests 
with an institutional actor. In technical standardization issues, this might 
be an organization like the Internet Engineering Task Force or the ITU 
Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU- T); in civil liberties cases, 
it might be a court decision establishing a precedent or a landmark ruling, or 
a company with millions of users implementing an authoritative policy; in 
development, an organization taking the lead on an e- skills programme at the 
regional level or a public institution monitoring multilingual Internet in areas 
with many different local languages.
Beyond the exercise of mapping agency in IG, analysing how stakeholders 
act in new issue domains provides two avenues of inquiry: the first regards 
whether new stakeholders are given central or marginal roles; the second con-
cerns the extent to which they adopt domain- specific approaches, which may 
result in the creation of new institutions or in institutional innovations. In 
many cases, such developments might depend on the leadership and entre-
preneurship of key individuals, while in others they might result from spe-
cific processes of area differentiation or from reactions to critical junctures or 
global trends.
Anchoring Practices
Foundational social practices guide the work of the IG communities. They 
represent an infrastructure of co- creation based on repeated interaction. As 
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the literature highlights, practices remain a stable referent because they stand-
ardize procedures and facilitate categorization and action. In emerging issue 
domains, they constitute meaning- making endeavours without which it is 
impossible to grasp internal dynamics. Moreover, they pattern interactions 
between individuals, forcing them to go back to known, yet hidden, assump-
tions and common denominators.
Yet bringing the ‘invisible’ out into the visible is not an easy task 
methodologically. In global fields that cut across issues and institutions, 
routines are part of political processes involving communication, negoti-
ation, or contestation. A systematic exercise to pin down the authoritative 
forces at work within the communities operating in complex fields such 
as IG exposes the daunting task of capturing interactive processes on the 
move. This is the first time a praxeological lens is applied in a study of IG 
spanning developments over more than four decades.
In the exploration of practices and communities, the positioning of the 
researcher is key to the knowledge one has access to. The selection of events 
and people, as well as our engagement with them (presentations, interactions, 
sharing of ideas and arguments) is never neutral. It generally interferes with 
how routines are conducted, be it by reinforcing them or by challenging 
them. In the tradition of Bourdieu, who perceived knowledge as relational 
and political, researchers need to engage in a ‘sociology of sociology’ and in-
quire about their own position.
Understood as enacted, governance exists through performers. In complex 
issue domains such as the one under investigation here, it is rarely the case 
that a handful of individuals can be actively involved in all relevant processes. 
While individual influence can be identified behind key initiatives, governing 
practices are important when they are transformative beyond singular agency, 
for a particular group or community. The inner logic of enduring routines, 
besides providing the hidden meaning and decoding clues, can also be trans-
lated to shed light on how certain actors are empowered and certain activities 
are legitimized or de- legitimized.
Informed by the theoretical tenets discussed above, the framework of ana-
lysis presented here captures various dimensions along which the govern-
ance of the Internet can be deconstructed. It explains how the modalities, 
mechanisms, and anchoring practices of governance can be disentangled in 
order to grasp the transformations and dominant patterns over time, pro-
viding guidance for the empirical analysis. The research design of this study 
is detailed below.
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Research Design and Methods
To address the challenge of interdisciplinary and ongoing development in 
Internet policymaking, an analytical eclectic approach (Sil and Katzenstein 
2010) is adopted in this book, favouring engagement across various research 
traditions in order to respond to broad research puzzles and real- world com-
plexity. In line with social constructivism, the framework applied here up-
holds the ontological assumption that no single reality exists, meanings and 
representations always being shared or collectively formed (Hughes and 
Sharrock 1997). A single method does not suffice to draw a comprehensive 
picture of the evolution of a field. An empirically informed analysis of how 
governance is articulated throughout distinctive periods requires a longitu-
dinal study and a complex research design. Here, this is achieved by com-
bining historical analysis and empirical insights, two approaches that capture 
sensitively the multiple sociopolitical factors and interactions at work in the 
expansion of a policy field.
Historical Analysis
Neither the Internet, nor its governance structures emerged in a vacuum. 
Historical approaches link the nature of governance arrangements with soci-
etal and economic shifts, providing insights into the degree to which specific 
changes are contingent on global transformations. Critical scholarship gen-
erally employs chronological research to answer the question of ‘how we got 
here’, pointing out the dependency, the paths not taken, and the alternatives. 
A historical reconstruction is also part of a comprehensive periodization ef-
fort, revealing the underpinnings of broad trends usually discussed in the 
lifecycle of an issue domain.
To situate the analysis and explain the emergence of governance, I recon-
struct the early history of the Internet  along sociopolitical lines, drawing 
on a variety of original documents and individual accounts. In contrast to 
other histories of the Internet, this investigation looked specifically at regula-
tory configurations, actors, and anchoring practices over time. The historical 
account reveals that tensions over the development of the Internet have been 
present from the beginning. The use of multiple sources, including personal 
testimonies, allowed for the corroboration and correlation of insights from 
active participants and observers, enriching the perspective presented here 




38 Deconstructing Internet Governance
38
However, such an exercise is by definition partial:  there is ‘no such 
thing as a definitive account of any historical episode’ (Gaddis 2001, 308). 
Despite the recent birth of the Internet, our epistemic access to early de-
velopments is limited, often fragmentary and more focused on techno-
logical aspects, rather than policy considerations. Generally, some Internet 
paternity claims enjoy greater support than others; my historical overview 
addresses this through the examination of multiple independent lines of 
evidence, subsequently compared with testimonies of actors involved in 
those processes.
Secondary sources have long been used in IR as documentary evidence 
(Thies 2002), particularly when the type of investigation is suited for com-
bining materials from different sources. The limitations in such analyses— 
unwarranted selectivity and investigator bias— were overcome in this study 
by relying on primary sources that were as close to the event as possible (ori-
ginal memoranda of understanding, speeches, event transcripts, etc.). The 
input and the complementary information around international negotiations 
and their formal outcomes were just as useful as the texts of the documents 
themselves, and their interpretation was facilitated by the triangulation of 
different sources of information.
In the selection of historical material, consideration was given to alter-
native background narratives, which enable a more rigorous reading of the 
genesis and structuration of a nascent issue domain. Not only does it allow us 
to examine the presence or absence of specific attributes, but it also relies on 
manifest and latent dimensions to explicate the articulation of governance. 
Observing the underlying credo and ideology is accomplished here through 
an analysis of dominant practices, whose methodological underpinnings are 
explained below.
Empirical Analysis
An analysis as comprehensive as the one presented here has not been previ-
ously pursued due to the lack of data and the absence of a systematic concep-
tual framework that permitted a domain- wide scrutiny. With an expanding 
field of governance, the challenge is twofold:  on the one hand, assessing 
the integration of new issues into discussions as they happen is notoriously 
difficult, other than for very narrow reporting purposes; on the other hand, 
such an approach indirectly fixes the boundaries of governance to a spe-
cific moment in time. Contrary to this, what this study aims at is building 
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Dataset and Coding
At the empirical level, the unit of analysis was a governance instrument agreed 
at the regional or global level with lasting impact in that specific subfield. 
Among these, the ‘soft’ governance instruments were the most difficult to 
disentangle, given that modelling activities could take various forms. Ranging 
from voluntary codes of conduct to model laws, the modelling of other actors’ 
behaviour was frequently resorted to in a highly sensitive, political context. 
To avoid the problem of incommensurability, the framework of analysis em-
ployed here proposed the exploration of the same dimensions across time 
and a dialectal basis loyal to the period investigated. The research design put 
forward here included a mapping of the field based on topical issues, as well as 
the construction and analysis of the 311 instruments dataset, complemented 
by insights from daily practices and routines acquired through participant 
observation. These different aspects thus provide us with possibilities to better 
theorize the nature and dynamics of governance across time.
To overcome the limitation of present- day categorization applied at a time 
when certain concepts were not yet in use, I deduced the broad areas of con-
cern historically, investigating the main clusters of issues on which govern-
ance efforts were concentrated without pre- empting variation inside these 
over time. I  then combined that with an outcome- oriented, inductive ap-
proach that takes all governance instruments on selected topics into account. 
In constructing the dataset, I was thus guided by two approaches: deductive 
and inductive. For the latter, I recorded, for each of these sub- areas identi-
fied above, formalized instruments of governance ranging from international 
treaties to voluntary agreements and benchmarking efforts. Cognizant that 
the 311 governance instruments thus arrived at have a different standing and 
cannot be treated in the same way, I used the hard– soft law continuum to 
locate them in broader mechanisms at work.
The extensive data collection exercise was performed between September 
2014 and June 2015 and was based on the initial mapping of the Digital 
Watch observatory and the CSTD mapping exercise. It was later supple-
mented with information regarding ongoing developments until 2016— 
relying on primary sources including original texts of the declarations, 
resolutions, treaties, as well as secondary references to additional materials in 
press releases, meeting minutes, official documents of different organizations, 
reports, and homepages. Developments up until September 2018, discussed 
in Chapter 6, were captured as they happened.
Multiple independent sources were used to cross- validate the relevance 
of the selected instruments including dedicated websites of specific organ-
izations (European Commission, Council of Europe, OECD, OSCE, etc.), 
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specific webpages for global events (Global Conference on Cyberspace, 
Freedom Online Coalition, etc.). This information was complemented 
by selected media reports, both from media outlets (New  York Times, The 
Economist, Financial Times, The Guardian, Washington Post, BBC, Le Monde, 
RFI, China Daily) and IG specific sources, such as the GIP Digital Watch 
newsletter, CircleID, and IPWatch. This cross- validation ensured that im-
portant mechanisms did not fall under the radar. As part of the dataset con-
struction, further operationalization and distinctions were drawn, such as the 
deliberate exclusion of national policies, except where they influenced courses 
of action critical for IG. For each instrument, I recorded the year of adoption, 
instrument and origin, whether it was IG- specific or it tangentially covered 
Internet aspects, whether it was global or regional, and the type of mechan-
isms it was an instance of.
Studying a myriad of governance mechanisms amid ongoing, incomplete 
developments renders some instruments more visible than others. As such, 
this survey, although authoritative and robust, cannot claim to be exhaustive. 
Similarly, some of the temporal inter- linkages were lost due to the nature of 
the exercise: when constructing a database, each instrument was assigned a 
line, rather than being seen as a process; to compensate for this limitation, 
dynamic aspects were brought back into the discussion through historical 
analysis and participant testimonials. The coding process and subsequent cat-
egorization shed light on the variation of key governance mechanisms across 
subfields. Moreover, it provided the tools to study events and conditions at 
the same time, and thus better capture complexity in the IG field. The clus-
tering of mechanisms according to the issues addressed was particularly useful 
for providing a longitudinal perspective on the evolution of concerns, as dis-
cussed in detail in each of the empirical chapters.
Textual Analysis
In the construction of the dataset, many documents were consulted to clarify 
provisions, mandates, and institutional origin. Some of these were particu-
larly telling of dominant processes in IG, and were thus classified as key texts. 
The selection of texts was further expanded based on the historical overview 
to better understand relevant discourses and narratives explaining how the 
Internet came into being as a global policy field. Occasionally, the texts in-
cluded mailing list discussions, and analysis of transcripts of video interviews 
and meetings conducted by important members of the IG community.
The strategy adopted for textual analysis was a flexible one, zooming in 
when needed to extract particular information of relevance to the histor-
ical narrative or to the argument. Particularly telling were the possibilities 
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to unveil specific language and references to the IG ‘community’. Given the 
long- term perspective of this study, the documents were never analysed in 
isolation from one other.
Participant Observation
Participating directly in IG discussions over the last seven years was key to 
grasping the dynamics and interlinks of this nascent field. I used the exten-
sive knowledge acquired in meetings and policy discussions in Geneva and 
elsewhere to ground this study. My access to these events was facilitated by 
working closely on IG issues in an academic and professional capacity. As 
an IG scholar and practitioner, I was partially immersed in the communities 
I was studying, which allowed me to acquire a broad, evolving understanding 
of the various processes and relationships hard to capture from formal docu-
ments. Beside my participation in conferences, policy meetings, summits, 
and forums, I also attended social events. These allowed me to observe the 
articulation of practices and routines, in particular through recurrent partici-
pation in global meetings such as the IGF, World Summit on Information 
Society Forum, or Internet Society and ICANN meetings.
As a member of relevant communities, negotiating access did not pose prob-
lems; on the contrary, an internalization of procedures and rules of thumb oc-
curred over time. Dissecting the tacit assumptions and understandings was a 
strenuous exercise, once I started penetrating the frames of meaning used by 
those studied. Through their insights, I also gained indirect access to what has 
happened or was happening in meetings I was not physically present in. Their 
interpretation, balanced against a thorough reading of relevant outcome docu-
ments and numerous meeting minutes and transcripts, guided my analysis.
Throughout this period, I also had numerous in- depth conversations with 
relevant stakeholders, both formal and informal, around international IG meet-
ings. Many statements disclosed informally provided insights useful for under-
standing the history of selected practices. Participant observation also allowed 
me to grasp the internal dynamics and comprehend important details about 
organizational aspects, both inside and outside the meeting venues. It also aided 
in locating the positions key players were speaking from and the associated 
dispositional logics. To limit the potential bias from immersion in the IG com-
munity on controversial aspects, I went back to original documents to see the 
exact wording used, informally asked experts about their opinion, and made an 
effort to attend a meeting relevant to that discussion, if it was possible.
This prolonged social interaction with members of the IG communities 
grounded my holistic perspective; it structured the way in which I conceptu-
alized governance as enactment in this book and explains, to a large extent, 
 
42 Deconstructing Internet Governance
42
my focus on anchoring practices spanning more than four decades. In prac-
tice theory, the meaning of routines can only be deciphered if they are both 
alien and native to the interpreter’s own system of meaning. As an insider, 
I gained the practical knowledge and tacit know- how that helped me make 
sense of their strength, while distancing myself enough for a critical reflec-
tion. The critical self- investigation, or ‘reflexivity’, represented a constant 
throughout the writing of this book.
Synopsis
Neither fully public nor fully private, neither entirely structured nor ad- hoc, 
nascent issue areas pose a set of multifaceted analytical and methodological 
challenges. This chapter proposes an inward journey through the literature, 
contextualizing the focus of the current research against the highly frag-
mented global and IG literatures. Although the concept of governance is not 
uniformly defined across these, the main points of convergence relate to dif-
ferent forms and roles of rule- making, authority, and praxis. Despite its wide 
engagement with governance concepts across different traditions, existing 
scholarship offers limited empirical insights on the long- term evolution of 
issue domains, how they are articulated and constituted in particular con-
texts, rather than given.
To conceptualize emergent forms of governance, this study proposes a 
situated analysis that brings together governance shifts, mechanisms, and 
anchoring practices, based on a novel conceptual and methodological frame-
work. Rather than analysing one institution or a group of stakeholders and 
defining the problematique in advance, this study unpacks broad concepts 
into the multiple activities that comprise them, observing their emergence, 
articulation, and displacement or permanentization. Drawing on key tenets 
from the highly fragmented global and IG scholarship, it singles out the 
‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘how’ in the key phases of the development of this field.
Offering a multifaceted exploration of governance, the deconstructive ap-
proach adopted here prioritizes the links between governance structures and 
actors, reflecting on power differentials. The methods used in this exploration 
include historical and empirical approaches that cover, in a granular manner, 
the general and the specific aspects of the three key dimensions elaborated in 
the analytical framework: governing mechanisms, actors, and anchoring prac-
tices. This tripartite structure guides the analysis in the next three chapters.
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 Revisiting the Origins: The Internet and its 
Early Governance
The universe of services, business models, and innovations built on the 
Internet was— and continues to be— made possible by the technical architec-
ture of the network, as well as the political commitment to its development. 
Both of these are tightly linked to the early history of the Internet, which is 
explored in this chapter. The birth of the Internet was the result of a series of 
relatively informal interactions, as part of an academic effort mainly driven 
by computer scientists contracted to work for the US Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA)1 in both technical and leadership positions. The 
early days of the Internet encapsulate much more than prima facie efforts to 
create a physical network of computers able to communicate with each other. 
They also elucidate the origins of governance activities in this field. Various 
functions, performed by different coordination bodies, amounted to direct or 
indirect decision- making with global implications, right from the start. All of 
these pre- date the very concept of ‘Internet governance’ (Abbate 1999), and 
are key to understanding how this field of inquiry emerged.
Contrary to how this may be portrayed nowadays, how the Internet came 
about is not without controversy. As Bing notes, despite its recent birth, the 
history of the Internet is ‘shrouded in myths and anecdotes’ (2009, 8) and 
partisan accounts have become widespread. Goldsmith and Wu talk about 
the Internet pioneers ‘in effect building strains of American liberalism, even 
a 1960s idealism, into the Universal language of the Internet’ (2006, 23). 
McCarthy refers to the ‘creation of an Internet biased towards a free flow of 
information as the product of a culturally specific American context’ (2015, 
92). In this chapter, I explore the lineage of the Internet through construct-
ivist lenses. After outlining the heterogeneity of ideas that stood at the basis 
1 The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) changed its name to Defense Advanced 
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of creating an interconnected network of computers, the development of 
problem- solving working groups is explored, followed by an analysis of the 
political environment that allowed for this network’s expansion. The role of 
the US government in subsidizing developments and encouraging the pri-
vatization of the Internet in the mid- 1990s is discussed subsequently. For 
Abbate, the history of the Internet is ‘a tale of collaboration and conflict 
among a remarkable variety of players’ (1999, 3), but it is also a tale of in-
formal governance, with key individuals and networks at the forefront, as 
presented here.
The global network of networks known as the Internet came out of a 
subsidized project by (D)ARPA and later by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), which funded the ‘NSFNET’, the basis for the current backbone of 
the Internet. Essential Internet Protocols still in use today, including File 
Transfer and TCP/ IP, date all the way back to the ARPANET experiment. 
Developments like the World Wide Web and the Border Control Gateway 
make the Internet a global network able to connect different types of sys-
tems using Internet Protocol datagrams. From laying the infrastructure to 
the content of web applications, the Internet has, from the start, been subject 
to various forms of governance, in addition to being an object of conten-
tion internationally and domestically. The latter is further illustrated by the 
competing projects of the different US agencies, in particular DARPA and 
the NSF.
To reconstruct the political dimensions of the debates around the cre-
ation and design of the Internet, I  draw on a multiplicity of sources and 
historical accounts on both sides of the Atlantic (including scholarly pub-
lications, original documents, and personal conversations) in an attempt to 
provide a full(er) picture of the tensions between the different technological 
camps and the type of action they structured. In this chapter, I divide the 
Internet’s early history into two parts: first, I explore the pre- Internet devel-
opments that established the structural conditions necessary for a computer 
networking experiment. Second, I analyse the TCP/ IP- related developments, 
the distinguishing protocol also known as the ‘Internet’ and delineate its dif-
ferent phases, from ARPANET to NSFNET, looking at the early governance 
practices and formalized arrangements.
Setting the Stage: Pre- Internet Developments
In the 1970s, humankind started to fulfil a long- time aspiration:  a global 
communication network sharing, storing, and sorting the largest amount of 
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information ever amassed. Scientists on both sides of the Atlantic were essen-
tial to the development of the features that constitute the modern Internet. 
Military and political support, extensive funding, light touch management, 
and long- term vision were all required to make this dream a reality. In 1837, 
the British mathematician Charles Babbage proposed a mechanical general- 
purpose computer with integrated memory and conditional branching, 
laying the foundations for modern computers. The invention, which was 
program- controlled by punched cards, was called the Analytical Engine and 
raised great interest in Europe, but not enough funding to ever be completed. 
Working on this with Babbage, Ada Lovelace published in 1862 the first al-
gorithm for implementation on the engine. To show the full potential of the 
programming capacities of the machine, the algorithm was designed to com-
pute Bernoulli numbers, but it never got tested during her lifetime.
Among the first to envision a central repository of human knowledge was 
the British futurist and science fiction author H. G. Wells (1866– 1946), but 
the list of pioneer thinkers is long and spans various disciplines. The American 
librarian and educator Mervil Dewey (1851– 1931) proposed a system of clas-
sification that revolutionized and unified the cataloguing of books across the 
network of US libraries. Still widely deployed around the world, the Dewey 
system uses a topic- based decimal system with further subdivisions. Card 
indexing for easily finding references in book storage and, later on, the idea 
of a ‘universal book’ are credited to the Belgian Paul Otlet (1868– 1944), 
who elaborated on this in his 1934  ‘Traité de documentation:  le livre sur 
le livre, théorie et pratique’. Together with Henri La Fontaine, he created 
the Universal Bibliographic Repertory in 1895 and later worked with Robert 
Goldschmidt to create an encyclopaedia printed on microfilm.
Technical developments during the Second World War also played a crucial 
role in the birth of the Internet. Considered the father of the modern com-
puter, the English mathematician and cryptanalyst Alan Turing developed 
the first electromechanical machine capable of performing multiple program-
mable tasks and learning from the stored information, with inspiration from 
Babbage. Working independently, the German Konrad Zuse developed the 
first programmable computer (Z3) in 1938. The Universal Turing Machine 
was launched in 1939 and laid the foundations for the machine called ‘the 
Bombe’ employed by the British to decipher the encrypted messages of the 
German intelligence.
With the war over in July 1945, Vannevar Bush, then- director of the 
US Office of Scientific Research and Development of the Defence Nuclear 
Research Committee (behind the Manhattan Project), called for a post- war 
research agenda in information management. After coordinating the work 
of more than 6,000 American scientists on transferring advancements from 
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science to warfare, Bush pushed for a concerted effort to make the rapidly 
growing store of knowledge widely and easily accessible. In his 1945 essay ‘As 
We May Think’ published in the Atlantic Monthly, he elaborates on his idea of 
a ‘memex’, a document management system very similar to today’s personal 
computer.
Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private file 
and library. It needs a name, and, to coin one at random, ‘memex’ will do. A memex 
is a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications, 
and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexi-
bility. It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory. (Bush 1945)
To address the concerns of a potential nuclear war, US scientists were preoccu-
pied with finding a solution for long- distance telecommunication within the 
Department of Defense, primarily for linking launch control facilities to the 
Strategic Air Command. The Russian launch of Sputnik I in 1957 brought 
new impetus for funding technological research that could better position the 
United States in space exploration and military command. In 1958, President 
Eisenhower authorized the creation of two special agencies for space research 
under the Department of Defense:  the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and ARPA. ARPA’s original mandate— with an 
initial budget of $520 million— was ‘to prevent technological surprise like 
the launch of Sputnik, which signalled that the Soviets had beaten the US 
into space’, and thus fund universities and research institutions to conduct 
complex research on science and technology useful for the defence industry, 
though not always explicitly linked to military applications.
ARPA, Internetworking, and the Military Agenda
ARPA’s focus on space research faded out shortly after its establishment and the 
agency began working on computer technology. As Stephen J. Lukasik, Deputy 
Director and Director of DARPA between 1967 and 1974, later explained:
The goal was to exploit new computer technologies to meet the needs of military 
command and control against nuclear threats, achieve survivable control of US 
nuclear forces, and improve military tactical and management decision making. 
(Lukasik 2011)
For the first years in ARPA’s operation, efforts were concentrated on computer- 
simulated war games. This changed when Joseph C.  R. (‘Lick’) Licklider 
(1915– 90) joined ARPA in 1962 to lead its newly established Information 
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). Licklider, a Harvard- trained 
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psychologist and computer scientist, published in 1960 his famous paper 
‘Man– Computer Symbiosis’, proposing technology that would ‘enable men 
and computers to cooperate in making decisions and controlling complex 
situations without inflexible dependence on predetermined programs’. In 
1965, Licklider’s ‘Libraries of the Future’ commissioned research introduced 
the concept of digital libraries as ‘procognitive systems’. Building on Bush’s 
memex work, Licklider noted:
the concept of a ‘desk’ may have changed from passive to active:  a desk may be 
primarily a display- and- control station in a telecommunication— telecomputation 
system— and its most vital part may be the cable (‘umbilical cord’) that connects it, 
via a wall socket, into the procognitive utility net. (Licklider 1965, 33)
Under Licklider’s lead at IPTO, the research focus shifted to time- sharing, 
computer language, and computer graphics, and cooperation with computer 
research centres around the United States was prioritized. Licklider referred 
to this cooperation as the ‘Intergalactic Computer Network’— later shortened 
to InterNet. For its implementation, he reached out to a private company 
based in Boston— Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN)— to develop network 
technology.2 Within the span of nine months, BBN, under the lead of Frank 
Heart, built a network of four computers, each operating on a different system 
and using the Interface Message Processors (IMPs). Licklider knew BBN well, 
having served as its vice- president in 1957. To a large extent, the digital dir-
ection chosen by the BBN was his idea: ‘If BBN is going to be an important 
company in the future, it must be in computers’ (Beranek 2005, 10). Frank 
Heart and Licklider were both emeriti alumni of the Lincoln Laboratory. The 
successors of Licklider at the IPTO were hand- picked from the same aca-
demic environment. The first was Ivan Sutherland (1964– 66), who ran the 
IPTO when its budget was approximately $15 million (National Research 
Council 1999, 100), between 1964 and 1966. The second was Lawrence 
Roberts, who came from MIT and the Lincoln Laboratory to IPTO between 
1964 and 1966. The third was Robert Taylor, who formerly worked at NASA, 
taking office with IPTO from 1966 until 1968.
Working independently, in the early 1960s, Paul Baran at the RAND 
Corporation in the United States and Donald Davies at the National Physical 
Laboratory (NPL) in the United Kingdom developed the message block 
system that set the basis of modern packet switching and dynamic routing, 
the foundation of the Internet infrastructure today. Packet switching allowed 
for breaking a message into smaller blocks of data that Davies called ‘packets’ 
2 All major telecom and computer companies dismissed the idea when he presented it in front 
of 100 business representatives.
48 Revisiting the Origins
48
and for routing them separately (‘switch’) via the network, yet ready to be 
recomposed by the computer at the receiving end. The significance of this 
breakthrough was compared to the advent circuit switching system used in 
the early days of the telephone, which enabled telephone exchanges— with 
human operators manually connecting calls— to create a single continuous 
connection between two telephones.
Baran’s three- fold categorization of communications networks— 
centralized, decentralized, and distributed networks— set the stage for fu-
ture work. Baran conducted the largest part of this work while employed 
by RAND from 1959 to roughly 1962. Although his ideas— summarized in 
eleven reports and supported by mathematical evidence and graphs— were 
never implemented, they were later picked up by ARPA scientists (Shapiro 
1967). A key advancement in computing came from MIT in 1961, when the 
time- sharing mechanism became operational, allowing several users to share 
the capacities of a single computer, which were full- room machines at the 
time. That same year, MIT’s Leonard Kleinrock completed his PhD thesis on 
packet switching, proposing the transmission of data by dividing messages 
into smaller ‘chunks’ lined up at the nodes of a communication system based 
on two principles: demand access and distributed control (Kleinrock 1962). 
Originally, advanced level work like Kleinrock’s was funded through the 
division of mathematical sciences, yet as of 1970, the theoretical computer 
science program was born as the NSF established its Office of Computing 
Activities. By 1980, the NSF already funded around 400 individual projects 
in computational theory. Alongside DARPA, it became the main source of 
funding for computing research during that decade.
ARPANET, its Alternatives and Successors
The first operational packet switching network was ARPANET, a project 
started with a budget of $1  million at ARPA. A  plan to experiment with 
connecting sixteen sites (ARPANET) across the United States was revealed at 
the 1967 symposium of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) 
in Tennessee. A  year later, ARPA funded its first graduate student confer-
ence at the University of Illinois, inviting a few students from each university 
working on computing research to cross- fertilize ideas. By 1968, to document 
the work undertaken on the ARPANET, a fast- paced experimentation net-
work, the Network Working Group (NWG) was established under the lead-
ership of Steve Crocker from UCLA.3 On 7 April 1969, Crocker sent the first 
3 Among these experiments was also a failed attempt to link computers on the campus at UCLA 
in 1968 (under the direction of Ivan Sutherland and Bob Taylor).
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Request for Comments (RFC) to the other NWG participants using conven-
tional mail. On 2 September 1969, the BBN Interface Message Processor was 
connected to UCLA.4 According to Crocker (2012), the RFC was initially 
thought of as a temporary tool to share information, independent of the level 
of formality envisioned for each document.
Beyond documentation purposes, the RFCs also embedded a ‘hope to 
promote the exchange and discussion of considerably less than authoritative 
ideas’ (Crocker 1969). In December 1970, the NWG completed the first 
interconnection protocol, the Network Control Protocol (NCP). The proto-
cols used started to be documented in a series called RFCs, which became the 
standard decision- making procedure in the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), a body created in 1986 to oversee the development of protocols for 
the first layer of internetworking. Over time, the RFC became an anchoring 
practice around which the community coalesced, as discussed towards the 
end of this chapter.
On 29 October 1969, the first ARPANET link was established between 
UCLA and the Stanford Research Institute. The latter remains central to the 
history of ARPANET, hosting the first formal coordination body, the Network 
Information Center (NIC) established in 1971 at the SRI Augmentation 
Research Center (Engelbart’s lab) in Menlo Park, California. Starting in 
1972, it was led by Elizabeth J. Feinler, known as ‘Jake’, who managed it 
under a contract with the Department of Defense (DoD). In its early days, 
the NIC handled user services (via phone and conventional mail at first) and 
maintained a directory of people (‘white pages’), resources (‘yellow pages’), 
and protocols. Once the network expanded, the NIC started registering ter-
minals and financial information, such as auditing and billing.
A number of Internet pioneers discussed the open, relaxed atmosphere 
of work at the outset,5 rather unusual under contracts with the DoD. The 
involvement of young graduates on par with military staff indicated the im-
portance given to the experiment. As only a small number of people had 
access to this project, no in- built security was prioritized in the early days of 
the network. Notably, ARPANET was not restricted to military use. Access 
to the network was limited to ARPA contractors, yet those who had permis-
sion to work were not under rigorous scrutiny. Nonetheless, there was a clear 
recognition among researchers and especially among managers that what was 
4 Kleinrock’s early development of packet switching theory determined the choice for the first 
node on the ARPANET: his Network Measurement Center at UCLA.
5 As Crocker (2012) recalled: ‘We were a group of young graduates . . . we were handed the task 
of trying to see what to do with this network that was going to be given to us, or imposed on us, 
depending on your point of view, so we had to organize from scratch. And it was an interesting tech-
nical challenge, open field, I mean no direction.’
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at stake was more than the development of a research network, as Lukasik 
revealed:
So in that environment, I would have been hard pressed to plow a lot of money 
into the network just to improve the productivity of the researchers. The rationale 
just wouldn’t have been strong enough. What was strong enough was this idea that 
packet switching would be more survivable, more robust under damage to the net-
work . . . So I can assure you, to the extent that I was signing the checks, which I was 
from 1967 on, I was signing them because that was the need I was convinced of. 
(Waldrop 2001, 279– 80)
Despite its heavy DoD funding, ARPANET never functioned as a military 
network in the strict sense, with the exception of a few international con-
nections, such as the one with Norway, limited to defence use. As Townes 
(2012) shows, some elements of the research conducted at the time on 
ARPANET were kept outside of the reports to the funding authorities. For 
example, the transnational spread of the network was constantly minim-
ized in order to stay within the scope of the military mandate. The British 
and Norwegian nodes of the network were not represented in one of the 
most reproduced maps of the ARPANET published in 1985, and a foot-
note explained that experimental satellite connections were not shown on 
the map. Back in 1972, the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) es-
tablished another packet switching network— WIN— used for operational 
command and control purposes. It was around that time that the idea of 
transferring control of ARPANET to a private organization consolidated 
(Abbate 1999).
The work environment remained open all throughout the ARPANET 
experiment, with scientists taking the lead for developments and funding 
streams. Part of it had to do with the research tradition and the technical chal-
lenges, meaning that there were frequent exchanges about what worked, what 
had to be fixed, and what could be improved. The developments that would 
come on top of this were not envisioned at that point, therefore the scientists 
working on it preferred an open format (Crocker 2012). However, political 
sensitivities existed; some were carefully mediated by those in charge, as an 
endeavour to create a community of practice that gave no attention to what 
was happening outside the technical space. As Elizabeth Feinler explains:
In the early days we put out the directory, which was sort of a phone book of the 
internet. And there were a lot of military people, there were a lot of graduate students, 
so there was a spectrum of users and developers. In the 1970s, there were [ . . . ] lots of 
strong feelings about the Vietnam war and what not. So I took it upon myself not to 
put anybody’s title in the directory, so that meant that everyone was talking to every-
body and they didn’t know whom they were talking to. (Feinler 2012)
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While the concept of internetworking was developed at ARPA (Leiner et  al. 
2009), linking computers in a network was an experiment tried in several other 
parts of the world, most importantly in France and the United Kingdom, where 
packet switching technologies were tested in the early 1970s. In 1971, plans 
for a European Informatics Network for research and scientific purposes under 
the direction of Derek Barber from NPL were announced by the European 
Common Market. That same year, at the French Research Laboratory IRIA, 
Louis Pouzin launched the Cyclades packet switched system based on datagrams. 
Despite concrete advancements in Pouzin’s project, the funding from the French 
government was discontinued at the end of 1978.
The ARPANET project provided inspiration for a number of similar projects 
in other parts of the world. While physical connections were only established dir-
ectly with Europe (first with Norway and the United Kingdom), academic net-
works were set up in Australia and later in Japan. By 1980, six main networking 
experiments were underway6 and by 1988 their number more than doubled.
While the overwhelming majority had an academic purpose, the networks 
were generally subsidised by states. A few internetworking experiments, such 
as USENET, EUNET, BITNET, FIDONET, and EARN received direct user 
contributions.
In October 1972, scientists working on packet switching networks on 
both sides of the Atlantic convened at the first International Conference on 
Computer Communication held in Washington. ARPANET was successfully 
tested publicly, connecting twenty- nine sites in a demonstration organized by 
Robert E. Kahn of BBN (Townes 2012, 49). A group of network designers 
volunteered to explore how these networks could be interconnected in the 
framework of a newly established International Packet Network Working 
Group (INWG), similar to the ARPANET NWG, using the request for com-
ments format for distributing the INWG notes. DARPA’s Larry Roberts pro-
posed to share the notes via the ARPANET NIC, and Vint Cerf, a graduate 
student working on one of the first ARPANET nodes at UCLA, volunteered 
to be temporary chairman. The group divided into two subgroups to con-
sider ‘Communication System Requirements’ and ‘HOST- HOST Protocol 
Requirements’. In June 1973, the first international node to the ARPANET 
was established, via satellite link, at Kjeller in Norway, in turn providing a 
cable link to University College London in the United Kingdom shortly after 
(Bing 2009).7
6 This included NPLNET in the United Kingdom, ARPANET, SATNET, and USENET in the 
United States, CYCLADES in France, CERNet as a joint research initiative of European govern-
ments at CERN in Geneva.
7 For a discussion about the spread of TCP/ IP along Cold War lines, see Townes (2012).
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In 1972, Robert Kahn joined the ARPA team to develop network tech-
nologies and to initiate the billion- dollar Strategic Computing Program, 
the largest computer research and development program funded by the US 
government. Kahn played a key role in the development of the ARPANET 
and is credited for the open- architecture networking and for coining the 
phrase ‘National Information Infrastructure’. In 1973, together with Cerf, 
by then an assistant professor at Stanford, Kahn developed the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), which encapsulated and decapsulated messages sent 
over the network, with gateways able to read the capsules, but not the con-
tent, decrypted only on end- computers. This protocol, meant to replace the 
ARPANET’s original NCP, was presented in the paper published in April 
1974 and entitled ‘A Protocol for Packet Networks Intercommunication’. 
Working on the datagram network and a connectionless packet switching 
protocol, the French scientist Louis Pouzin joined Vint Cerf and his col-
leagues at INWG to propose a transport protocol across different networks. 
In 1975, they submitted their proposal to the standard- setting body in 
charge of telecommunications, the International Telegraph and Telephone 
Consultative Committee (CCITT).
Private Initiative and Competing Protocols
In parallel with the work conducted at ARPA, major computer companies 
in the United States proposed their own proprietary products, such as 
IBM’s Systems Network Architecture, Xerox’s Network Services, or Digital 
Equipment Corporation’s DECNET, which were all in operation in the mid- 
1970s. It is around that time that IBM, Xerox, and several national European 
post, telephone, and telegraph organizations (PTT)— functioning as mon-
opolies at the national level— proposed their own packet- switched common- 
user data networks, for example in the United Kingdom, France, and Norway. 
These were based on ‘virtual circuits’, able to make use of the routines of 
circuit switching employed by telephone exchanges. The virtual circuits so-
lution and TCP/ IP had a different architecture and were proposed by dis-
tinct groups of specialists:  on the one hand, there were the engineers and 
scientists that worked on voice telecommunications; on the other, computer 
scientists explored data traffic via the transmission control protocol. Their ref-
erences and terminology were different, they attended different conferences 
and they read other journals. There was scepticism in both camps regarding 
the technological upgrades needed to make packets communicate effectively.
In 1977, representatives of the British computer industry, supported by the 
US and French representatives, called for the establishment of a committee 
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for packet switching standards within the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), an independent nongovernmental association whose 
work did not focus exclusively on telecommunications. The Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) committee was set in place and led by Charles 
Bachman, the American developer of a database management system called 
Integrated Data Store. After long negotiations, two camps consolidated 
within the OSI committee: on one side, Bachman and former members of 
the INWG pushed for the Pouzin- inspired connectionless protocols, whereas 
the IBM representatives and some of the industry delegates favoured the ‘vir-
tual circuits’ option. Their proposed interconnection solution, designed as 
a universal standard, was published by the CCITT in its Recommendation 
X.25 and became the international standard. This standard required a reli-
able network, unlike what Cerf and Pouzin proposed. Their solution did not 
place any substantial function on the network and ensured that processing 
was performed directly at the edges, on end- computers (McCarthy 2015). 
The work on the TCP continued amidst international negotiations for the 
adopted standards.
At the outset, the developments at ARPA and those originating in pri-
vate computer labs remained completely separate. A few years passed before 
the important advances in different camps would converge, in particular to 
bridge the private– public gap. The email system was developed by Raymond 
Tomlinson from BBN in 1972, while the Ethernet system was the outcome 
of the work of Robert Metcalfe8 and his team at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research 
Center in 1977. That year, the Apple II personal computer (PC) was launched 
at the West Coast Computer Fair, offering, for the first time, a ready- made 
unit,9 easy to access and operate. The Apple II PC was accompanied by a ref-
erence manual detailing its source code and providing machine specifications. 
This trend for publishing the source code was also followed by IBM, when 
their first PC was released in 1981 (Ryan 2010). A number of other services 
were made available to go along with developments in PCs, including net-
work mailing lists and multiplayer games (e.g. Adventure). The first mobile 
phones were also developed in the 1970s. Moreover, the UNIX operating 
system, with its kernel in C programming, was publicly released outside the 
AT&T’s Bell Labs in October 1973 and became widely adopted by program-
mers as a portable, multitasking, and multi- user configuration.
By the mid- 1970s, a number of technical breakthroughs from pri-
vate labs started to be integrated into ARPANET through its contractor 
8 Metcalfe was the graduate student who connected the MIT site to ARPANET.
9 Prior to the Apple II computer, PC manufacturers were selling parts to be assembled, meaning 
that access was also restricted to the technical savvy.
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network. Among these, the case of the UNIX operating system is poignant. 
UNIX was developed at Bell Labs in the early 1970s and quickly became 
widespread in universities as its source code was made available, allowing 
computer scientists to experiment with different features. In 1975, Ken 
Thompson from Bell Labs took a sabbatical as visiting professor at Berkeley, 
where he contributed to installing Version 6 Unix and began a Pascal im-
plementation project on computers bought with money from the Ingres 
database project. Version 6 UNIX was further developed by two graduate 
students, Chuck Haley and Bill Joy, and publicly released as part of the 
Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) in 1978. By 1981, (D)ARPA was 
funding the Computer Systems Research Group at UC- Berkeley to produce 
a version of BSD that would integrate TCP/ IP, to be released publicly in 
August 1983.
Similarly, the Data Encryption Standard developed at IBM for businesses 
received the endorsement of the National Bureau of Standards in 1977, 
making available to a wider public what was formerly proprietary informa-
tion. Local area networks such as Ethernet and dial- up connections at a max-
imum speed of 64 Kbps became more widely spread in the 1980s. In 1981, 
IBM started selling their first PC with the following specifications: 4.77 MHz 
Intel 8088 microprocessor, 16 kb of memory (expandable to 256 k), two 
160 k floppy disk drives, and an optional colour monitor. Its price started at 
US$1,565 and it was the ‘first to be built from off- the- shelf parts and mar-
keted by outside distributors’ (Bing 2009, 34).
As access to computers grew, the OSI work got rapid traction among com-
puter vendors like IBM and garnered political support from national gov-
ernments, including from the European Economic Community. By 1985, 
CERN opened a ‘TCP/ IP Coordinator’ position as part of a formal agree-
ment, which restricted the use of TCP/ IP to the CERN site and mandated 
the ISO protocol for external connections (until 1989). According to Ben 
Segal, who occupied the position until 1988, the Internet protocol was intro-
duced at CERN a few years before via the Berkeley UNIX system. Around 
that time, CERN became the Swiss backbone for USENET, the UNIX users’ 
network that carried most of the email and news between the US side and the 
European side, EUnet.
Notably, the US government was also among the first adopters of the OSI 
standard. In 1985, two years after the publication of the ISO 7498 inter-
national standard, the US National Research Council recommended that the 
ARPANET move from TCP/ IP to OSI; by the same token, in 1988, the 
Department of Commerce requested that the OSI standard be implemented 
on all US government computers after August 1990.
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TCP/ IP and the Birth of the Internet
As of 1977, the TCP was used for cross- network connections at ARPA. The 
Internet Protocol (IP) was added a year later to facilitate the routing of mes-
sages. The IP solved the problem of locating computers in a network, by 
designating them concomitantly as both ‘hosts’ and ‘receivers’. Each connected 
device was assigned a unique 32- bit number (represented in dotted decimal 
form: 92.123.44.92) that a user could employ to send a message to his or her 
desired destination. In the early days, each computer was also given a name, 
in addition to a corresponding IP address. Each computer received a copy of 
a database (hosts.txt) file, so a user would be able to copy the numeric address 
into the designated header of the message before sending it. The ‘hosts.txt’, per-
forming a similar function to that of a phone book, together with a list of tech-
nical parameters, was maintained at the NIC based at the Stanford Research 
Institute and was managed by Jon Postel at the Information Sciences Institute 
at the University of Southern California. This set of functions later evolved into 
the so- called Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, playing a 
key role in future political disputes, as detailed in Chapter 4.
Despite increased complexity as the network grew bigger and bigger, the 
tasks continued to be performed by individuals. Between 1977 and 1982, 
a set of technical documents entitled ‘Internet Experiment Notes’ (IENs) 
were released in order to discuss the implementation of Kahn– Cerf proto-
cols, modelled on the RFC series that Crocker initiated at ARPANET. Jon 
Postel helped to revise the TCP/ IP version in 1978 and again in 1979. The 
specifications of the protocol were open to everyone. In 1979, ARPA founded 
the Internet Configuration Control Board (ICCB) to assist with TCP/ IP soft-
ware creation. The editor of IENs was Jon Postel, and about 206 documents 
were published in the series before it was discontinued.
ARPA’s TCP/ IP network became known as the ‘Internet’. In 1981, the 
TCP/ IP was integrated into the Berkeley version of UNIX developed by Bill 
Joy, thus expanding the reach of the ARPA- born communication protocol. 
Looking back at the early days, Vint Cerf located the birth of the Internet 
on 1 January 1983, when the transition plan to migrate the 400 hosts of the 
ARPANET to TCP/ IP was completed. That year, the domain name system 
(DNS) was invented by Paul Mockapetris, together with Jon Postel and Craig 
Partridge and was announced in RFC 882. The DNS converted IP addresses 
consisting of numbers only into letters and words that could be easily remem-
bered by Internet users. The DNS represented a hierarchical system allowing 
for instant database queries and information retrieval for turning names into 
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numbers and replicating the structure at each level:  the 2nd- level domain 
maintains a name server containing the zone file with the IP Addresses for all 
3rd- level domains. In the early days, SRI was one of three hosts of the root 
zone file.10 According to RFC 920 from 1984, the initial set of generic top 
level domains (gTLDs) included .com, .edu, .gov, .mil, .org, with .net being 
added later. In 1988, .int was introduced for international organizations, fol-
lowing a request from NATO.
The expansion and growth of the ARPANET was no longer easy to 
contain. By 1983 it had over 100 nodes and was further divided into two 
parts: an operational component, the military network (MILNET), to serve 
the operational needs of the DoD, and a research component that retained 
the ARPANET name. After the network split, the MILNET expanded, and it 
reached over 250 nodes within a year. In 1985, two important decisions were 
made:  first, two- letter country- code top level domains (cc- TLDs) specific 
to each jurisdiction were incorporated in the DNS, based on a pre- defined 
ISO 3166- 1 list;11 second, the adoption of the DNS was made mandatory 
by ARPA. A year later the general adoption of the DNS was ensured at a 
major congress held on the West Coast in the presence of all major network 
representatives (Hafner and Lyon 1999). At that point, the running cost 
of ARPANET was around $14 million per year (McCarthy 2015)  and its 
decommissioning was in sight. By 1989, the early packet switching network 
was dismantled into smaller networks (detailed in Table 1), most of which 
were moved under the local administration of universities.
Similar to ARPANET, DARPA also funded other computer- related pro-
jects of high impact. Between the 1960s and 1990s, it sponsored studies 
on artificial intelligence (AI)— in particular at MIT and Carnegie Tech— 
at first for research purposes only and, later, for military applications. With 
the MILNET split on the ARPANET, all unclassified military communica-
tion underwent increased protection. A number of gateways made possible 
email exchange via ARPANET, but disconnection was facilitated for security 
reasons.
A large part of the work on ARPANET was entrusted to graduate students 
engaged in ground- breaking projects from the beginning and able to develop 
10 Until 1987, only four root name servers were in operation, but their number increased to 
thirteen, of which ten are located in the United States and three in Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Japan. The root zone file was maintained and updated on a master root server called, as of 1995, 
‘authoritative root server’ or ‘A’ root server.
11 According to Jon Postel (1994), ‘the IANA is not in the business of deciding what is and what 
is not a country. The selection of the ISO 3166 list as a basis for country code top- level domain 
names was made with the knowledge that ISO has a procedure for determining which entities 
should be and should not be on that list’.
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and grow a community of practice, subsequently involved in running the 
successor networks. The co- existence of policy practitioners and scientists, 
rotating in leading positions, unified the vision for how ARPANET could 
develop. This mutual influence, while not resulting in equal power, created 
a hierarchy of preferred solutions and policy directions. As soon as the net-
work developed, special measures were introduced for military communica-
tion and that was clearly distinguished from ARPANET’s academic research 
and public use.
Table 1 ARPANET and its successors
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From ARPANET to NSFNET
Alongside the DoD investment in ARPANET, the US NSF began funding 
the establishment of the Computer Science Network (CSNET) in the early 
1980s. The project— awarded $5  million for its first five years— aimed to 
link computer science departments at academic and research institutions that 
could not be directly connected to ARPANET. The proposal for the grant was 
prepared by Lawrence Landweber from the University of Wisconsin- Madison 
on behalf of a consortium of universities,12 after receiving seed funding of 
$136,000 from the NSF. As the concern for sustainability became more ap-
parent, the NSF tied to the CSNET funding a clause that the network would 
be self- sufficient after five years.
By 1984, CSNET included eighty- three sites in the United States and 
one in Israel, expanding to computer science departments internationally in 
Korea, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan. At its peak, the net-
work had 180 institutions with independently operated networks. Starting in 
1985, CSNET charged universities an annual fee of $2,000 to $5,000 and 
industrial sites (e.g. DEC, IBM) a fee of $30,000 to participate. By 1989, 
CSNET merged with BITNET and created a larger network managed by the 
new Corporation for Research and Educational Networking (CREN).
Moreover, the NSF also supported research that no other agency agreed to 
fund, such as cryptography. Work on public- key cryptography— in particular 
by Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie at Stanford University— started in the 
early 1970s. Partnering with the Office of Naval Research, the NSF continued 
to support this stream of research by funding the work of Ronald Rivest, Adi 
Shamir, and Leonard Adleman at MIT on public- key method using number 
theory. Openly shared, these advances in cryptography became fundamental 
for computer security textbooks, despite the National Security Agency pres-
sure to keep this research secret (National Research Council 1999).
The NSF also provided funding for the creation and interconnection of 
five supercomputer centres across the United States at top universities.13 To 
12 The consortium comprised: Georgia Tech, University of Minnesota, University of New Mexico, 
University of Oklahoma, Purdue University, University of California- Berkeley, University of Utah, 
University of Virginia, University of Washington, University of Wisconsin, and Yale University.
13 The five supercomputer centres established in the mid- 1980s were: the John von Neumann 
Center at Princeton University, the San Diego Supercomputer Center on the campus of the 
University of California at San Diego, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the 
University of Illinois, the Cornell Theory Center, a production and experimental supercomputer 
center, and the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, jointly operated by Westinghouse, Carnegie- 
Mellon University, and the University of Pittsburgh.
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connect these centres, the CSNET technology and framework were upgraded 
to a higher speed and the extended network evolved into the National Science 
Foundation Network (NSFNET), eventually the backbone of the modern 
Internet. NSFNET was developed by three private firms:  IBM, MCI, and 
MERIT. The total funding allocated to NSFNET from 1986 to 1995 was 
$200 million (Leiner et al. 1997).
On its network, the NSF implemented the ‘Acceptable Use Policy’, spe-
cifying that the use of the network must be consistent with the purposes 
of NSFNET: research, instruction, and support activities (for academia and 
not- for- profit institutions of research14). Importantly, this provided access to 
research facilities, universities, academic networks, and centres beyond com-
puter science departments, linking different areas of work and expanding re-
source sharing. In this context, non- military domains would no longer be 
funded by the DoD and a number of responsibilities were transferred from 
the DoD to the NSF. The latter established, through a competitive bidding 
process in 1992, to entrust domain name registration (at no charge until 
1995), directory management, information services to three companies 
(Network Solutions, AT&T, and General Atomic, respectively), which 
formed InterNIC in 1993. These responsibilities were partly taken over by 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 
1998.15
The distinction between ‘Internet’ and ‘internet’ dates back to the 
1980s, when attempts were made to distinguish between the federally 
sponsored network and any other network using TCP/ IP (Bing 2009). 
Concepts like ‘cyberspace’ or ‘the knowledge society’ also became popular 
in that decade. The term ‘cyberspace’ was first used by Gibson (1984) in 
his sci- fi novel Neuromancer, where he described it as ‘a consensual hallu-
cination . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the bank of 
every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity’ (1984, 51). 
The French social critic Jean- François Lyotard is credited for coining ‘the 
knowledge society’ (1979) and highlighting the central role of informa-
tion and computerization in its consolidation. Yet, by the time the decision 
to commercialize the Internet was taken, the US administration gave cur-
rency to the ‘information superhighway’ discourse, promoted by Al Gore 
(Broad 1992).
14 The exact formulation was: ‘use for research or instruction at for- profit institutions may or may 
not be consistent with the purposes of NSFNET, and will be reviewed by the NSF Project Office 
on a case- by- case basis’.
15 Chapter 4 discusses in detail the formation of the organization and the transfer of responsibil-
ities from Jon Postel to the new entity.
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Mechanisms of Governance
It is difficult to disentangle the early mechanisms of governance from the in-
formal network that set them into motion and the key individuals taking the 
lead in the creation of standards and institutional structures. The first two dec-
ades of networking experiments, resulting in the development of the Internet 
as we know it today, share a number of characteristics that structured— 
constrained and favoured— the future evolution of the field. Most important 
among these are the transversal links between academia, government, and, 
eventually, the computer industry. Equally significant for the evolution of the 
Internet in the first decades was the highly permissive regulatory milieu in 
the United States, discussed in detail later. These two dynamics enabled the 
development of a strong culture of volunteerism and innovation that crossed 
the US border when the Internet globalized in the early 1990s.
Research Funding: Basis for the Emergence 
of Multidisciplinary Cooperation
The strong involvement of scientists from elite universities in both technical 
and leadership positions at ARPA created an environment of sharing and 
collaboration, further enabling the open exchange with and among graduate 
students. While access to the network remained restricted to contractors, 
ARPANET benefited from the movement of leading figures from research 
and teaching to implementation teams and finally to decision- making posts. 
Among the key strategists at ARPA were pioneers Kleinrock from UCLA 
and Licklider from MIT and Lincoln Lab, who envisioned a network of net-
works that would later be opened up to a larger community through the 
work of Lawrence Landweber from the University of Wisconsin- Madison. 
Landweber proposed the creation of CSNET to link computer science de-
partments in the United States and abroad. Formerly working for the Irish 
Higher Education Authority (HEAnet) and for the Trinity College Dublin, 
Dennis Jennings started acting as Program Director for Networking to lead 
the establishment of the NSFNET in 1985, enabling general purpose access 
to a wide network. With very few exceptions (such as ‘Jake’ Feinler), women 
were mostly absent from this early community.
Earlier on, experimentation with internetworking at ARPANET was sup-
ported by the DoD, which awarded research contracts to academic teams 
(rather than individuals) for developing projects that would then be carried 
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Processing Techniques Office was its leadership style: programme managers 
brought in from academia for two- year- long positions were given broad lati-
tude in deciding strategic directions and funding. They were carefully selected 
for their expertise and were able to work closely with the researchers they con-
tracted, providing intellectual leadership. This management style also elim-
inated the need for a separate monitoring and evaluation track of activities, 
giving enough flexibility to managers to adjust financial support according to 
the progress made and to respond quickly to developments (National Research 
Council 1999). Unlike the DARPA practices of restricted access (generally 
limited to the military and to contractors from selected universities), the 
NSF operated on an open, accessible research basis. Complementing this 
approach, the NSF also supported the public dissemination of results and 
funded participation in conferences, thus investing in building a robust re-
search community, just like ARPA did in the early years, in particular by or-
ganizing student conferences on internetworking.
The success of the CSNET— which was open to all computer science 
researchers— also influenced the decision to fund NSFNET, further ex-
panding access to other research facilities. On NSFNET, the regional aca-
demic networks initially connected were also encouraged to seek commercial 
customers and open their facilities to them (Leiner et al. 2009). Yet, the NSF 
budget dedicated to computer- related activities as part of its Computer and 
Information Sciences and Engineering Directorate continued to grow be-
tween 1987 and 1995 (National Research Council 1999).
Domestic Regulation: New Rules for Computing Services
In addition to sustained funding from DoD and NSF, the development of 
the Internet in the American context was facilitated by the minimal state 
ideology, dominant at the time. In 1988, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) created the special category of ‘value- added’ services, 
which left computer- mediated information virtually unregulated by the gov-
ernment. This created a permissive environment for the creation and develop-
ment of sui generis institutions for its technical management (Mueller 2004), 
in charge of protocols and standards of operability. As the chairman of the 
FCC said in his speech before the World Economic Development Forum in 
September 1999:
Our hands- off approach wasn’t entirely a choice. The reality is that the Internet grew 
so fast that policy- makers could not have written a code to govern it even if they 
wanted to. (Kennard 1999)
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This regulatory direction was prefaced by a set of developments aimed at ad-
dressing the technological evolution and convergence challenges, in a context 
of national telecommunications monopoly.16 In 1966, the FCC commenced 
its Computer Inquiries, an investigation trio into data transfers and the con-
ditions for a related competitive market, thus providing rules and regula-
tions for computing services. Adjusting an earlier categorization, the 1976 
Computer Inquiries II distinguished between basic and enhanced services. 
Basic services referred to processing the movement of information and com-
puter processing, which included protocol conversion, security, and memory 
storage. Enhanced services, on the other hand, altered a subscriber’s infor-
mation or electronic signals (any service transmitted over common carrier 
facilities employing computer processing applications acting on the format, 
content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted 
information, that restructured information or involved interaction with 
stored information). Services developed around that time, such as protocol 
processing, email, or newsgroup fell in the ‘enhanced services’ category.
In 1985, the third FCC Computer Inquiry aimed to structure the condi-
tions of the market before the deployment of the Internet to a broader audi-
ence. Accordingly, the FCC established two safeguards:  the Comparatively 
Efficient Interconnection and Open Network Architecture, which removed 
the structural remedies previously imposed on incumbent players from the 
telephone industry, in particular AT&T and its Bell System, which func-
tioned as a legally sanctioned monopoly.17 In Europe, a similar constraint was 
imposed via the principle of interoperability plus physical interconnection 
between networks (Coates 2011).
Up to the late 1970s, the developments at ARPANET and those in the 
industry remained separate, each conducting research according to different 
priorities. By the 1980s, the trend changed, and developments from different 
sectors started to build on one another, sometimes as a result of joint teams. 
While NSFNET, operating on TCP/ IP, implemented restrictions against the 
commercial use of the newly established public infrastructure, it granted, in 
1988, limited access to MCI Communications Corp. to experiment with 
commercial email services (Shah and Kesan 2007).18 Moreover, starting in 
16 For an extensive discussion of this transformation, see Rioux (2014).
17 A noteworthy development prior to Computer Inquiry III was the 1982 finalization of the 
eight- year- long antitrust suit by the US government against AT&T, resulting in the separation of the 
local exchanges component of AT&T (where the natural monopoly continued to apply) and the Bell 
System long distance, manufacturing, and research and development open to competition from that 
point on. This led to the divestiture of the company in 1984 and the creation of a reformed AT&T 
and seven regional Bell operating companies.
18 The person facilitating this was Vint Cerf. As vice- president of MCI Digital Information 
Services from 1982 to 1986, he led the engineering of MCI Mail, the first commercial email service 
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1988, NSF initiated a series of conferences at Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government on ‘The Commercialization and Privatization of the Internet’, as 
well as on the ‘com- priv’ list on the net itself, meant to enable dialogue on pri-
vately funded networks (Leiner et al. 1997). In 1992, the NSF started a bid-
ding process for the organization and maintenance of the DNS registry and 
related services resulting in the creation of the Internet Network Information 
Center (InterNIC) in 1993.
The transition from ARPANET to NSFNET was important not only in 
terms of expanding access, but also for the perpetuation of particular organ-
izational forms. Just like during the ARPANET era, collaboration between 
academic networks involved a mix of informal governance alongside formal-
ized arrangements and emulation of a set of practices. NSF took on the or-
ganizational infrastructure developed at DARPA under the Internet Activities 
Board (IAB). The joint authorship by the IAB’s Internet Engineering and 
Architecture Task Forces and by NSF’s Network Technical Advisory Group 
of RFC 985 (Requirements for Internet Gateways) ensured that DARPA and 
the NSF segments remained interoperable. When the Internet was privatized, 
these institutional forms endured.
International Governance
The history of the Internet explored so far indicates that international legal 
constraints were near- absent in the early days of the Internet. But that does 
not mean there was no governance. While the practice of standard- setting 
goes back to 1865,19 Internet- specific organizations tasked with it emerged 
in the 1980s to respond to functional needs for coordination. To ensure the 
stability and development of the network, the architecture set in place was 
the primary vehicle of regulation, and it was mostly the business of tech-
nologists. Yet this became a hot topic of debate a decade later, when certain 
features of the architecture were understood to have far- reaching policy im-
plications, for aspects such as anonymity or innovation at the edges. Lessig 
(2006) referred to this as ‘regulation by code’ or the ‘<built environment> of 
social life in cyberspace’ (2006, 121) with long- ranging effects on what could 
to be connected to the Internet. Prior to re- joining MCI in 1994, Cerf was vice president of the 
Corporation for National Research Initiatives.
19 This practice stood at the basis of cooperation for the creation of the first international or-
ganization:  International Telegraph Union (later renamed the International Telecommunication 
Union, ITU).
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and could not be done online. In that sense, Lessig perceived code writers as 
‘lawmakers’.20
Globally, until the 1990s, the governance of global telecommunications 
was carried out mainly through interaction among governments, who owned 
and controlled national incumbent operators, and the ITU, which was in 
charge of regulating issues related to interconnection. UNESCO’s New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) placed on the 
global agenda a set of issues of relevance to the spread of new technologies. 
Building on the 1980 MacBride Report— which documented the emergence 
of global communications governance dominated by industrialized nations- 
led commercial and military infrastructure— the NWICO agenda raised 
the first serious controversies at the international level (Zehle 2012)  be-
tween the US principle of ‘free flow of information’ and the demands of the 
Soviet Union and of the Non- Alignment Movement of independent states. 
In particular, the unequal distribution of radio spectrum and the restricted 
spread of satellite and computer technologies to developing countries were 
perceived as key imbalances in global information flows. The Soviet Union, 
China, India, Cuba, and Tunisia were key players in the NWICO movement, 
covering the period spanning from the heights of decolonization to the col-
lapse of communism. The pursuit of this agenda by the UNESCO leadership 
in the first part of the 1980s led to a few countries withdrawing from the 
organization: United States (1984– 2003), United Kingdom (1985– 97), and 
Singapore (1986– 2007).
De facto, the landscape change resulting from technological development 
and convergence, hinted at in the NWICO agenda, would continue to af-
fect the balance between developed and developing countries over the years 
to come. The analysis of governance mechanisms at the outset reveals that 
treaties, conventions, and agreements constituted the preferred form of regu-
lation (36 per cent prevalence), followed by operative international and re-
gional guidelines (20 per cent), and the formation of specialized bodies. Table 2  
provides an overview of the governance landscape between 1970 and 1993, 
with examples on the hard– soft law continuum using the tripartite frame-
work introduced in Chapter 2, consisting of legal enshrinement, institutional 
solidification, and modelling instruments. Notably, with institutional con-
solidation in its infancy, monitoring mechanisms were not given priority at 
the outset. General rules for telecommunications were designed to remain 
broad and applied to the Internet in a non- specific manner, be it as part of 
20 In Lessig’s words: ‘code writers are increasingly lawmakers. They determine what the defaults 
of the Internet will be; whether privacy will be protected; the degree to which anonymity will be 
allowed; the extent to which access will be guaranteed’ (2006, 79).
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transborder data flows, privacy and personal data protection, or information 
systems security.
In 1988, ITU’s member states adopted, at the World Administrative 
Telegraph and Telephone Conference in Melbourne, a treaty to ‘establish 
general principles which relate to the provision and operation of international 
telecommunication services offered to the public as well as to the underlying 
international telecommunication transport means used to provide such 
Table 2 Governance mechanisms (global and regional) from 1970s to 1993 (based 
on a total of twenty- five instruments recorded in the database)






36% 1981 CoE Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data









16% 1986 High Technology Crime Investigation 
Association
1988 TMFORUM Industry Association
1990 APEC Telecommunications and 
Information Working Group





12% 1980 UNESCO NWICO






Modelling Discursive 4% 1985 OECD Declaration on Transborder Data 
Flows
Operative 20% 1990 UN Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters
1990 UN Guidelines for the regulation of com-
puterized personal data files
1992 OECD Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems
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services’ (ITU 1988). The treaty, entitled ‘International Telecommunication 
Regulations’ (ITRs), came into force in 1990 and facilitated the liberalization 
of pricing and services, encouraging a more innovative use of basic services, 
such as international leased lines. The ITRs established an international re-
gime for the exchange of telecommunications traffic across borders, pro-
moting interoperability and interconnection. Their revision would come 
under discussion again in 2012 in light of the accelerated digital transform-
ation (see Chapter 5).
A number of international organizations started to establish committees 
whose work covered Internet- related aspects, such as the Directorate for 
Science, Technology and Industry within the OECD, the Telecommunications 
and Information Working Group in APEC (dating back to 1990), or policy 
commissions within ICC, whose activities remained ascribed to a broader 
mandate. In the UN system, in 1993, the Commission for Science and 
Technology for Development was formed under the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) received funding for their Sustainable Development 
Networking Program. These developments set the stage for the quick ex-
pansion of the Internet as a social and political medium in the subsequent 
decade, enabling the involvement of developing countries to various degrees.
Actors
A number of technical bodies exclusively concerned with the Internet— 
equipped with their own modus operandi— emerged during the first decades 
of internetworking. The most important of them grew into global entities 
and continued to function largely unchanged. Some of the practices estab-
lished back then continue to shape the way in which decisions are taken with 
regard to protocols and standards. Informality and open communication re-
main key features of the community, modelled extensively on the interactions 
during the ARPANET period.
The small community which formed around the (D)ARPA project revealed 
a high degree of informality manifested through cherry- picked collaborators 
and informal agreements. Personal relationships— primarily formed in the 
university environment— and limited access to the network gave ARPANET 
contractors a strong sense of ownership and commitment. The cross- sectoral 
work conducted through early networks and, later, through NSFNET for 
both advanced research and education networking put forward comple-
mentary strengths, a high degree of flexibility, and space for open- ended 
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experimentation. It is around these values that an early community began 
to form.
This progress was also backed by the development of a new discipline, 
computer science, and related departments in the United States and abroad. 
Between 1968 and 1994, the number of PhD dissertations submitted annu-
ally in computer science in the United States grew from one to almost 3,000 
(National Research Council 1999, 221). As part of the efforts to lower the 
technical barrier of entry through knowledge creation and sharing, common 
language and expertise were codified in textbooks for computer science 
programs. A key test which revealed the extent of this consolidation was the 
TCP/ IP versus OSI dispute, in which it became clear that the community 
of computer scientists on the one hand and engineers and telecommunica-
tions experts on the other proposed different solutions informed by their 
specialized jargon and references.
Trust and cooperation appeared as the underlying values of the emerging 
community, alongside the idea that anyone could initiate work on any pro-
ject that would add to the common network. The latter, closely rooted in 
the American distinctive culture of volunteerism, shaped the collective action 
outcomes. Open standards and architecture, sharing and collaboration al-
lowed for user- developed functionalities to be added to the network. This 
is the case with the development of the first email program that Raymond 
Tomlinson, who was working for BBN to develop ARPANET, coded in his 
free time. Another example of volunteerism was the original distribution of 
cc- TLDs to whomever in a national jurisdiction offered to administer the 
delegation. In Australia, .au was given to Robert Elz of the University of 
Melbourne (Malcolm 2008).
The number of individual players who were at the forefront of innov-
ations with long- lasting impact grew in time, in both academia and the pri-
vate sector. The development that steered this further came in 1991, when 
Tim Berners- Lee announced the public release of the World Wide Web 
(WWW), an application he developed21 together with his colleagues while 
working at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) on 
the Swiss- French border. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) they pro-
posed made the Internet easier to navigate with point- and- click programs, 
based on the CERN code library. The WWW was a game- changer as of 1993, 
when CERN made it available in the public domain. To further improve 
the WWW, Berners- Lee created, in 1994, the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), where he continues to act as director.
21 This was funded by European governments participating in the programme.
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Other institutional forms dating back to the first two decades of the 
Internet persisted over time, building on the legacy of personal involvement 
and dedication of some of the key figures. The IANA was informally estab-
lished in the early 1980s. Prior to it, the central numbering authority of the 
network, in charge of keeping records and assigning host names (the famous 
HOSTS.TXT- file) was the NIC, based at the Stanford Research Institute 
and managed by Jon Postel at the Information Sciences Institute, University 
of Southern California, under a contract with (D)ARPA. IANA functions 
evolved to include the allocation of unique names and numbers in the global 
network, including the cc- TLDs and gTLDs, but continued to be managed 
by Postel until 1998.22 IANA represents a textbook example of informal gov-
ernance, generally understood to ‘prevail when informal influence overrides 
legal procedures, or when important rules are unwritten’ (Stone 2013). For 
the latter, the DNS is a case- in- point. It was innovative for its time as it made 
use of datagrams, but was not perceived as a major development, and im-
portant work around it was left in the hands of graduate students. As Paul 
Mockapetris recalled:
People got the job to do something and it was so much fun doing it because nobody 
at the time thought it was important. And it was clear, because I was a recent graduate 
and this was a nice little project while all the important people were off doing other 
things. Now, it turned out to be a very important thing, but nobody at the time 
thought it was. (Mockapetris 2009)
Another technical body, the Internet Architecture Board was created in 1984 
as the Internet Activities Board to coordinate the work on the development 
of the Internet suite of protocols (changed to its current name in 1992). It 
currently oversees and advises the IETF, which was formed after the 1986 
meeting of fifteen researchers sponsored by the US government. The IETF 
developed as a voluntary open standards network for promoting Internet us-
ability and currently functions as a consensus- based organization comprising 
technical experts, network operators, hardware and software implementers, 
and researchers. Entirely private, not- for- profit oriented from the outset, 
both the IAB and the IETF continue to involve members in their personal 
capacity rather than based on their affiliation. This is a legacy of the early days 
in which a limited community of computer scientists and academics inter-
acted on a daily basis for the purpose of operating the Internet seamlessly. 
During the early 1990s, the IETF became an independent international body 
22 IANA is currently incorporated in ICANN, whose first Chief Technology Officer was sup-
posed to be Jon Postel, but he died unexpectedly in October 1998, just a month after ICANN was 
founded.
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under the umbrella of the Internet Society (ISOC), which continues to pro-
vide its legal framework and coordinate sponsorship to this day. As of 1991, it 
holds three annual meetings on different continents that are open to everyone 
contributing to the standard development process, conducted through the 
RFC— the only documents issued by the IETF.
It is in the CSNET context that the Landweber seminars developed as a 
venue for people to meet annually and, starting in 1984, CSNET- related dis-
cussions took place in Paris, Stockholm, Dublin, Princeton, Jerusalem, and 
Sydney. In 1990, in Sydney, it was decided that the seminar should become 
a conference, and the next year INET 91 was held in Copenhagen. At INET 
92, in Kobe, Japan, the conference also marked the first annual meeting of 
ISOC. Together with Robert Kahn, Vint Cerf established ISOC in 1992, 
to provide an institutional home and a legal framework to the various task 
forces, including the IAB and the IETF. Cerf was the founding president 
of ISOC from 1992 to 1995 and in 1999 served a term as chairman of 
the Board.
In a short time- span, the roles of scientists and of the limited number of 
network users grew, including by formal representation in coordination com-
mittees. In 1990, selected members of such communities were invited to join 
an advisory committee for the newly created Federal Networking Council 
(FNC), a body established by the NSF for consolidating the coordination 
of oversight for Internet administration and funding. The FNC brought to-
gether representatives from federal agencies that participated in the develop-
ment of the Internet, including NASA and the Department of Energy. The 
FNC mission was to ‘provide a forum for networking collaborations among 
Federal agencies to meet their research, education, and operational mission 
goals and to bridge the gap between the advanced networking technologies 
being developed by FNC research agencies and the ultimate acquisition of 
mature versions of these technologies from the commercial sector’ (FNC 
1990), signalling the privatization trends in the 1990s.
Underlying this multidisciplinary collaboration was a strong emphasis 
on common values, standards, and protocols, perpetuated from the outset 
of internetworking by all key players, from funders to developers. The early 
Internet standards stemmed from a sheer need for coordination:  to send 
information from one computer to another, multiple ways could be em-
ployed, but choosing to perform the task in the same manner had obvious 
benefits. Standardization was of practical value to the early NWG. Based on 
early decisions and practices in the ARPANET group, standards continue 
to be open, free of cost, and available in a simple format. The next section 
explores how we got there through the ‘request for comments’ enduring 
routine.
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Anchoring Practice: RFCs
The process of establishing standards and protocols was— and continues to 
be— an exercise in reaching consensus among a community of Internet en-
thusiasts who volunteer their time to the process. Standards are generally dis-
cussed in a layered approach, allowing work in one layer while abstracting 
the other, and thus respecting the end- to- end principle. While not all spe-
cifications of protocols or services for the Internet ‘should or will’ become 
Internet standards (according to RFC 1310 from 1992), RFCs may be ini-
tiated from early discussions of new research concepts or from status memos 
about the Internet and they would be marked as ‘experimental’ or ‘infor-
mational’. The standards are summarized periodically in the ‘IAB Official 
Protocol Standards’. To reach the final stage, they need to match the fol-
lowing criteria: high quality, prior implementation and testing, openness and 
fairness, and timeliness. When they are published, they offer specifications 
that manufacturers of equipment and software can integrate into their pro-
duction processes.
The RFC process to design standards was born out of sheer need and contin-
gency. Steve Crocker, who coined the term, summarized this clearly in 2012:
As our ideas started to permeate, we knew we had to write them down and we also 
knew that the mere act of writing them down was going to trigger some reaction, and 
possibly, even a negative reaction. We were just graduate students, nobody put us in 
charge, we had no authority. And it came to me to organize these notes that we were 
going to write and I found myself extremely nervous . . . so I hit upon this . . . silly 
trick . . . saying we’re just going to call every one of them, no matter what they are, 
they might be super formal or they might be completely informal, but we’re just 
going to call every one of them a Request for Comments. I thought that this was a 
temporary device that would last a few months until the network was built and we 
had organized manuals and documentation and so forth. So here we are, more than 
40 years later, requests for comments are still the lingua franca for the standards pro-
cess, RFC is in the Oxford English Dictionary.
To minimize any claim of authority, Crocker, who graduated from UCLA a 
year before, drafted the first RFC on behalf of the NWG. It was 1969, and 
internetworking was in its inception phase, consisting of a network established 
between four research centres: UCLA, SRI, the University of California, Santa 
Barbara; and the University of Utah in Salt Lake City. Dedicated to the IMP 
host software, RFC 1 had open questions and diagrams. The idea of an un-
finished product on which the others could comment meant cooperation and 
collective input were welcome. The culture of the rather small community of 
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computer scientists (less than 100) clashed directly with that of the engineers 
in the telephone networks, where special approvals to introduce new features 
were needed from hierarchy.
The drafting of RFCs started before email was invented, and in order to 
reach the members of the group, a copy was sent by post to each research 
group lead, who would then photocopy more for the rest of the group. As a 
shared practice, the RFCs became influential across dispersed memberships, 
at first only in the United States and subsequently across the world. Deciding 
to avoid patents, restrictions, or financial incentives on the side of the pro-
posers of RFCs meant that agreement could be reached much more easily. As 
the community became larger, more formal meetings had to be organized. 
A legitimating purpose was intrinsic to this functional exercise. Until today, 
the RFCs invite comments from everyone in their first phase as proposed 
standards, then they become draft standards and finally Internet standards.
The main characteristics of the dominant practice embedded in the RFCs 
are telling of the in- built values:  agreement around the appropriateness of 
this method, a need for replication and wider adoption. Yet the implemen-
tation of standards, just like their creation, is voluntary; they become oper-
ational if they are functional and deliver what is needed. The IETF standards 
are authoritative, being widely adopted despite lacking legal or enforcement 
powers. Apart from functionality, they are influential because they mobilize 
the expertise and the support of a larger group beyond the proposers. The 
decision- making process around RFCs is based on ‘rough consensus and run-
ning code’ (as explained in RFC 7282), in practice designating a majority 
agreement and a proof of reliable and replicable work. Sometimes rough con-
sensus is determined by participants ‘humming’ when prompted by the chair 
of a working group; used as a means to get a ‘sense of the room’, having 
either everyone present at the discussion or the separate sides in a discussion 
humming in favour or keeping silent on a certain proposal.
RFCs are thus also used as a consensus- building ritual. In the vocabulary of 
technical bodies that have adopted similar consensus- oriented practices, this 
is equivalent to substantial support for a position or proposal and indicates 
the absence of substantial hostility. In the wording of RFC 1603 formalizing 
the process in 1994, a separation is needed between procedural disagreement 
(for which a review and appeal system was designed) and disagreement on 
technical decisions:
Technical disagreements may be about specific details or about basic approach. When 
an issue pertains to preference, it should be resolved within the working group. 
When a matter pertains to the technical adequacy of a decision, review is encouraged 
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whenever the perceived deficiency is noted. For matters having to do with preference, 
working group rough consensus will dominate. (Huizer and Crocker 1994)
When the IETF community expanded, the practice of reaching rough con-
sensus needed not only formalization, but also further specification. The 
creators’ imprint was apparent in the way opinions based on preference or 
interest could be overridden by rough consensus to achieve a functional, 
user- oriented solution inside an organization with no formal membership. 
The status of the RFC has consolidated over time into a publication mech-
anism (RFC series) comprising the totality of drafts discussed, independent 
of whether they turn into standards or not. As a communal reference point, 
it re- enacts a specific way of building a community around a shared purpose.
More than documenting developments and enabling dialogue, RFCs also 
represented a mechanism to include individuals outside established relation-
ships (the small group of people in ARPA- related projects), as they could 
follow the progress at ARPANET and keep abreast of the technical advances 
from the sidelines. The NIC, based at the Stanford Research Institute, played 
a key role as a dissemination node, and its example was followed by successor 
organizations. Through the work of the NIC, more and more decisions, 
from ad- hoc groups to formalized procedures, started to be documented, 
in response to the need for ‘getting things done’ when a higher number of 
people became involved; it also created a domestic and an international audi-
ence, as attention was focused on successful experiments; and it increased 
transparency.
Yet the early Internet was overwhelmingly based on English- language 
content, limited access to outsiders, and was mostly dominated by male re-
searchers and technologists. Most of the information transmitted was textual, 
making the environment relatively homogenous. The term ‘open Internet’— 
though in many cases open standards were a necessity of the time— was not 
formally introduced until March 1992, when Lyman Chapin, the chairman 
of the IAB, published the RFC 1310 entitled ‘Internet Standards Process’ 
(Russell 2014). The document outlined procedures ‘intended to provide 
a clear, open, and objective basis for developing, evaluating, and adopting 
Internet Standards for protocols and services’ and identified openness and 
fairness as a key goal for Internet standardization.
Characteristic of Internet standard- setting organizations was a certain emu-
lation of existing practices in the small community forming at the time: the 
NWG model was followed when establishing the INWG, and the IENs 
were modelled on the RFCs format. Moreover, the tradition of delegating 
decision- making to specialized committees for different purposes (providing 
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information, legal, technical matters, etc.) continued to be observed by tech-
nical bodies. Among these, the IETF remains a relatively informal and loosely 
institutionalized standardization body, with no membership, no fees, and no 
board of directors, preserving the principles developed in the early days of the 
Internet.
As an anchoring routine shared more broadly by the technical community 
based on the IETF practice, the RFC series reveals the like- mindedness of the 
initial group of practitioners who could thus reaffirm the joint enterprise they 
took part in. Importantly, it shows how practice fostered learning among old and 
new members, transforming identities and institutionalizing the norm of open 
and inclusive participation in discussions. This pattern of engagement is central 
to the evolution of the field, inspiring wide adoption in the Internet governance 
community.
Synopsis
This chapter showed that in the early days, the Internet was a rather homo-
genous domain, closely linked to computer science and networking experi-
ments. Different forms of governance, combining public and private initiatives, 
were profiling, and that initial interaction shaped the way in which the Internet 
evolved. Until the commercial Internet in the mid- 1990s, the predominant gov-
ernance route for Internet- related decisions was the creation of standards and 
protocols to make different networks interoperable. Such processes were regu-
lated via informal interactions among a relatively small group of pioneers able to 
cross sectoral boundaries.
Around this, a set of institutions formed— at first completely informal, 
later formalized— performing different functions as part of governing the 
network. In that sense, governance activities— primarily coordination and 
standardization— were set in place without being referred to as such. Notably, 
hybrid arrangements between academia, governmental funding agencies, and 
large computer companies, such as NSFNET, expanded the reach of the net-
work. The process of governance diversification and transformation was led 
by a number of scientists- cum- practitioners, such as Vint Cerf, Bob Kahn, 
and Tim Berners- Lee, who were at the forefront of ad- hoc groups formed to 
answer functional problems. At the international level, through their leader-
ship work and the founding of institutions, a transnational policy network 
started to form. Prior to 1993, with the exception of the work conducted 
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around the OSI standard, most governance mechanisms at the global level 
remained telecommunications- specific and included more instruments with 
binding character than soft law.23
Despite the sustained funding directed first to ARPANET and later to 
NSFNET, the divergent agendas of funding agencies and their prioritiza-
tion of various interests allowed for supporting innovative, complementary 
areas of research, such as AI, database management, and cryptography. This 
fragmentation of resources opened up the space for collaboration. When 
the transfer of responsibilities towards NSF started, infrastructure costs con-
tinued to be shared. While ARPA funded research groups rather than individ-
uals, involving the same scientists ensured that developments could build on 
each other and that an early community could be formed. The management 
style also reflected trust- based contracting and long- term relationships with 
private providers, at first with BBN and later with IBM, MERIT, and NSI, 
contracted to do the high- speed upgrade for NSFNET in 1987.
The majority of pioneers continued to play key roles in the development 
of the network and the institutional architecture evolving around it. Kahn 
and Cerf formed ISOC in 1992 as an institutional home for IAB and IETF, 
Postel continued to run IANA and prepared its transition to the ICANN. 
Academic networks and universities— in particular those that developed com-
puter science departments such as MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, UCLA— 
remained strongly involved in Internet advancements. The ARPA computer 
network benefited from generous funding and a wide degree of autonomy 
for the researchers, mostly brought in through peer- selection, via personal 
networks and scientific conferences (Hafner 1998; Abbate 1999). The net-
work expanded to include a number of university centres not connected with 
ARPANET initially. Later on, a set of functionalities developed in the private 
sector were added to what became a public use network. Yet, as early as the 
first decade of ARPANET, politicization trends emerged: the high stakes were 
indicated by a number of instances of contestation, such as the early protocol 
‘war’ (TCP/ IP vs. OSI), the efforts to create interconnected networks in the 
private sector, and the push towards commercialization.
23 In addition to their Declaration on Transborder Data Flows (1985), OECD prepared its 
Guidelines for the security of information systems as early as 1992.
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 Privatization and Globalization  
of the Internet
The ‘Internet governance’ discussions formally started around 1995, with the 
commercialization of the network that spurred out of the National Science 
Foundation Network (NSFNET) (Sylvan 2014). Two key advancements 
dating back to this period stand at the basis of the current functioning of the 
Internet: the development of the infrastructure, on the one hand, and of web 
applications and dotcoms on the other. Multiple for- profit Internet backbone 
and access providers (e.g. dial- up systems of CompuServe, America Online, 
Prodigy) emerged when the Internet was privatized. At first, Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) preferred connections to the backbone networks in the 
United States, where more services and content were available. In many cases, 
such connections also meant charges lower than what the telecommunication 
monopolies in many countries asked for. As the number of providers grew, 
options for connection diversified and a variety of services became available 
at the regional and local levels, though unevenly spread across continents. 
The large amount of user- generated content, which set the Internet apart 
from other communications media, also became a competitive advantage. 
This fostered the emergence of an online market for domain names, a highly 
contentious issue for global regulation.
Mirroring the exponential growth of the network, the scale of Internet 
operations expanded at an unprecedented pace during the mid- 1990s; inter-
national connections became the norm, rather than the exception. The driver 
of innovation throughout this period was the so- called ‘knowledge- creating 
company’ (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), which used the production of know-
ledge, including user- generated content, for developing or improving prod-
ucts and services. Aided by a permissive regulatory approach, advancements 
in website development, and the e- commerce boom, the Internet became the 
engine of economic growth in the 1990s in most developed countries.
This chapter investigates the privatization trends, the creation of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a core 
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institution for the technical management of the Internet, and the expansion 
of the global online market. It analyses the distinctive features of governance 
arrangements from the mid- 1990s to the early 2000s, which epitomize ‘the 
search for governance models coherent with the neoliberal globalisation pro-
cess’ (Chenou 2014, 338). Here, I analyse the emergence of what is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘private governance of the Internet’, growing from the na-
tional level to a global scale. Applying the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 2, the articulation of governance during this period is deconstructed 
empirically to reveal the tensions of regulation and institutionalization.
A Global Internet (Fairy) Tale: Market Emergence
Despite its importance, a critical history of the commercialization of the 
Internet is a rare occurrence in Internet governance (IG).1 The expansion of 
the Internet and the subsequent crisis of the late 1990s left an imprint: be-
yond shaking the enthusiasm of the early investors, it also shaped the very 
basics of the market and the modern structures of online advertising. Amid 
regulatory disputes, business practices became a dominant modality of gov-
ernance, consonant with the classical definition of private authority as the 
‘ability by non- state actors to cooperate across borders to establish rules 
and standards of behaviour accepted as legitimate by agents not involved in 
their definition’ (Noelke and Graz 2008, 2). Profit- seeking entities became 
co- creators of standards and norms and, in certain cases, held discretionary 
power for law enforcement, be it for criminal investigations or for the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. The transformation of private intermedi-
aries into law- enforcement institutions emerged as a reality early on, showing 
that the Internet space was hybrid by definition. Three main developments 
marked this period: the expansion of the infrastructure, the dotcom market, 
and the advent of web applications.
Infrastructure
The transition from a national network (with a few external links) to a global 
network of networks happened in a rather short time- span:  from 1993 to 
1995. The formal involvement of the private sector in the functioning of the 
network started a few years before on the NSFNET. When the higher- speed 
upgrade was authorized in 1987, NSFNET delegated the task to a consortium 
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known as Advanced Network and Services, led by Merit Network, Inc., IBM, 
and MCI. A number of commercial experiments— such as the MCI email 
service, introduced by Vint Cerf2— were tested and allowed on the NSFNET 
before the 1990s. When the Border Gateway Protocol was introduced in 
1994, the network architecture was improved with the facilitated external 
Internet routing (the move of IP packets from sender to recipient across nu-
merous autonomous networks) and decentralization. In reality, the Internet 
reached millions of homes before being placed on international agendas or 
discussed as a global issue. And, unlike the early Internet experiments, the 
globalization of the Internet did not rely on state subsidies anymore.
When the NSFNET was decommissioned in April 1995, the funds re-
covered from its dismantling were redistributed to regional networks to buy 
connectivity from the private providers that started to mushroom. The tran-
sition to the commercial Internet was completed through the introduction of 
five NSF- designated and partially funded network access points. A few years 
later, the role of access points was minimized as the majority of ISPs started 
contracting directly with backbone and transit providers. Technical standard-
ization, infrastructure, and interconnection remained concealed to the public 
eye for the largest part of the Internet evolution, yet their profile on the pol-
itical agenda was raised when the Internet became global.
The shift from government- owned to privately owned infrastructure was 
overseen by Steve Wolff from the NSF, who retrospectively assessed that it was 
necessary to conduct the transition in a coordinated fashion to maintain the 
network as a single Internet, rather than multiple separate networks. He also 
reiterated the commitment of the NSF to ensuring that the academic com-
munity would not remain aloof. In the words of Wolff:
There had to be commercial activity to help support networking, to help build 
volume on the network. That would get the cost down for everybody, including the 
academic community, which is what NSF was supposed to be doing. (NSF n.d.)
In 1995, responding to a solicitation made in 1993, NSF awarded contracts 
for three network access points to serve as links to commercial networks and 
one routing arbiter for exchange of traffic. It also signed a cooperative agree-
ment for a new- generation Backbone Network Service, decommissioning 
NSFNET. But a global Internet required much more.
2 Cerf acted as vice- president of MCI Digital Information Services from 1982 to 1986, before 
joining Bob Kahn at the Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI). In the beginning, 
CNRI hosted the secretariat of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), before moving under 
the Internet Society (ISOC).
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To begin with, the physical connection with other parts of the world 
needed to be improved; this expansion process was led by the private sector. 
The underlying infrastructure on which the Internet was growing rapidly 
relied on submarine cables, an interconnected network originally used for 
telegraphy. The first of the transatlantic cables, carrying telegraphic corres-
pondence between the United States and the United Kingdom was laid in 
1859 by the Atlantic Telegraph Company. Ever since, underwater cables 
evolved from electromagnetic copper cables to fibre optic to support the faster 
transmission of messages. Historically, the telegraph cables were owned by the 
operators. Later on, the consortium model dominated, consisting of splitting 
the cost of submarine cables among telecommunication operators, but also 
sharing the risks and reducing competition. In the early 1990s, a strong push 
for adopting a common approach to the global Internet infrastructure came 
from the Telecommunication Standardization Sector of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The body has played an important role 
in drafting recommendations and guidelines for undersea cable development 
and deployment ever since. In 1958, the International Cable Protection 
Committee (ICPC) was established to serve as the undersea cable operators 
association, providing representation and leadership in international policy 
processes. The ICPC also acted as a forum for information exchange, tech-
nical expertise, and legal and environmental advice for its members.
Submarine connections currently carry 99 per cent of transoceanic digital 
communication and represent a billion- dollar business (Chesnoy 2015; 
Starosielski 2015). The fastest growth of this industry was registered at the 
end of the 1990s during the dotcom bubble. Part of what made the latter 
possible was the expansion of the infrastructure to Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America. The cables circling the African continent were laid down later, the 
first three being placed between 2000 and 2004.
Over the years, three tiers of networks developed, differentiated3 according 
to whether they provided bandwidth (tier 1 and 2) or Internet services (tier 
3). Tier 1 networks, such as AT&T, Verizon, or NTT Communications, op-
erate based on peer- to- peer agreements, generally covered by non- disclosure 
clauses. There are no overt settlements among tier 1 networks, meaning they 
do not charge among themselves for traffic sent over the networks. Tier 2 
networks pay transit fees to tier 1 providers, while tier 3 ISPs pay to tier 2 
networks. Speaking to the high degree of informality that persists in the in-
frastructure layer, the largest part of the agreements was not— and is not, to 
the present day— recorded in writing. A Packet Clearing House study from 
3 This differentiation, frequently used by the industry, is a functional one that has not been 
formalized.
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2010 to 2011 brings evidence that of 142,210 interconnection and peering 
agreements (representing approximately 86 per cent of all Internet carriers at 
the time), only 0.49 per cent were written.
Domain Name Registrations
The most contentious issue in the 1990s was the creation of a market for do-
main names. The commercial impact of domain name system (DNS) regis-
trations changed the outlook of the decade, with the emergence of companies 
whose activities and profits derived directly from the Internet, the so- called 
dotcoms. In the shaping of the nascent market, the NSF (under the leader-
ship of Steve Wolff) continued to play a steering role. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) subsidies for domain registrations ended in the early 1990s, 
and responsibility for non- military domains was transferred to NSF, which 
continued to subsidize the civilian Internet and awarded, in 1993, a five- year 
contract for managing it to Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), at the time sup-
porting around 7,500 domains. It was the ‘information superhighway’ time, 
and the potential of the Internet was just beginning to be explored.
A 1994 National Research Council report, ‘Realizing the information fu-
ture:  the Internet and beyond’, commissioned by NSF and prepared by a 
team chaired by Kleinrock,4 articulated the benefits of this evolution, but 
also pointed to a number of issues that became heatedly debated throughout 
the decade: intellectual property rights, regulation for the Internet, pricing, 
education, and ethics. Evaluating the performance of the InterNIC contrac-
tors through an expert panel, NSF followed the expert recommendation and 
authorized the NSI to begin charging for .com domain name registrations. In 
1995, the NSF ‘acceptable use policy’ was ended, and NSI was authorized to 
charge annual fees for generic Top- Level Domain names (such as .com and 
.net) until 1998. In this period, the NSI profits increased from $5 million to 
approximately $94 million.
Initial registration would cost $100 for the first two years (minimum 
amount of time for registration), with a subsequent annual renewal of $50. 
The informal allocation of domains— based on the interactions in the small 
technical and academic network at the time of the DNS expansion— was per-
petuated by NSI, their allocation of domains also being performed on a first 
come, first served basis.
The NSF continued to subsidise the .edu registrations as well as, for a 
limited time, the .gov domains. The high increase in registrations compelled 
4 Among the members were also Kahn and Clark.
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InterNIC to adopt automatic processing and to no longer distinguish be-
tween different types of registrants for .com, .net, and .org5 (Mueller 2004, 
112). Unlike manual processing, no reviews were performed under the 
new model, making the InterNIC domain registrations more popular than 
country- code domains, which were generally more restrictively allocated. 
Notably, by July 1996, the number of registrations under InterNIC was 
3.96 million, compared to only 1.52 million for the seven largest country do-
mains combined: the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, and France (Mueller 2004, 114). The interest in .com 
second level domain names skyrocketed from 200 applications per month in 
January 1993 to more than 30,000 by late 1995, and to more than 200,000 
by January 1998. For total registrations, that meant an increase from less than 
15,000 .com second level domains in 1992 to approximately one million in 
January 1995 and over 8 million by 1998 (Post and Kehl 2015). This high 
number of registrations drove the Internet browser developers to make .com 
the default (Mueller 2004) and, in turn, increased the value of the domain.6
This gave way to the formation of the so- called ‘dotcom bubble’,7 with a 
burst around 2001. What became widespread during the 1990s was the prac-
tice of cybersquatting:  the registration, trafficking in, or use of an Internet 
domain name with bad faith intent to profit from a trademark belonging to 
someone else. Intellectual property disputes became a concern, bringing into 
sharper focus the DNS and the authority over it. In reaction to trademark 
lawsuits, NSI issued a Domain Dispute Resolution Policy Statement in July 
1995 for InterNIC- operated domains, serving two purposes. The first was 
to make public the fact that it ‘had neither the legal resources nor the legal 
obligation to screen requested Domain Names to determine if the use of a 
Domain Name by an Applicant may infringe upon the right(s) of a third 
party’ (NSI 1995, § 1). The second purpose was to impose an obligation on 
the registrants to certify that there was no infringement or interference with 
trademarks or intellectual property for the proposed registration and that 
there was bona fide intention in the use of the name. NSI reserved the right 
to withdraw or transfer a domain name if a court or an arbitration panel so 
decided. Under this policy, there was a massive increase in dispute resolutions 
cases, going from around 200 in 1995 to over 907 in 1997. In mid- 1998, 
5 In the process, the practice of assigning one domain name per person was also renounced.
6 In the beginning, no differentiation was made in the fees perceived for domain names, all of 
them being charged the same amount.
7 In academic parlance, the ‘dotcom bubble’ is generally seen as an economic cycle, between the 
late- 1990s and early- 2000s, whereas the Internet boom refers to the constant growth of the Internet 
following the introduction of the World Wide Web (WWW) and search engines.
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the number of cases exceeded 750. The creation of ICANN later that year— 
which solved this problem— is discussed further in this chapter.
Throughout this period, the NSI had physical possession of the ‘A’ 
root, while Jon Postel (under contract with DoD, still physically based at 
the University of Southern California) continued to have policy authority 
over top- level domain names approval and allocation (Weinberg 2011). In 
1995, the control of the main research backbone was entrusted to MCI 
Communications, operating alongside other commercial, academic, and 
non- profit networks.
Web Applications, Information Intermediaries,  
and E- commerce
Following the US administration’s decision to allow commercial Internet ac-
tivities, the network became the largest global market; the development of 
web applications facilitated the e- commerce boom and raised the political 
profile of the Internet. It was the time of the ‘information superhighway’, 
as the Clinton- Gore electoral campaign highlighted. In 1993, the WWW, 
publicly released two years before, was popularized through the broad adop-
tion of the Mosaic browser, co- programmed by Marc Andreessen. Email and 
file sharing, video and audio streaming, web pages, and voice telephony, or 
interactive multi- player games all became profitable areas of investment. To 
a large extent, this market boom tapped into the potential of the Internet 
architecture itself, with its separation of transport and application layers, as 
the Internet protocol remained indifferent to the packets it carried.
Yahoo.com, eBay.com, and msn.com were all launched in 1995. Amazon, 
created one year earlier, started as an online bookstore, but soon diversified 
its offer to software, video, and music downloading, as well as commerce in 
tangible goods. Alongside the giants of the day, many businesses opening up 
online promised overnight success and attracted investors effortlessly. Cassidy 
(2002) revealed that the myth of ‘companies started in a garage’ was so strong 
at the time that Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon, rented a house with a 
garage in Seattle to preserve it. In 1995, Netscape Navigator was launched 
featuring the secure sockets layer, a protocol for encrypting information, used 
primarily for transactions. Microsoft introduced Internet Explorer at the end 
of that year.
Online advertisements also contributed to shaping this virtual market. The 
first online ad, dating back to 1994, was an art museum ‘banner ad’ spon-
sored by AT&T which appeared on HotWired.com. This gave way to one 
of the most successful business models of the Internet era— also known as 
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‘third- party advertising’— based on indexing content and increasingly more 
targeted marketing.
Information intermediation, closely linked to operations such as profiling, 
transactions, or advertising, offered more than what the infrastructure pro-
viders could promise, namely carrying information from point A  to point 
B.  The selection, ranking, aggregation, and sharing of content created by 
others (generally users) proved to be extremely profitable. Google— currently 
operating the most successful search engine worldwide— was formally 
registered in 1998, with the mission to ‘index the world’s information’. This 
fast- expanding company originally used Stanford University’s website with 
the domain google.stanford.edu for the development of the search engine, to 
be later incorporated as a company in a garage in Menlo Park, California. In 
2000, Google launched AdWords, a system for selling search advertising with 
real- time auctions for keywords.
Online social networks began developing in 1997, when Six Degrees facili-
tated contact with former school mates. They were inspired by the user- created 
Usenet discussion and bulletin boards of the 1980s. In 2002, MySpace and 
Friendster were among the first to target primarily young people and became 
more widely used as Internet penetration rates increased. Facebook was re-
leased in 2004, and it was built on the original Facemash platform that Mark 
Zuckerberg designed in 2003 for his fellow Harvard students. The develop-
ment of social networking sites remained largely outside regulatory purview 
during their first years of operation, encouraged to self- regulate.
The dotcom bubble was built on enthusiastic confidence and stock specula-
tion for extra profits sought by an increasing number of Internet- based com-
panies (known as dotcoms)8 and venture capital investment firms. California’s 
Silicon Valley and New York’s financial district were at the centre of it. In 
the crash, many companies went bankrupt, while others suffered huge reces-
sions: the case of Amazon.com is emblematic, with shares dropping from 107 
to 7 before starting to recover steadily. Relying on a ‘first mover advantage’ 
into a new market, company managers predominantly pursued fast busi-
ness development strategies that required substantial financial backing. This 
mostly came via risk investment, as nearly 80 per cent of all venture capital 
resources went to Internet companies in 1999 and 2000. Investment growth 
went from about $7 billion in 1995 to nearly $100 billion in 2000, dropping 
to less than $40 billion per year for the next decade (Zook 2008).
What remained unchanged before and after the dotcom bubble was the 
relatively strong position of information intermediaries. With data as their 
8 This included ISPs such as Netscape, Amazon, Yahoo, etc., but also online advertising com-
panies such as DoubleClick.
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main asset, they started to set the technical constraints and guidelines for 
social behaviour online, defining the codes of conduct for activities ranging 
from defamation to cyberbullying and obscenity. The terms of service, the 
equivalent of the Acceptable Use policy in the early days of the NSFNET, 
were commonly used to define the conduct of the users. The permissive regu-
latory environment in the United States led to a concentration of key players 
in the Silicon Valley, a region of California that became a leading innovation 
hub following the invention of the microprocessor and microcomputer in 
the 1970s.
Regulatory Framework
The globalization of the commercial Internet around the mid- 1990s coin-
cided with the spread of hybrid governance, involving both the public and 
the private sector, often with blurry delimitations of their functions and attri-
butions. Replacing the 1934 Communications Act, the Telecommunications 
Act signed into law by President Clinton in 1996 defined the regulatory re-
gime for services using the same underlying infrastructure. It separated voice 
telephone services and cable television from information services, which re-
mained added- value services (comprising services offering a capability for 
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, 
or making available information via telecommunications). The law separated 
‘telecommunications carriers’ from Internet services carriers, placing broad-
casting and spectrum allotment for the Internet under a different regime. The 
first broadband service, starting at 256 Kbps, was introduced in the United 
States shortly after by @Home.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also included a controversial 
section: the Communications Decency Act (CDA) criminalized the knowing 
transmission of ‘obscene or indecent’ messages to any recipient under 18; and 
also knowingly sending to a person under 18 anything ‘that, in context, de-
picts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs’. That section of 
the CDA was declared unconstitutional on freedom of expression and med-
ical grounds in the first major Supreme Court ruling on the regulation of 
materials distributed online, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997), 
but that did not reduce the plea to regulate online indecency.
Importantly, the CDA also introduced, in section 230, one of the most 
important provisions for information intermediaries in the history of the 
Internet, namely protection from liability for the online actions of their users. 
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Accordingly, section 230, still valid today, states that ‘no provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider’. With 
few limitations in place for criminal and intellectual property- based claims, 
this regime for the protection of intermediaries represented a cornerstone for 
private governing, endowing the intermediaries with rule- setting power after 
a long legal dispute.9
Being the first country to introduce protections against liability for online 
platforms, the United States established itself as a safe haven for Internet 
services, attracting the majority of providers. An outcome of this favourable 
legal environment was the growth of Silicon Valley into a prominent hub for 
high- tech innovation. Moreover, at the international level, the CDA triggered 
John Perry Barlow’s famous declaration on the Independence of Cyberspace 
written in Davos, Switzerland, hailing a space in which governments would 
have no role to play:
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You have 
neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, 
nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not 
think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You 
cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. 
(Barlow 1996)
The decade starting around the time Barlow wrote his declaration was marked 
by strong privatization tendencies, with governmental intervention providing 
the space for industry self- regulation in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’.10 The de-
regulatory agenda of the Clinton administration was enhanced with the 
introduction of the ‘Framework for global electronic commerce’ in 1997, 
which proposed a strategy for promoting global commerce via the Internet 
and empowering the Department of Commerce to be the lead agency on 
this initiative. According to the document, ‘governments must adopt a non- 
regulatory, market- oriented approach to electronic commerce’ based on a 
9 The CDA resulted out of a longer legal battle, fought around two court cases decided in 
New York in the early 1990s, with conflicting outcomes. In the first of these, the 1991 case Cubby, 
Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the court concluded that CompuServe could not be held responsible for 
the defamatory comments posted by a special- interest forum columnist against a competitor as it did 
not review forum content before publication. In the second case, the 1995 case Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., the court found that Prodigy, a web service company with more than 
2 million subscribers and over 60,000 postings a day, did not act as a blind host. It had, in the past, 
moderated some of its online message boards and deleted posts for ‘offensiveness and bad taste’, 
which, for the court, meant that it acted as a publisher and was thus liable for defamatory postings.
10 According to Héritier and Eckert (2008), industry self- regulation is more likely to appear 
when positive incentives are provided or when the threat of legislation is present.
 New Rules under Construction 85
decentralized, contractual model of law in order for the Internet to deliver 
its full economic potential (White House 1997). The first principle of that 
roadmap, that ‘the private sector should lead’, set the standard for the glo-
balization of the Internet. It envisioned governmental oversight applicable 
only to nine areas of regulation, including customs and taxation, electronic 
payments, intellectual property protection, privacy, security, and technical 
standards.
Not only did the US government delegate a number of functions to busi-
nesses, it also actively shaped the future global market. The value and po-
tential of the Internet were widely recognized when the Fourth Protocol to 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services entered into force in 1998. This 
Protocol stirred the liberalization of telecom markets, through the privatiza-
tion of national monopolies, the promotion of competitive services, and the 
establishment of national regulators.
New Rules under Construction
The framework for global electronic commerce was accompanied by a 
Presidential directive calling on the Department of Commerce to ‘support 
efforts to make the governance of the domain name system private and com-
petitive and to create a contractually based self- regulatory regime that deals 
with potential conflicts between domain name usage and trademark laws on 
a global basis’ (Smith 2002). In response to this, the Department issued a 
Request for Comment on domain name administration to which it received 
more than 650 comments.
What prefaced this move by the US administration was a heated debate 
around the creation of new top- level domains (TLDs). This matter was ap-
proached by the technical community on a dedicated mailing- list, newdom, 
created in September 1995. Following discussions on this list, an Internet 
draft was issued, ‘New Registries and the Delegation of International Top- 
Level Domains’ widely known as ‘draft- postel’, which proposed the intro-
duction of 150 new top- level domain names, multiple registries for .com and 
other domains and the chartering of Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) by ISOC. Proposals for alternative TLDs were also popular at the 
time, backed by entities like AlterNIC, Iperdrome, or pgmedia, which in-
tended to create and sell new TLDs such as .web, .arts, or .xxx. While technic-
ally feasible, these domain names were not authorized by IANA to be added 
to the root, and NSI refused to make them visible, meaning that they had a 
minimal perceived value for potential buyers.
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Most importantly, the draft- postel grouping faced the coalition led by the 
incumbent, the NSI, gathering support around a competing proposal, the 
International Forum for the White Paper (IFWP). NSI had been in charge of 
administering additions and deletions to the authoritative root server data-
base since 1993, in accordance with the cooperative agreement it had signed 
first with the NSF, and later with the Department of Commerce (DoC). 
In 1998, the IFWP held public meetings in Reston (Virginia), Geneva, 
Singapore, and Buenos Aires.11 A smaller successor group to the IFWP, re-
ferred to as the Boston Working Group, put forward a proposal for the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
At the time, private sector consensus was also shaped in the framework 
of a different platform, the Global Internet Project (GIP) formed in 1996. 
The GIP was less vocal, but brought together a highly influential group of 
senior executives of sixteen Internet and e- commerce companies (including 
MCI- Worldcom, IBM, etc.). It served as an advisory committee to the World 
Information and Telecommunication Association (WITSA), a consortium of 
ICT industry associations worldwide. In 1998, the GIP was led by IBM’s 
vice- president for Internet technology, John Patrick and started working on 
IG by providing strategic direction for corporate interests, which would be 
subsequently implemented by the Information Technology Association of 
America, a Washington- based business lobby group hosting the secretariat 
of WITSA. The primary goal of the GIP was, in their phrasing, ‘not to shape 
government regulation, but instead promote industry actions that will min-
imize the need for such regulation’. Alongside the GIP, the International 
Chamber of Commerce also contributed to the White Paper debates pre-
senting an Internet economy perspective.
In response to the harsh critiques to the Postel plan, ISOC announced, in 
mid- November 1996, the formation of the International Ad Hoc Committee 
(IAHC). The IAHC was chaired by ISOC’s Don Health and comprised rep-
resentatives of standard- setting organizations such as the IETF, intellectual 
property organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), as well as the International Trademark Association (INTA) and civil 
society and business representatives. Joining them was also a delegate from 
the NSF. The proposal they came up with differed from the Postel plan in 
three regards. First, it projected the addition of seven new generic TLDs12 to 
the DNS, as opposed to the 150 suggested before. Second, it introduced the 
functional differentiation of the registry and registrar functions, which did 
11 Harvard’s Berkman Center was originally involved in facilitating the meetings, and withdrew 
subsequently.
12 The new gTLDs proposed were: .web, .rec, .info, .firm, .store, .nom, .arts.
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not exist in the NSI model. The registry function referred to the collection, 
storage, and maintenance of data, alongside the operation of name servers 
that provided updated authoritative lists of domains. The registrar performed 
the retail function, managing the reservation of the domain names (if not 
already taken).
To manage the new governance system, the IAHC plan envisioned a global 
monopoly registry co- owned by multiple, competing registrars, sharing access 
to the same TLDs. The total number of registrars was limited to twenty- eight 
companies selected by lottery, four for each of the seven geographical regions. 
Registrars would be incorporated in a not- for- profit Council of Registrars 
(CORE) headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, upon an entry fee of $20,000 
and a monthly payment of $2,000. For the stewardship of the domain- name 
space, a Policy Oversight Committee would be formed, grouping represen-
tatives of ISOC, IANA, Internet Activities Board (IAB), CORE, but also 
the ITU, WIPO, and INTA (similar to the composition of the IAHC), sup-
ported by the Policy Advisory Board that could be joined by any signatory 
of this governance framework. The third key difference was the introduc-
tion of a complex mandatory arbitration system centred on domain name 
challenge panels placed under WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Center. 
The IAHC later drafted the Generic Top- Level Domain Memorandum of 
Understanding (gTLD- MoU).
Glaringly, the issue of trademarks in Internet domain names was neglected 
by the technical community despite its increasing commercial and political 
salience at the time. In contrast, the IAHC attempt to design a system that 
took into account the varied interests garnered more support, just like the 
NSI initiative bringing together private stakeholders under the IFWP. Both 
had a multi- stakeholder composition:  the IAHC gathered representatives 
from various intergovernmental organizations such as the ITU, WIPO, the 
US NSF, trademark interest representatives, and intellectual property owners, 
whereas the IFWP, steered by NSI, had the private sector and members of 
academia involved.
The most significant attempt to internationalize the debates and to include 
civil society actors, the IFWP, was by- passed in the final stages of the creation 
of ICANN. In March 1997, the gTLD- MoU was signed by Heath and Postel 
in an official ceremony in Geneva at the ITU. It was drafted by the IAHC, 
building on support from trademark owners. In spite of the controversies it 
stirred, the document garnered the support of over 223 public and private or-
ganizations several months after its announcement, in particular from entities 
outside the United States. The ITU Secretary- General presented the MoU 
as a form of ‘voluntary multilateralism’ (Tarjanne 1997) and his institution 
offered to serve as the official repository of the MoU. Opposing the MoU 
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were US multinationals such as IBM and AT&T, the incumbent NSI, but 
also European companies such as British Telecom, trademark holders, and 
those concerned with a more prominent role of the ITU in Internet matters, 
including the US government.
At the time, more than half of Internet users were based in the United 
States.13 A proposal for creating a new governance system outside the United 
States prompted the formation of the Interagency Working Group in the 
US government. As the MoU was gaining momentum, Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright confirmed, in a cable sent to the US mission in Geneva on 
1 May 1997, that the US government ‘has not yet developed a position on 
any of the proposals to reform the Internet domain name system, including 
the gTLD- MoU, nor on the appropriate role, if any, of the ITU, WIPO, or 
other international organisations in the administration of the Internet’ (cited 
in Mueller 2004, 157). The day after, the Interagency Working Group an-
nounced that it opposed the plan. On 2 July 1997, the DoC issued a Request 
for Comments on DNS administration, soliciting public comments on four 
specific aspects: overall framework, the creation of new TLDs, policies for 
domain name registrars, and trademark issues. More than 430 comments— 
totalling over 1,500 pages— were received during the comment period. This 
astonishing interest in the direction the DNS privatization would take is in-
dicative of the high stakes in the process and the growing awareness around it.
Before the issue was settled, Jon Postel demonstrated his authority over the 
root though a redirection of the root server from NSI to IANA at the begin-
ning of 1998. This was done by eight of the twelve operators of the Internet’s 
regional root nameservers. The remaining four were under the direct control 
of the US government. Although the transfer did not affect the experience 
of the users, Postel was forced by senior US officials to restore the manage-
ment of the DNS and complied with the request. His action also prompted 
a formal response from the NTIA, which issued ‘A proposal to improve tech-
nical management of Internet names and addresses’ the week after, on 30 
January 1998. The proposed rulemaking, or ‘Green Paper’, was published 
in the Federal Register on 20 February, and invited comments on the out-
line of the process by which the US government planned to privatize the 
DNS. Among the rationales listed were the need to move away from ad- hoc 
decision- making by individuals and entities not formally accountable to the 
Internet community and the inadequacy of continuous funding from US 
research agencies (NSF and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
13 According to the US Census Bureau data, there were more than 40 million Internet users in 
the United States in 1997.
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(DARPA)) for an increasingly more commercial Internet. In the process, the 
DoC would coordinate the US government policy role.
On 10 June 1998, the DoC announced in a ‘White Paper’ its readiness 
to sign an agreement with a new non- profit corporation formed by private 
sector Internet stakeholders. The policy statement mentioned that ‘overall 
policy guidance and control of the [TLDs] and the Internet root server 
system should be vested in a single organization that is representative of 
Internet users around the globe’ (NTIA 1998). The organization would be 
constituted based on the four principles put forward in the public consult-
ation:  Internet stability, competition, private bottom- up coordination, and 
global representation.
Postel continued to play a key role in the process. He appointed the IAHC 
members and, together with IBM’s Brian Carpenter, active in the GIP under 
the IBM leadership and chair of the IAB, also appointed an IANA Transition 
Advisory Group (ITAG) in 1998. With five out of its six members with for- 
profit affiliations,14 the ITAG reflected the strong position of the private 
sector at the time and throughout the negotiations. The Postel- led group sub-
sequently established ICANN in September 1998 as a private, California- 
based, not- for- profit corporation. In September 1998, the DoC signed an 
MoU with NSF for transferring the responsibilities performed by NSI to 
the DoC, which then amended the agreement to continue to have Network 
Solutions as the operator of the Authoritative root server, this time under the 
direction of the DoC (GAO 2000).
That month, ICANN was legally incorporated and indicated to the DoC 
that it would submit a bid in response to the policy statement. In October, 
the DoC signed three agreements with ICANN: (a) an MoU for a joint DNS 
project, (b)  a cooperative research and development agreement, and (c)  a 
sole source contract for technical function relating to the coordination of 
the DNS (GAO 2000). The four months that passed between the White 
Paper and the allocation of the decision to ICANN were marked by intense 
debates. The innovative approach adopted by the US administration15 was 
explicit in the DoC NTIA prioritization of ‘private sector leadership’ and 
14 The ITAG had six members:  Brian Carpenter (IBM and IAB), Randy Bush (Verio, Inc.), 
David Farber (University of Pennsylvania), Geoff Huston (Telstra), John Klensin (MCI), and Steve 
Wolff (Cisco). Wolff formerly acted as director of NSF’s Computer and Information Sciences and 
Engineering Division, supervising the transition to the commercial Internet. He joined Cisco 
in 1994.
15 This approach also faced harsh critiques, such as the one from the Harvard professor Lawrence 
Lessig: ‘we are creating the most significant jurisdiction since the Louisiana purchase . . . and we are 
building it outside the review of the Constitution’ (2006, 318).
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‘industry self- regulation’.16 According to Stuart Lynn, president and CEO of 
the Corporation between 2001 and 2003, ICANN was to serve as an alterna-
tive to the traditional multilateral treaty model pre- dating the Internet:
I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a purely private sector 
body, based on consensus and consent, had been shown to be impractical  . . . But 
I am also convinced that, for a resource as changeable and dynamic as the Internet, a 
traditional governmental approach as an alternative to ICANN remains a bad idea. 
(Lynn 2002)
At the end of 1998, ICANN was granted the authority to set policy for 
and manage the DNS, as well as the allocation and assignment of Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses. It operated on a contractual basis, primarily with 
registries (in charge of operating and administering the master database of 
each TLD name registered) and accredited registrars (the companies or or-
ganizations from which consumers buy domain names). The delegation of 
authority from the US government was, however, not complete. The DoC 
retained ‘residual authority’ (Mueller 2004) over the DNS root via the IANA 
functions for longer than the two- year period originally envisioned, which 
continued to be the focus of debates for the next two decades. The voice of 
developing countries was little heard in these initial negotiations establishing 
the governance framework for the technical ruling of domain names and re-
lated market formation.
The Creation of ICANN
Both the White Paper and the initial Board of ICANN presented the new 
organization as a ‘technical coordinator’. The narrow mandate thus delim-
ited would serve a legitimation purpose for the subsequent conflicts around 
the functions to be performed in the new context. The policymaking pro-
cess within ICANN and the extensive influence of the US government re-
mained a Gordian knot over the years. In ICANN’s phrasing, ‘policy’ refers 
to guidelines for making technical decisions, for instance the way in which 
parameters for protocols are assigned, or the conditions under which the IP 
address blocks are allocated or country- code top- level domains (cc- TLDs) are 
redelegated. Similarly, policies could regard the creation of new TLDs and 
16 For Mueller (1999, 504), industry self- regulation was ‘an appealing label for a process that 
could be more accurately described as the US government brokering a behind- the- scenes deal 
among what it perceived as the major players— both private and governmental’ (in relation to the 
creation of ICANN).
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related specifications as discussed in the key proposals preceding the estab-
lishment of ICANN.
The 1998 White Paper made reference to bottom- up governance as a char-
acteristic of Internet development and specified that ‘the US government 
policy applies only to management of Internet names and addresses and does 
not set out a system of Internet “governance” ’. In a written exchange with 
consumer advocates back in 1999, Esther Dyson, Chair of the ICANN Board 
of Directors, made the following statement:
The White Paper articulates no Internet governance role for ICANN, and the Initial 
Board shares that (negative) view. Therefore, ICANN does not ‘aspire to address’ any 
Internet governance issues; in effect, it governs the plumbing, not the people. It has a 
very limited mandate to administer certain (largely technical) aspects of the Internet 
infrastructure in general and the Domain Name System in particular. (Dyson 1999)
However, for almost a decade after, Internet governance was synonymous with 
the management of technical resources and the work of ICANN (Mueller 
2004; Chenou and Radu 2015). The attention it raised was mostly due to 
the legitimacy and accountability concerns around its new role. To overcome 
the tensions of a UN- versus a US- solution and to respond to the increasing 
number of cybersquatting cases, WIPO was invited to initiate a process for 
resolving domain name trademark disputes. Deeply involved in the consult-
ations around the best institutional design for ICANN, WIPO also played 
a formal role in the creation of the organization, as envisioned in the NTIA 
1998 White Paper. This involvement at the early stage was seen as a com-
promise for the Europeans and Australians, who sought to counterbalance 
the American oversight of ICANN (Mueller 1999, 505– 6).
From the start, WIPO was represented in the Governmental Advisory 
Committee of ICANN, together with the ITU, Organisation for Economic 
Co- operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and 
fifty- nine national governments. Back in 1998 and 1999, the close relation-
ship between WIPO and ICANN was built around creating new rights or 
expanding rights to names (Mueller 2010, 232). Early cooperation between 
the two organizations revealed fears regarding the use of pre- emptive regu-
lation, for example through name exclusions (blocking the use of particular 
names or words).17 In this debate, WIPO originally asked for the exclusion 
17 The cooperation between ICANN and WIPO was strengthened in the new gTLD programme 
launched in 2012, as the latter was deemed the exclusive provider of dispute resolution services for 
Legal Rights Objections (LRO) through its Arbitration and Mediation Center. The LRO allows 
trademark owners and intergovernmental organizations to file a formal objection to a third party’s 
application for a new TLD for infringement of an existing trademark, IGO name, or acronym in 
the pre- delegation phase.
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of major trademark holders from the first domain name process, but the pro-
posal was turned down. Nonetheless, the other WIPO recommendation— 
the implementation of an alternative dispute resolution method for Internet 
cases— was accepted. This initiative, known as Universal Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), became the ‘overwhelmingly preferred 
mechanism for domain name dispute resolution’18 as early as 2001 (Sharrock 
2001, 819).
The UDRP was stipulated in advance as a dispute resolution mechanism in all 
contracts involving the registration of gTLDs and some cc- TLDs. Uniquely, its 
arbitration awards were applied directly through changes in the DNS without re-
sorting to enforcement via national courts. Domain name disputes treated under 
this policy rarely reached the litigation phase. Binding all registrars, the UDRP 
stipulated that most types of trademark- based domain name disputes must be 
resolved through agreement, arbitration, or court action before a registrar would 
take action (cancelling, suspending, or transferring a domain name). In practice, 
the complainants must prove that the disputed domain name is identical or con-
fusingly similar to a trademark or a service mark in which the complainant has 
rights; the registrant does not have any rights or legitimate interest in the domain 
name; and the domain has been registered and is being used in bad faith. All dis-
putes launched under UDRP are submitted to independent panellists, primarily 
trademark lawyers selected from an expert list.19
The creation of ICANN gave birth to multiple compromises, also visible in 
the initial structure of the organization. The IANA functions, previously per-
formed by Jon Postel, remained separate in the ICANN structure. ICANN 
administered IANA under a contractual relationship with the NTIA, which 
continued to have an oversight role until 2016. The IANA functions have 
historically included:  (1) the coordination of the assignment of technical 
IP parameters; (2)  the administration of certain responsibilities associated 
with Internet DNS root zone management; (3)  the allocation of Internet 
numbering resources; and (4) other services related to the management of 
.arpa and .int TLDs. For the IP addresses, as of 2003, IANA delegated the 
distribution of blocks of addresses to the Number Resource Organization 
(NRO).20
18 The number of domain names in WIPO cases in 2013 peaked at 6,191, a 22 per cent increase 
compared with the previous year. For the same year, 2,585 cybersquatting cases were filed with the 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, a 10.4 per cent decrease compared to 2012 (Chenou and 
Radu 2015).
19 WIPO is one of the five UDRP service providers curating one such list of potential panellists.
20 In turn, NRO assigned the blocks of addresses via its five member organizations, the Regional 
Internet Registries (RIRs), covering Europe, Africa, America and Canada, Asia- Pacific, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
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Governments started being involved in ICANN in an advisory capacity via 
the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) as early as March 1999. The 
first GAC was chaired by Australia’s Paul Twomey and comprised represen-
tatives of fifty- nine national governments and of the EU, OECD, ITU, and 
WIPO. Upon their first meeting in 1999, GAC members affirmed the status 
of the DNS as a ‘public resource’. Some governments subsequently started 
being involved via the country code supporting organizations, responsible for 
policies exclusively concerning national domains, whose ownership diversi-
fied over the years. The initial delegations made by Postel relied on personal 
relations established in the technical community; the growth of the Internet 
and its increasing salience compelled a number of governments to ask for in-
creased and oftentimes formalized control at the national level.
At the outset, ICANN comprised two constituencies, namely the Domain 
Name Supporting Organisation (DNSO) and the membership structure 
set to elect the nine At- Large board members. A ground- breaking attempt 
to enhance community participation was the 2000 global election for five 
At- Large Directors, one from each geographical region. It was the first time 
ICANN designed a process that would involve the global public by giving 
them a direct online vote in determining the governing structure. The At- 
large Directors election was an attempt to implement broad inclusiveness, 
but only 30,000 out of 176,837 registered electors (anyone in the world 
could register with an email and postal address) casted a vote. The practice of 
global elections has since been dropped.
Recurrent questions of legitimacy and accountability undermined the 
work of ICANN over the years. In 2000, ICANN introduced the set of seven 
TLDs,21 including specialized TLDs22 with a sponsor, which would generally 
be delegated a number of responsibilities over policy- formulation for that de-
fined group of interest. The newly introduced sponsored domains constituted 
a proof of concept for a larger expansion phase, started at the end of 2003 and 
completed in 2004, which brought eight new TLDs.23 As the DNS was ex-
panding, the need for an appropriate repartition of roles among stakeholders 
and a better inclusion of national governments seemed necessary. A report by 
ICANN president Stuart Lynn entitled ‘ICANN— The case for change’ (Lynn 
2002) paved the way for a deep reform of the organization in order to strike 
a new balance between public and private governance and to gain more legit-
imacy at the global level. One of the main changes in the ICANN structure 
21 Among the seven new TLDs were: .biz, .info, .name, and .pro.
22 The three sponsored TLDs were: .aero, .coop, and .museum.
23 The following gTLDs were successfully introduced in 2004: .asia, .cat, .jobs, .mobi, .post, .tel., 
.xxx, and .travel.
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was the strengthening of the role of the GAC. Developing countries saw the 
GAC as the policy forum of IG, while the other bodies of the organization 
were to take charge of technical matters. The result of the reform process was 
embodied by the new by- laws of the corporation that entered into force on 
15 December 2002. The resulting structure has been described as ‘ICANN 
2.0’ and as a ‘public- private partnership’ (Kleinwaechter 2003). The reform 
also triggered the creation of an At- Large Advisory Committee designed to 
include the ‘community of individual Internet users’ and to strengthen the 
participation of civil society in the daily operations of the organization.
The reform was oriented towards enhancing the legitimacy of ICANN 
through a structured participation of affected parties in the policymaking 
process. To achieve that, ICANN divided participants based on the constitu-
ency they belonged to (ISPs, intellectual property owners, and commercial 
business users; non- commercial users, not- for- profits, registrars, and regis-
tries), the nature of their interests (commercial or non- commercial) and the 
function they intended to perform: supporting organizations for the recom-
mendation of specific policies, or advisory groups to the Board of Directors 
on any ICANN- related issue. As these changes indicated, the ICANN stakes 
were not strictly market- related. In the construction of a new system of rules, 
the management of key Internet resources was a source of tension for the 
power positions it allocated. The historical control of the Internet’s name and 
address space was important not only for the technical community seeking to 
preserve its independence, but also for trademark owners looking to enforce 
claims about exclusive rights. Similarly, governments, computer industry, and 
civil society groups expressed strong interest in ICANN policymaking pro-
cesses and demanded a seat at the table.
Following the restructuring mentioned above, the business community and 
civil society organizations were offered two ways to participate in the ICANN 
policy development process: either through the Generic Names Supporting 
Organisation (GNSO), which made policy recommendations specifically 
related to gTLDs, or through the At- Large community, which advised the 
Board. Non- commercial interests subsequently found a home in the Non- 
Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) of the GNSO, to advance policy 
objectives such as human rights, education, access to knowledge, freedom 
of expression, privacy rights, etc. End- users were invited to participate in 
ICANN in an individual capacity via the At- Large structures.
ICANN Negotiations: Political Stakes
The proposals for governing domain names prior to the creation of ICANN 
embedded the tenets of the time: the free- market, open competition ideology 
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(Postel- plan) faced the public resource discourse, be it under a form of public- 
private oversight (IAHC) or under industry self- regulation (MoU). In the 
plan designed by Postel, the governance of the Internet was strictly under-
stood as the technical allocation of unique domain names and IP addresses. 
Other aspects, mentioned in the 1996 draft- postel abstract, were bound to 
be ‘determined, and coordinated, by contractual agreements between private 
interests’. Tough reactions from intellectual property owners, intergovern-
mental organizations, and some states confirmed that a broader support base 
was needed in order to obtain legitimacy and acceptance for the new govern-
ance system, since a number of stakeholders were marginalized throughout 
the process.
The debates that led to the establishment of ICANN involved only a 
small number of individuals and organizations, mostly from the United 
States. National governments from developing countries did not take part 
in the negotiations. Historically, civil society groups played a limited role in 
the founding of the institution and its early years (Gross 2011), gradually 
increasing its presence in different committees over time. Given the struc-
ture envisioned at the outset, civil society did not exert the same influence 
as the other three stakeholder groups (Commercial Stakeholder Group, the 
Registrars Stakeholder Group, and the Registries Stakeholder Group) in the 
development of policies. Even after several reforms, ICANN’s governance 
structure continued to be a unique hybrid power structure involving the tech-
nical community, businesses, governments, and different groupings of civil 
society. The restructuring of the organization happening in the early 2000s 
did not put an end to the debates around the core questions of legitimacy and 
the specific role of governments and, in particular, that of the United States in 
global processes of IG. While greater autonomy was given to ICANN by the 
US DoC, the successive Memoranda of Understanding and the Affirmation 
of Commitment have come under heavy critique as illegitimate supervision 
by a single government (e.g. Singh 2009, Weber and Gunnarson 2012). The 
extensive scholarly literature that was critical of ICANN also played a role in 
raising awareness of this issue (Mueller 1999).
The creation of a private sector- led governance system outside traditional 
organizations for regulating a global network raised important transparency 
and accountability issues. If ICANN was to manage some of the critical re-
sources of the Internet, who was it accountable to? And how could its op-
erations be supervised? The ICANN structure gave way to asking broader 
questions about the legitimacy of the entire governance system. Transparency 
was seen as an important aspect of the organization’s legitimacy. One of the 
most discussed aspects of the ICANN by- laws before their adoption was the 
inclusion of transparency procedures and participation mechanisms. A suit 
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was successfully filed against ICANN for the lack of transparency provisions 
in its original procedures (ICANN 2002). Broader concerns about demo-
cratic procedures within ICANN were also in focus (Koppell 2005).
As a result, participation in ICANN processes remained contested. Among 
the key questions were the following: Who were the stakeholders? How were 
they represented? And in what proportion compared to other stakeholders? 
Marginalized actors such as civil society organizations, individual users, and 
developing countries’ governments were part of peripheral bodies whereas the 
representatives of the Postel- led ‘dominant coalition’ controlled the core of 
the organization. A global membership was foreseen in the by- laws but was 
never implemented. The failure of the ICANN global elections in 2000 illus-
trated the difficulty of implementing meaningful participation mechanisms.
Finally, in retrospect, the tension stemming from the evolving role of the 
GAC did not diminish. The GAC— comprising representatives of national 
governments and intergovernmental organizations— was originally designed as 
an advisory body that would act only upon the request of the Board, in accord-
ance with the US DoC vision (articulated in 1998) of a limited role of national 
governments in the management of the network. The US NTIA retained the 
oversight power over the IANA function, while other governments struggled to 
become more influential in the organization, gradually drawing attention to the 
political nexus in IG. Divergent views regarding the role of the state consoli-
dated and ICANN became the symbolic locus of central IG struggles.
After the 2003 reform, the organization resembled a public– private part-
nership and continued to clash with the traditional ‘one state, one vote’ prin-
ciple of intergovernmental organizations. The Board remained the central 
body of the California- based corporation and, in the view of many, ICANN 
largely escaped the control of national governments (Mathiason 2009). Thus, 
the institutional development of ICANN did not completely solve the issues 
of participation and legitimacy that had emerged at the time of its creation. 
The changing international context of the early 2000s accelerated the debate 
on the role of national governments in IG, making it apparent that the con-
flict of governance modes would enduringly shape the nascent issue domain. 
The dotcom crisis had undermined confidence in the self- governance of the 
private sector and the organization that merged private initiative with public 
interest functions, but remained under US government oversight, only in-
spired more controversy.
Mechanisms of Governance
The decade leading up to 2005 marked a new turn in the interaction between 
the public and the private domain. Innovative forms of private governance, 
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brought into place by governmental action, revealed a strong dimension of 
hybridity. The expansion of the Internet worldwide embedded the neoliberal 
ideology and the deregulation trend, which in turn gave rise to power and 
legitimacy concerns relative to the new institutional creations. While the 
state did not disappear completely after defining the market conditions, rule- 
making processes for the Internet had to be positioned against property rights 
regimes, existing governance structures and rules of exchange.
The incomplete privatization of the DNS was the exception, rather than the 
norm, in the dominant private ordering that solidified during the ‘Internet 
boom’ decade. Corporate strategies and policies, coupled with market- driven 
approaches to regulation fostered the salient role of corporate actors, bringing 
about new online business models. Peer- to- peer agreements, exchange con-
tracts, content development and management, and end- user contracts be-
came the main instruments for the functioning of the newly created market. 
But there was more to it. The privatization trends also touched the technical 
standardization work of groups that presented themselves as independent and 
autonomous.
The policy development process in technical organizations such as 
ICANN or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), generally bottom- 
up, consensus- based, and open to anyone,24 suffered transformations. The 
focus shifted from protocols and standards for the smooth functioning of the 
Internet to a business- driven agenda. The IETF was not exempt from it, as 
remarked by one long- term contributor to its processes, Avri Doria:
It was quite blatant. At some point we needed to bring forward at least two companies 
willing to develop something before we could put a new tech project on the table. It 
has since softened a bit, but for a while it was quite absolute. (McCarthy 2016)
The strong self- regulation trend fomented by the US DoC brought to the fore 
competing logics, meanings, and practices associated with the Internet. They 
all converged in the negotiations for establishing a new organization for the 
management of the ‘phone book’ of the Internet, presently known as ICANN. 
The focus on trademarks and the litigation in domain names illustrate the 
concerns of the late 1990s that intensified over the years. The pre- emptive 
regulation via name exclusions and the sunrise procedures for trademark 
owners were rooted in the regulatory logic dominating at the beginning of the 
dotcom boom. The privileged position of the intellectual property industry— 
not least in the ICANN– WIPO dispute resolution system— expanded as the 
Internet spread worldwide.
24 Exceptions include some closed meetings of the W3C, and the membership limited to RIRs 
in the NRO.
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The de facto institutionalization of IG happened with the participation of 
private actors. A similar evolution can be noted for the merging of technical, 
legal, and economic logics in establishing the priorities of IG. Based on the 
analysis of the governance instruments in the dataset— presented in Table 
3— the focus on operative modelling dominated the decade (23 per cent of 
the instances recorded). E- commerce, cybercrime, and intellectual property 
rights were explicitly targeted in efforts to create new rules.
The majority of authoritative governance instruments deployed during this 
period fall in the modelling category. Legal enshrinement follows suit, rep-
resenting the preferred solution in almost a third of instances. Absent the 
consensus needed for a cyberspace treaty— regularly called for in the 1990s— 
conventions and agreements established regionally defined a set of rules 
for state– state and state– private sector interactions. Illustrative of this were 
two important developments. The first was the fact that the Convention on 
Cybercrime adopted by the Council of Europe (CoE) in November 2002 was 
open to non- CoE members to sign and ratify. The political process behind 
this revealed the need to act in a unified way for tackling challenges that could 
no longer be isolated to a national or regional context.
The second key development was the landmark decision of the Tribunal 
de grande instance in Paris in the case Ligue contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme 
et Union des étudiants juifs de France v. Yahoo! Inc. et Société Yahoo! France 
(LICRA v. Yahoo!), reaffirming the anchoring of the Internet in geography 
and in existing law. LICRA complained that Yahoo! allowed their online auc-
tion service to be used for the sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period, 
contrary to Article R645- 1 of the French Criminal Code. After establishing 
its competence to hear the case, the high court concluded that the auctions 
for Nazi memorabilia were open to French residents, despite their prohibition 
under French criminal law, and that Yahoo! was aware of the location of users 
accessing these pages, as proved by targeted advertising in the national lan-
guage for computers connecting from France. It subsequently ruled against 
Yahoo!, thus imposing a geo- location obligation. Yahoo! contested the deci-
sion through a declaratory relief action in a Californian court, which found 
that geo- location filtering software violated Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights 
and was therefore unenforceable. This case set a precedent and fomented im-
portant discussions about the links between freedom of expression, regulation 
of online content, and technical means for selective display of items.
Such tensions, testing the exceptionalism of the Internet against existing 
laws, also articulated an important legal debate extending into the mid- 2000s. 
Was the Internet to be bound by new, cyber- sensitive laws? Or could it be in-
tegrated under rules already in place, since those remained applicable none-
theless? Data communication introduced a set of policies that were inherently 
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(continued )
Table 3 Governance mechanisms (global and regional) for the period 1994– 2004 
(based on a total of seventy- four instruments recorded in the database)






16% 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty
2000 Safe Harbour Agreement (USA– EU)
2001 CoE Convention on Cybercrime
2001 CIS Agreement on Cooperation in 






11% 1999 WIPO– ICANN Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy
2000 E- commerce Directive
2000 ECtHR Rotaru v. Romania
2001 US v. Microsoft Corporation
2002 Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications





15% 1995 Article 29 Working Party on Data 
Protection
1995 Global Information Infrastructure 
Commission
1997 APEC Intellectual Property Rights 
Expert Group





12% 1998 WTO Work Programme for Electronic 
Commerce
2000 UN Millennium Development Goals
2002 APEC Shanghai Program of Action




3% 1998 Spamhause— abuse tracking and 
notification
1999 World Bank/ UNESCO ICT Statistics 
in Education (WISE)
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Table 3 Continued
global, as the identifier space was not bound by a territorial dimension. At 
the same time, the issues emerging in the cyberspace were not entirely dif-
ferent from those regulated offline, although their salient features might have 
transformed in the process of moving online. Infringements of intellectual 
property rights and online fraud, in particular, expanded in scale and speed 
favoured by the low costs associated with their enactment.
The period leading up to 2003 marked the emergence of Internet- specific 
regulation at the global and regional levels. Unlike in the previous decade, 
more than half of the instruments negotiated during this period focused dir-
ectly on the Internet, as opposed to covering it tangentially. Representing a 
key moment for the institutionalization of IG in the late 1990s, this attention 
to further specialization also represented an act of politicization. The delicate 
balance between formal and informal governance constantly evolving, formal 
mechanisms were no less the result of interactions with informal networks 
or with lobbying. In the case of ICANN, that was obvious in the concerted 
attempts towards establishing a more accountable governance system, while 
preserving a fragmented nature of supervision and narrow enforcement power.
As the domain continued to mature, the links between the private sector 
and the public authorities started to be formalized via regulation, gradually 
reducing the dependence on individuals and interpersonal networks. The 
Mechanisms Instruments % Examples
Modelling Discursive 20% 1998 OECD Ministerial Declaration on 
Authentication for Electronic Commerce
1999 CoE Recommendation for the 
Protection of Privacy on the Internet
2002 UNGA Combating the Criminal 
Misuse of Information Technologies (56/ 121)
2003 UNESCO Charter on the Preservation 
of Digital Heritage
Operative 23% 1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce
1997 G8 24/ 7 Network of Contacts for 
High- Tech Crime
2002 Guidelines for the Security of 
Information Systems and Networks
2004 Arab League Model Law on Combating 
Information Technology Offences
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common use of binding legislation stands proof to that. The lack of attention 
to sanctions and the limited efforts invested in monitoring exposed the fact 
that the new ordering was in- the- making. The political stakes exposed in the 
negotiations indicated strong ideological and diplomatic tensions that ma-
terialised in threats of sanction.
As Figure 1 shows, throughout this period, the focus revolved around se-
curity concerns (in particular cybercrime and spam), and legal issues, targeting 
particularly jurisdiction, arbitration, and intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
For authors like Castells (2001, 177– 8), it was the threat posed by cybercrime 
that restored state power during the early 2000s: ‘it became necessary for the 
most important governments to act together, creating a new global space of 
policing . . . a network of regulatory and policing agencies’. He linked that to 
the focus on surveillance, a tool which allowed for regulation and policing 
by traditional forms of state power. In connection with the focus on trade 
and e- commerce, another preoccupation arose: what risked jeopardizing the 
new market was the increase in cybercrime and the expansion of the ‘deep 
web’. Michael Bergman (2001) coined this terminology using the metaphor 
of dragging a net across the surface of the ocean, missing the information 
hidden in the underwater depths (outside the reach of search engines, and 
thus more difficult to find). In 2001, the deep web consisted of 7.5 petabytes.
The success and the collapse of the indexed web and the online market it 
created brought into sharper focus the two main preoccupations of regulators 
at the end of the 1990s: ensuring security online and promoting trade. In its 
fight against cyberterrorism following the 9/ 11 attacks on the World Trade 




















Figure 1 Variation of governance mechanisms across subfields (1994– 2004)
Note: total does not add up due to multiple cases in which an instrument covers several subfields
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2001, which made it illegal to advise or assist terrorists, including via online 
means. Many private initiatives emerged to curb the availability of terrorism- 
related materials online in partnership with Internet service providers, with 
varying degrees of success. Four years later, in the aftermath of the London 
attacks, stricter content controls were also introduced by European countries, 
in particular in the area of hate speech. Together with child online sexual 
abuse, these were the two focus areas for the illegal content monitored by the 
European network of hotlines, INHOPE, established in 1999.
As early as 1998, discussions started in the UN General Assembly with a 
draft resolution proposed by Russia on ‘information security’ with yearly it-
erations, followed by the 2002 ‘culture of cybersecurity’ resolution sponsored 
by the United States (Radu 2013). Another significant 1998 development at 
the international level was the successful negotiation by the US delegation of 
an amendment to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements to treat 
the Internet as a duty- free trade zone. Accordingly, exchanges through the 
Internet were exempted from tariffs and duties on the basis of a temporary 
moratorium on taxes on cross- border data flows, which has been continu-
ously renewed. This represented a competitive advantage for the American 
companies providing Internet- related goods and services. The United States 
thus became the first country to apply trade policies to govern cross- border 
information flows (Aaronson 2015).
Concomitantly, the developmental aspects grew in salience in Internet gov-
ernance discussions. The intensification of debates around information and 
communication technologies for development (ICT4D) deserves a separate 
discussion here. Driven by UN agencies, OECD,25 the G8, or the World 
Economic Forum, the plethora of transnational efforts to reduce the global 
digital divide stemmed from the recognition of this problem as a multidi-
mensional gap and economic limitation with long- term consequences. The 
meaning of the ‘digital divide’— a term coined by Lloyd Morrisett, presi-
dent of the Markle Foundation— came to incorporate more elements than 
the original divide between information haves and have- nots (Gunkel 2003). 
It was initially linked to the ownership of personal computers, but evolved 
into encompassing more than just patterns of Internet access. Popularized 
with the 1998 publication of the report of the NTIA having the term ‘digital 
divide’ in the title, the concept acquired media attention in the United States 
and worldwide (Parker 2000). ‘Falling through the Net II: New Data on the 
Digital Divide’, a continuation of the ‘Falling through the Net’ project from 
25 The OECD (2001) defined the digital divide as:  ‘the gap between individuals, households, 
businesses and geographic areas at different socio- economic levels with regard both to their oppor-
tunities to access ICT and to their use of the Internet for wide variety of activities’.
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1995, found that variation in the penetration levels was linked to income, 
education level, and race. The instruments capturing development aspects 
remained predominantly linked to modelling, rather than direct institutional 
involvement and resource allocation. ICT4D remained the focus of attention 
on a discursive level and a key dimension in subsequent UN negotiations.
Actors
With the creation of ICANN, the grouping of ‘technical bodies’ crystal-
lized in IG. They represented stable arrangements in a shifting policy mi-
lieu and fostered recursive interactive relationships in a space of volatile 
institutional arrangements. The main activities they engaged in had no 
territorial binding: the development of IP standards; the administration, 
coordination, and allocation of IP addresses; the delegation of domain 
names; the coordination of the root server system; the coordination of 
procedures related to the technical coordination of the Internet, were all 
global. Mueller (2010, 4)  argued that organically developed institutions 
provided ‘a new locus of authority for key decisions about standards and 
critical resources’. Yet their authority also derived from and consolidated 
via transversal links with other organizations, including those that were in 
competition in the early days.
From the beginning of the 1990s, the IETF and the ITU 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU- T) were already cooper-
ating informally. In the context of the emergence of a specific institutional 
framework for the Internet in the second half of the 1990s, the cooperation 
between the IETF and other organizations was clarified and in some cases 
formalized. A Request for Comments (RFC 2436) on the ‘Collaboration 
between ISOC/ IETF and ITU- T’ was published in October 1998. It intro-
duced, among others, a liaison position to foster exchange between the 
two bodies. The rationale behind this creation was the explosion in the 
growth of IP- based networks. It also foresaw the cross- referencing and the 
use of IETF documents in ITU- T processes and vice versa. This type of 
procedure was designed to integrate the two standardization processes and 
enable cross- organizational work, in particular as the operating logics of the 
two differed substantially.
The work of sui generis non- profit standard- setting organizations (such 
as ICANN, IETF, W3C) was authoritative because they were internation-
ally accepted as rule- makers from the early days. All these bodies continued 
to function alongside inter- governmental and private- sector initiatives. Yet, 
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unlike the ITU- T, for whom governments represent full members and non- 
governmental organizations need to obtain ‘sector’ or ‘associate’ status, ‘native 
institutions’ (Mueller 2004) operated on an open membership model and did 
not generally limit participation to organizations or official structures.26 In 
their governing bodies, they all represented their primary constituencies— 
remaining, by definition, transnational. Table 4 offers an overview of the key 
bodies during that decade analysed in this chapter, including the governance 
structure in place for each, together with their status and function. As the 
comparative analysis shows, these organizations share a number of charac-
teristics, such as their mission and a board to report to. NRO represents an 
exception, as its ‘core community’ was made up of RIRs, whose representa-
tives constituted the Executive Council, annually rotating officers. The NRO 
did not develop policy directly, but served as ICANN’s Address Supporting 
Organization and reviewed and developed recommendations on global IP 
address policy for ratification by ICANN’s Board of Directors.
Alongside the consolidated role of technical organizations, new private 
and state- led bodies started profiling their work throughout the deregu-
latory decade, in particular on the developmental aspects of IG. In 2000, 
the World Economic Forum initiated the Global Digital Divide Initiative 
(GDDI) for increasing opportunities for private– public partnerships in 
diminishing the digital gap. It set in place three steering committees dedi-
cated to Entrepreneurship, Policies, and Strategies, and Education. Similarly, 
the G8’s Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT Force) was developed as an 
initiative to ‘bridge the global digital divide’ (Hart 2004, 2) in the aftermath 
of the 2000 Okinawa Summit, where the Charter on Global Information 
Society was signed. In paragraph 7, the Charter reaffirmed the strong lead 
of the private sector, relegating to governments the responsibility to ‘create a 
predictable, transparent and non- discriminatory policy and regulatory envir-
onment necessary for the information society’, placing on them the onus of 
avoiding ‘undue regulatory interventions’.
With the recognition of the basic right of access to knowledge and 
information as ‘a prerequisite for modern human development’ (DOT 
Force 2002), the high- level task force aimed to facilitate discussions with 
developing countries, international organizations, and other stakeholders 
to promote international cooperation with a view to fostering policy, 
regulatory, and network readiness; improving connectivity, increasing ac-
cess, and lowering cost; building human capacity; and encouraging par-
ticipation in global e- commerce networks. The advancement monitoring 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and fostering was delegated to four implementation teams:  National e- 
Strategies, Human Capacities, Global Policy Participation, and Local 
Content and Application.
Notwithstanding its specialized fields of action, the DOT Force lifespan 
was short. The entity formally concluded its work after the meeting in Canada 
in June 2002. By 2002, the African continent benefited the most from the 
programme by the development of more than five transnationally funded 
projects and the renewal of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), with a focus on the activities of the e- Africa Commission. For the 
latter, ambitious objectives were envisioned. Among these, the increased tele- 
density to two lines per 100 persons by 2005, the achievement of e- readiness 
for all African countries, and the development of local content software were 
hardly realized by the set time frame. When the World Bank (WB) led the 
creation of InfoDev in June 2005, the interest had moved from developing 
an action force to shaping and sustaining a global development financial pro-
gramme, led by a Donor’s Committee and a Programme Manager, as well 
as organizing an InfoDev Symposium. Alongside the WB and the EU, ten 
governments contributed to its projects at the time. The focus was on three 
main directions: (1) enabling access for all, (2) mainstreaming ICT as tools 
for development and poverty reduction, and (3)  innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, and growth.
Among the most interesting bodies created at the time within the 
UN was the ICT Task Force (UNICT), that UN Secretary- General Kofi 
Annan established in November 2001 in response to a UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) request from July 2000. This followed the 
recommendation of the high- level panel of experts convened from 17 to 
20 April 2000. The UNICT had a three- year long mandate, subsequently 
extended until 31 December 2005 to allow for its active participation 
in the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) process. The task 
force had a hybrid composition, with fifty- five members appointed by 
different sectors in representative capacity, which would elect the chair. 
IBM, Cisco, Hewlett- Packard, Siemens, Nokia, and Sun Microsystems 
were represented among the members of the industry, alongside civil so-
ciety organizations, governments, and international organizations. It had 
a panel of thirty technical advisers and a secretariat of six at the UN head-
quarters in New York.
The UNICT acted as a platform for dialogue open to multiple stakeholders 
(Flyverbom 2011)  and served a purpose similar to the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and G8 initiatives. Unlike the latter, it enjoyed a broader le-
gitimation, in particular from developing countries. Its main activity was the 
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organization of global forums, which enabled discussions around a wide set of 
concerns ranging from education to IG. Between 2001 and 2005, it held ten 
global forums: four in New York, three in Geneva, and one in Berlin, Dublin, 
and Tunis, respectively. Epitomizing the drive for deregulation, UNICT 
proposed in its ‘Business plan’ that governments facilitate competition by 
opening markets, encouraging investments in infrastructure, and removing 
barriers to competition.
The rise of organizations dedicated to Internet- specific work, either tech-
nical or developmental, attests to the way in which the field was institu-
tionalized via operational measures. Specialized authorities, from ICANN 
to InfoDev, become subject to a number of formal requirements, such as 
transparency and a continual base of legitimate support. As IG was gradually 
recognized as the shared responsibility of multiple organizations and diverse 
stakeholders, a dominant practice developed around it:  multi- stakeholder 
participation.
Anchoring Practice: Multi- stakeholder Participation
The intense negotiations around the creation of ICANN shed light on the 
number of stakeholders interested in the global governance of the Internet. 
Beyond what NTIA identified as ‘key’ stakeholders (NTIA 1998), a broader 
group of enthusiasts and sceptics expressed opinion on the privatization of 
the DNS. Most of these engaged as part of a specific (interest) group and 
spoke on behalf of a constituency that they presented as global. In the design 
of the institution, several stakeholder splits became obvious: contracted and 
non- contracted parties, policymakers and implementers, or government and 
users. This multiplicity of entities helped to address some of the legitimacy 
concerns. Among these were the limitations stemming from the reality of a 
handful of people making decisions of worldwide relevance; it was seen as a 
disguise for agendas that benefit particular actors more than others, especially 
when their lobbying power was higher. The inclusion of a limited number 
of stakeholders— with powerful voices— in the structure of ICANN became 
contested and led to the first reform of ICANN in 2003.
The dominant practice of multi- stakeholder involvement— no matter 
what definition was adopted for it— became a pillar for community forma-
tion during that decade. The constitutive rules of the community were re-
iterated in setting up the membership practices through the categorization 
of groups, officially institutionalized within ICANN. Defining how certain 
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actors could participate, however, was not restrictive to newcomers, as long as 
they had the technical expertise, would take on board the volunteer culture, 
and could participate in the relevant processes. Although the involvement of 
actors belonging to different sectors was practised before the formation of 
ICANN, never before was the diversity of the community celebrated so vis-
ibly. The different subgroups forming the ‘community’ gave it a new identity, 
uniting rather than dividing it. The public assertion of diversity became a 
strong community- building goal.
By the same token, the WEF and G8 initiatives also included a multi- 
stakeholder approach with broad participation by stakeholders from indus-
trialized and developing countries in public– private partnerships. Enjoying 
more legitimacy due to its origin in an intergovernmental agreement, the 
UNICT also operated on multi- stakeholder logic. Despite its lack of binding 
power, its work was influential in agenda- setting functions, as it was required 
to submit annual reports and recommendations to the UN Secretary- General. 
Starting in 2004, the general impetus for multi- stakeholder practices in the 
UN ambit was strengthened with the release of the Cardoso report endorsing 
the wider participation of civil society in UN activities.
In effect, unlike at ICANN, where the multi- stakeholder practice materi-
alized in bottom- up policies, in the daily works of the UNICT or the DOT 
Force (which were not decision- making bodies) the practice remained pri-
marily formative and mostly discursive. In their case, authority was vested 
in the organizations’ UN- appointed Chairs or Secretariats. The power asym-
metries and the concerns for legitimacy were recognized in the functioning 
of the UNICT: stakeholders involved in the ICT Task Force had competing 
or conflicting aims and there was as a contest of influence and power among 
multilateral, bilateral, and civil society groups (Malcolm 2008).
In addition to being seen as an instrumental governance mode which 
gave the United States dominance over the Internet and its development, 
multi- stakeholderism also meant, for numerous developing countries, a 
move away from intergovernmental decision- making and international law. 
Negotiating new rules for the increasingly more commercial Internet in 
the absence of an equal vote guaranteed via international processes dis-
satisfied many. As an anchoring practice for legitimacy, multi- stakeholder 
participation presented a strong normative dimension. It was based on the 
idea that those most affected by a policy change or measure should in some 
way be involved in its management, governance, and resolution (Gurstein 
2013). In effect though, not all affected interests were represented. This 
came under scrutiny by the supporters of a governmental leadership model. 
In December 2003, China, backed by developing countries, proposed the 
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adoption of an Internet treaty and the creation of a global Internet organ-
ization (Kleinwaechter 2009).
But the multi- stakeholder practice was also under scrutiny by its adopters. 
In the early days of this practice, the principles of representativeness and open-
ness were not reified in the decision- making processes for IG, according to 
Palfrey, Chen, Hwang, and Eisenkraft (2003). Their study on public partici-
pation in ICANN revealed that an insufficient assessment of public involve-
ment and a limited collection of substantive comments from Internet users 
accounted for the failure of the organization in attracting and incorporating 
‘representative’ input (Palfrey et al. 2003). Gradually, the practice became an 
element of regulatory design (Drake and Wilson 2008; DeNardis 2009) and 
even an ‘- ism’ (Doria 2014), with a two- fold significance: on the one hand, 
there was a claim for distinctiveness in ‘multi- stakeholderism’; on the other 
hand, its habitual use pinpointed that the principles and tenets behind it were 
held to be intuitive to everyone.
In the ICANN context, supporters of multi- stakeholderism saw a legit-
imization of the ICANN model in the use of the principle within the UN 
context. Other IG bodies also labelled their practices as multi- stakeholder. 
Western governments saw in the multi- stakeholder model a way to pro-
mote the delegation of authority and a way to improve self- regulation and 
the limited state intervention that they had been implementing in various 
sectors, and especially in the telecommunication sector since the 1980s. 
Civil society organizations and some governments interpreted multi- 
stakeholderism as participatory democracy and hailed the effort to improve 
democratic processes in global governance. Only some non- Western gov-
ernments and some critical factions within civil society castigated multi- 
stakeholderism as a pejoration of democratic practices compared with 
traditional intergovernmentalism.
Nonetheless, the multi- stakeholder practice continued to be implemented 
and applied on a global scale. It quickly opened the door for the participa-
tion of marginalized actors, even if not done in clearly defined terms. The 
enthusiasm for this practice gave rise to a ‘vernacular moment’ around multi- 
stakeholder involvement in IG, claiming a dominant position for it, beyond 
contestation. Over time, it resulted in the loss of the ability to look at this 
practice from the outside, to scrutinize it critically without being perceived as 
an ‘enemy’ of it. As an ideologically laden organizational principle (Mueller 
2010), multi- stakeholderism had deep implications on community forma-
tion, further discussed in Chapter 6.
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Synopsis
The evolution of the Internet has been profoundly shaped by the salient 
role of corporate actors, transforming the field into an economic and polit-
ical contest. When digital markets began to prosper in the 1990s, the dom-
inant US- driven ‘hands- off’ approach condemned any attempt to regulate 
the Internet and related markets. In 1997, the Clinton administration issued 
a ‘Framework for global electronic commerce’ ingraining this vision in the 
future development of the field. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, 
e- commerce and other Internet- related markets were far from meeting the 
optimistic expectations of the 1990s. The burst of the ‘dotcom bubble’ further 
reaffirmed the crucial role of social institutions in the creation, reproduction, 
and expansion of markets.
Deeply influenced by neoliberal ideology, the regulation milieu that fos-
tered the growth of the Internet left a global imprint. When the Internet 
became commercial, three major shifts occurred in governance arrange-
ments:  they grew in size, scale, and scope. First, the reach of the network 
extended, with connections being established all over the world. Second, the 
scope of governance arrangements diversified over time: from infrastructure 
and technical resources management, to an array of broader societal issues 
spurred by the ‘dotcom’ boom; legal and security issues (in particular around 
cybersquatting), as well as e- commerce and digital economy more broadly. 
Overall, this meant that in addition to the technical community dealing with 
standards and protocols, a new set of actors entered the governance arena 
at the regional and global level. With it came a renewed interest in under-
standing the complex interaction of technology, society, and politics, played 
out in the digital divide debates.
The informal arrangements dominating the period prior to the commer-
cialization of the Internet intensified and routinized over time. The decisions 
of standard- setting bodies were generally archived and publicly accessible, fol-
lowing open meetings or mailing list discussions (generally open for anyone 
to join). Importantly, the initiatives for policy processes and standards devel-
opment could come from anyone. The standards were open, resulting from 
collaborative work and placed under the organization’s name. This ethos, still 
present today, was slightly altered at the end of the 1990s with the rise of the 
for- profit ICT sector and its strong involvement in the policymaking of not- 
for- profit institutions.
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The question of ‘who governed the Internet’— asked more and more fre-
quently in the period leading up to 2005— remained difficult to answer. 
Regional differentiation appears as a key governance trend during that 
decade: 43 per cent of all governance instruments reflect partial agreements 
and limited consensus, but they also reveal the emergence of localized ap-
proaches on issues of global concern such as cybercrime. Certain govern-
ance mechanisms resulted from (long- standing) political agendas, others were 
driven by the private sector, and some developed ad- hoc in reaction to these, 
presenting us with a fragmented picture. It is from this perspective that the 
articulation of governance in a heterogeneous, hybrid environment is ex-
plored in the next two chapters.
Negotiating Internet Governance. Roxana Radu © Roxana Radu 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford 
University Press.
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 The WSIS Decade and the Public– Private 
Partnership Thirst
When the United Nations convened its first World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) in Geneva in 2003, what surfaced was the merging of the 
ICT agenda with concerns regarding the uneven expansion of the Internet 
and imbalanced representation of states in its governance mechanisms. The 
Summit, split in two phases (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005), was the starting 
point for vocalizing the worries of developing countries, but also for collab-
orative institutional endeavours that would continue throughout the decade 
in what became known as the ‘WSIS process’. The sheer breadth of topics 
covered by this process and the formal recognition of shared responsibility of 
different actors marked a turning point in the evolution of the Internet, setting 
the stage for an accelerated institutionalization of an emerging policy field.
Sprouting from the WSIS process, the tensions regarding the role of the 
United Nations and that of the United States in Internet- related decision- 
making were particularly significant for the evolution of Internet governance 
(IG). The WSIS Summit Outcome document contributed to the formation of 
IG as a public domain, providing a conceptual framework for understanding 
it and delimiting mandates and responsibilities. By sanctioning a broad defin-
ition for IG, WSIS provided a common vocabulary shaping the conversations 
for years to come. Mirroring the Geneva Declaration of Principles adopted 
two years before, the Tunis phase recognized the need to continue to involve 
a variety of stakeholders in relevant governance arrangements, without going 
much further in clarifying responsibilities for this hybrid order.
The period comprised between 2005 and 2015 also shed light on the regula-
tory efforts of various actors, primarily states and international organizations. 
The rise of smartphones and mobile Internet was unparalleled: the global mo-
bile data traffic grew 4,000- fold between 2005 and 2015 (Cisco 2017) and 
facilitated the fastest expansion of connectivity worldwide. Accordingly, the 
governance arrangements of the time revealed a stronger involvement of 
corporations and civil society in IG processes, alongside a redesign of the 
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public– private sector relationships, tested in watershed moments such as the 
2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications or the 2013 
Snowden leaks on mass surveillance. They also revealed stronger collabor-
ation between governments and private actors on content controls in the 
context of the Arab Spring revolutions between 2010 and 2012, followed by 
the introduction of policing regimes for online activities. This chapter traces 
the evolution of the field throughout the WSIS decade, providing an analysis 
of the governance transformations that marked the field’s coming of age.
Internet Governance @ WSIS
In both academic and policy discussions, WSIS is known to have given 
the first definition of IG endorsed in a globally negotiated outcome docu-
ment. With its focus on a broadly understood ‘information society’, WSIS 
constituted a UN summit comparable in scope and purpose to the 1992 
Earth Summit, the 1995 World Conference on Women, and the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development. The idea for a large- scale 
event that would tackle ICTs and development came from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1998 and was authorized through 
General Assembly Resolution 56/ 183 in 2001. The Summit was to link with 
the UN Millennium Declaration, starting a discussion around the use of ICTs 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1 The Summit was 
held in two phases: the first took place in Geneva from 10 to 12 December 
2003 and the second was held in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005; the 
preparations for and follow- up to WSIS- related activities are referred to as the 
‘WSIS process’.
The two Summit phases were preceded by PrepCom meetings, consult-
ations, working group sessions, and roundtables which included a range of 
stakeholders, from UN member states to civil society actors. The process of 
designing the summit benefited from input gathered in three global prepara-
tory meetings held in Geneva between July 2002 and September 2003, and 
four regional meetings in Africa, Asia- Pacific, Europe, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The process was open to non- state actors, who were al-
lotted the status of observers. Hitherto, practices of inclusion in working 
groups varied throughout the preparations, from government delegates only 
to equal footing partaking by different sector representatives. In December 
1 MDG 8 called upon governments, ‘in cooperation with the private sector, [to] make available 
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications’.
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2003, more than 11,000 participants attended WSIS- I in Geneva. Four pre-
paratory global meetings (all in Geneva) and three regional gatherings took 
place before WSIS- II and over 19,000 representatives were present in Tunis 
in November 2005. The significant growth in attendance for WSIS- II was 
mainly due to a two- fold increase in the number of civil society represen-
tatives and a ten- fold increase in business sector participation. In total, the 
Summit attracted nearly fifty heads of state/ government and vice- presidents 
and twice as many ministers and vice- ministers, the majority from developing 
countries.
Against the backdrop of state- negotiated telecommunication regimes, 
WSIS represented an unprecedented experiment, with 45 per cent of all 
participants in the Geneva phase and 60 per cent in the Tunis phase being 
non- state actors (Chenou 2014). Apart from the ‘usual suspects’ for large- 
scale UN summits, most of the attendees reflected the variety of entities that 
were directly affected by digital convergence. This phenomenon challenged 
the works of different sectors (telephony, radio, recorded music, film, video, 
books, magazines, and libraries), affecting the way in which they were gov-
erned by separate policies before. The governance of ICTs and media was 
traditionally placed under the control of states (Irion and Radu 2013) and 
the publishing, film, and music industries maintained strong positions on 
intellectual property rights. Their presence at the Summit meant that these 
issues would be addressed in the negotiations. Notably, technical Internet 
bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) or the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)/ Internet Society 
(ISOC) were well- represented in the consultations. Last but not least, the 
business sector secured a double representation,2 first as corporate entities 
speaking on their own behalf and second via the Coordinating Committee 
of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) organised by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (Raboy et al. 2010).
The WSIS process placed a strong emphasis on the developmental di-
mension of the information society, with a view to addressing the perceived 
inequalities. On the one hand, it discussed the terms of access to ICTs, in par-
ticular stressing the availability, quality, cost, and capability to connect to the 
Internet in developing countries. In this regard, WSIS called into question 
the commercial arrangements for traffic services established in the 1990s, re-
sulting in a net flow of revenues into developed countries and higher costs for 
access in the global South. Moreover, capacity building was deemed necessary 
2 The WSIS process also received input from the United Nations Information and Communication 
Technologies Task Force (UNICTTF) and the G8- created Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT 
Force), where business interests were strongly represented.
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for developing the skills required to thrive in the information society. On 
the other hand, in addressing governance mechanisms, the focus was on the 
representation of developing countries in global ICT- related arrangements. 
Salient in the WSIS negotiations were two issues: first, gaining access to pro-
cesses by which the Internet was managed; second, ensuring an equal say in 
debates that have been transformed by the Internet, such as intellectual prop-
erty, trade, or consumer protection.
Without mentioning IG, the January 2002 UNGA resolution 56/ 183 an-
nouncing the Summit set in motion a process that would redefine the under-
standing of the terms, but also the rules of engagement. Participants (Drake 
2005; Kummer 2007)  recall that IG was not among the topics originally 
discussed and was added to the WSIS agenda gradually. Among the factors 
that increased the visibility of this topic were the intense IG discussions held 
throughout the ITU plenipotentiary conference of Marrakesh in September 
to October 2002 (marking a divide between the United States and developing 
countries on the management of the domain name system (DNS)) and the 
development of internationalized and multilingual domain names. IG was 
thus closely related to unresolved technical issues plus institutional turf bat-
tles and resurfaced as a subset of ICT for development (ICT4D) concerns.
In Search of a Definition
While the ITU assumed the leading managerial role, the Summit was fa-
cilitated by an open- ended intergovernmental Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) defining the agenda and the means of participation, as well as 
drafting the outcome documents of the Summit. Fewer than 1,000 people 
participated in the Geneva preparations for WSIS- I, which constituted an 
important arena for negotiation. The first PrepCom meeting on 1 to 5 July 
2002 in Geneva was dominated by representatives of states and civil society.3 
The elected President of the PrepCom was Adama Samassekou (Mali), with 
elected Vice- Presidents from five geographic groups:  Africa, Asia, Eastern 
Europe, Western Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, in addition 
to the two co- hosts (Switzerland and Tunisia) added ex officio.
3 Attending the first PrepCom meeting were: 607 participants from 139 member states of the 
United Nations and of any specialized agencies; and observers. The latter category included: fifty- 
four participants from UN secretariat and organs, twenty- one participants from ten UN specialized 
agencies, thirty- five participants representing thirteen invited intergovernmental organizations, 223 
participants from NGOs and civil society organizations, and thirty- four participants from business 
sector entities.
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The themes put forward at the first PrepCom for initial discussions in-
cluded access to ICTs, development of a policy and regulatory framework, 
ICT applications, infrastructure and network security, capacity building, as 
well as the role of different stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for de-
velopment. Calls to discuss IG were made by the European Union,4 Brazil,5 
and a coalition of twenty- two NGOs, the latter calling, among other, for 
the democratization of ICANN. Notably, adding IG to the agenda meant 
the Internet was understood as a subcategory of the governance of the infor-
mation society, with a particular set of concerns, the most poignant of these 
being its private nature. Integrating IG into the global governance approach 
shifted the focus away from the Internet exceptionalism discourse dominant 
in the 1990s (Chenou 2014).
Input from regional preparatory meetings and thematic multi- stakeholder 
roundtables on the discussion themes was presented at the second PrepCom 
meeting on 17 to 28 February 2003, where drafts for the Action Plan and 
WSIS declaration were also introduced. They were the product of a working 
group originally opened to all states and subsequently also open to all ob-
servers, chaired by Lyndall Shope- Mafole from South Africa. By the time 
the PrepCom for WSIS met for the third time in Geneva (PrepCom- 3) on 
15 to 26 September 2003, the draft text of the Declaration of Principles 
had already stirred controversy in the intersessional meeting on 18 July in 
Paris, where an Internet Governance Ad Hoc Working Group was created 
to discuss the issue. It was composed of state representatives and remained 
closed to non- state actors (with the exception of the first meeting). The pro-
posed text reported at PrepCom- 3 evidenced dissent around the formulation 
of roles and responsibilities outlined in paragraph 44 of the Declaration of 
Principles draft.
While they all agreed on the democratic, multilateral, and transparent man-
agement of the Internet, the opinions consolidated during the negotiations 
diverged in terms of participation entitlements, coverage, and role of states. 
I  include below four alternative formulations that illustrate the divergent 
4 The EU statement: ‘new mechanisms for governance at global and national levels encompassing 
a) issues related to the sector like electronic communications regulatory frameworks, data protec-
tion, network security and cyber- security, legal aspects of e- commerce and Internet governance as 
well as b) more general issues related to the new citizenship in the information age’.
5 The Brazilian statement: ‘democratic and representative Governments should not be replaced 
by arbitrary groupings of private business and non- governmental institutions in decisions regarding 
the economic space brewing within powerful digital networks, such as the Internet. Organizing this 
new environment to the satisfaction of all, and ensuring the beneficial participation of developing 
countries and their societies is central to our work’.
118 WSIS Decade & Public–Private Partnership Thirst
18
perspectives of key stakeholders in the WSIS preparations, as they appear in 
the final report presented by PrepCom- 3 in September 2003.
Formulation 1




The international management of the Internet should be democratic, 
multilateral, transparent and participative with the full involvement 
of the governments, international organisations, private sector and 
civil society. This management should encompass both technical and 
policy issues. While recognizing that the private sector has an important 
role in the development of the Internet at the technical level, and will 
continue to take a lead role, the fast development of Internet as the basis 
of information society requires that governments take a lead role, in 
partnership with all other stakeholders, in developing and coordinating 
policies of the public interests related to stability, security, competition, 
freedom of use, protection of individual rights and privacy, sovereignty, 








Internet governance must be multilateral, democratic and transparent, 
taking into account the needs of the public and private sectors as 
well as those of the civil society, and respecting multilingualism. 
The coordination responsibility for root servers, domain names, and 
Internet Protocol (IP) address assignment should rest with a suitable 
international, inter- governmental organization. The policy authority for 
country code top- level- domain names (cc- TLDs) should be the sovereign 
right of countries.
Formulation 3
proposed by  
the EU
The international management of the Internet should be democratic, 
multilateral and transparent. It should secure a fair distribution 
of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure 
functioning of the Internet. It should respect geographical diversity and 
ensure representativeness through the participation of all interested 
States, including public authorities with competence in this field, of 
civil society and the private sector, with due respect to their legitimate 
interests.
Final text, in 
paragraph 48 
of the Geneva 
Declaration of 
Principles
The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public 
and its governance should constitute a core issue of the Information 
Society agenda. The international management of the Internet should 
be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement 
of governments, the private sector, civil society and international 
organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of resources, 
facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the 
Internet, taking into account multilingualism.
The two basic visions for IG— intergovernmental control or private sector 
leadership— remained the Gordian knot of debates throughout the WSIS 
process. The wording finally adopted at WSIS- II was strongly normative, 
yet remained ambiguous as to the specific responsibilities or lead roles. At 
the WSIS- I meeting in Geneva, a Declaration of Principles was adopted, as 
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well as a Plan of Action aiming to provide guidance on the implementation 
of the first. As in previous negotiations, most contention emerged around 
the definition of IG, which would have elucidated the boundaries of par-
ticipation and the extent to which the status quo was supported, as well as 
the roles of new actors in IG. The multi- stakeholder nature of the informa-
tion society was not homogeneously understood by the delegations present at 
WSIS. What surfaced during the negotiations, before and after phase one in 
Geneva, was a split conceptualization of what multi- stakeholder governance 
meant: sometimes, the process was legitimized as a balanced representation of 
the state next to other stakeholders, via an equal number of members; other 
times, the state was understood as having a leading role in multi- stakeholder 
governance.
Moreover, strong contestation came from civil society groups which op-
posed the very notion of an ‘information society’ and, concordantly, opposed 
the organization and the Summit as capitalist endeavours (Raboy et al. 2010, 
106– 7). Hacker collectives refused to engage with the summit, while artists 
and activists designed alternative events, such as ‘WE SEIZE!’, which took 
place in front of the Palexpo complex where the Geneva Summit was held. 
The Geneva police intervened to disperse participants at other alternative 
events taking place throughout the city.
To overcome the lack of consensus discernible at the Geneva Summit, 
Kofi Annan, then Secretary- General of the United Nations, requested the 
establishment of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). 
The formation of this group was the only specific reference to IG in the 
Geneva Plan of Action. This WSIS outcome document translated the vi-
sion into eleven concrete action lines, with tasks mandated for governments 
including: facilitating the establishment of national and regional Internet 
Exchange Centres; managing or supervising, as appropriate, their respective 
country- code top- level domains (cc- TLDs); promoting, in cooperation 
with the relevant stakeholders, regional root servers and the use of inter-
nationalized domain names in order to overcome barriers to access, user 
education, and awareness about online privacy and the means of protecting 
privacy (2003a). An earlier reference to the contentious ‘governments 
should work to internationalize the management of Internet resources in 
order to achieve a universally representative solution’ (Draft Plan of Action, 
21 September 2003, para. 19) was removed from the final Plan of Action. 
The private sector lead and the calls for an enabling environment had been 
toned down to:
Governments, in collaboration with stakeholders, are encouraged to formulate con-
ducive ICT policies that foster entrepreneurship, innovation and investment, and 
with particular reference to the promotion of participation by women. (WSIS 2003a)
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The role of governments in the international governance of ICTs, including, 
inter alia, the naming and addressing resources, continued to generate debate. 
Many discussions called into question, implicitly or explicitly, the special role 
of one government:  the United States, whose approach was challenged in 
three respects. First, authorizing the publication of any modifications, de-
letions, or additions to the root zone file, via NTIA, was seen as an immi-
nent threat. Some countries perceived this as a ‘privilege’ that would give 
the United States the power to remove specific cc- TLDs from the root and 
eventually restrict the communication of users under that cc- TLD. Second, 
the location on American soil of ten out of the thirteen root servers6 was 
challenged. The third source of contestation was the informality of the ar-
rangements among root server operators (Kleinwaechter 2005). The debate 
on IG at WSIS- I remained polarized, resulting in a compromise text focused 
on process rather than on substance. The proposal to establish a WGIG, man-
dated to develop a working definition of IG, was welcome. The expert group 
was also tasked to identify the public policy issues that were relevant to IG 
and develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibil-
ities of governments, the private sector, and civil society.
Established in November 2004,7 the WGIG was chaired by Nitin Desai, 
the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary- General for the WSIS, appointed dir-
ectly by Kofi Annan. The group consisted of forty experts equally representing 
the tripartite classification of stakeholder groups (states– businesses– civil so-
ciety),8 but participating in an individual capacity. The majority of the selected 
members took part in WSIS- I and in the work of the UNICTTF or the G8 
DOT Force. They had complementary skills and knowledge, ranging from 
technical specializations to development policy. A  former Swiss diplomat, 
Markus Kummer was named executive coordinator of the working group after 
Switzerland announced that it would fund a secretariat for this new body.9 
The Secretariat was established in July 2004, and on 20 to 21 September that 
year it held a two- day open consultation on the composition of the WGIG 
and its agenda, to which multiple stakeholders were invited. For the selection 
6 For increased network reliability, the anycast system was introduced in the early 2000s; there 
are currently more than 100 anycast instances of root servers all over the world.
7 As McLean (2005) notes, the group was formally announced on 11 November, but decisions 
about the membership were made in advance and the participants were notified informally by the 
WGIG Secretariat ahead of time.
8 It has been argued, however, that the process leading to the formulation of the definition was 
‘not a multi- stakeholder effort’ due to the overrepresentation of states (some with repressive Internet 
policies) in WGIG (Raymond and deNardis 2015, 16).
9 This was announced at the UNICTTF Global Forum on Internet Governance in New York, 
24– 25 March 2004.
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of the WGIG members, broad criteria were put forward by Desai:  regional 
representation, stakeholders, gender, developed and developing countries, and 
differing schools of thought; yet the final selection of participants was made by 
the Secretariat using informal means of consultation (Mathiason 2009). The 
largest part of group members came from governments (44 per cent), with 
a significant representation of emerging economies (including Brazil, China, 
Cuba, Iran, Russia) alongside European states. About a quarter of the WGIG 
members were active in ICANN discussions (Chenou 2014).
The WGIG Process
The WGIG prompted a momentous political negotiation and represented 
an early example of a new anchoring practice in use throughout the WSIS 
decade: the reliance on expertise from senior members of the community to 
find a solution to a stalemate. The group was at the epicentre of a much larger 
IG argument, marked by failure to agree on a shared understanding of the 
field. At least six international meetings within and outside the UN system 
touched upon this issue earlier that year, either in preparation for the second 
phases of WSIS or in specialized conferences. All ICANN meetings from 
July 2004 onwards also held dedicated sessions. To advance the WSIS nego-
tiations, the task of scoping IG was allocated to WGIG in 2004. This chal-
lenge was addressed procedurally by designing a process that consisted of four 
multi- stakeholder meetings, all including an open consultation part, deemed 
necessary to ‘meet the concerns of those countries that did not want a small 
group process, but rather a full intergovernmental meeting’ (Desai 2005, ix). 
Four open consultations with stakeholders took place at the UN headquar-
ters in Geneva between November 2004 and June 2005; representatives of 
states, business, and civil society actors were heard during the consultations in 
plenary session. Beside these, the WGIG members also met in closed sessions.
The WGIG mandate was subject to repeated contest, in particular for clari-
fying whether a reform of the IG system was at stake. For some, the work of 
the group was about the narrow technical side of the Internet. At the first 
WGIG meeting, ITU Secretary General Utsumi recommended ‘focus[ing] 
on the core activity of the management of Internet resources by ICANN, in 
particular top- level domains, which is where important issues remain unre-
solved’. For others, the WGIG task was inherently political.10 Former WGIG 
member William Drake summarized this as follows:
10 In the words of one of the WGIG members, Lyndall Shope- Mafole (South Africa): ‘The focus 
and the main reason for the establishment of this group and for asking the Secretary- General of the 
UN to establish this group is because the issue is not technical. I think the issue is political’ (state-
ment made on 18 April 2005).
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If I had a one US dollar for every time I was told— almost exclusively by my fellow 
Americans— that the WGIG was actually a UN plot to ‘take over the Internet’ and 
give it to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), I could have a quite 
nice dinner— in Geneva no less. If in addition I had one US dollar for every time 
I was told that the WGIG was a plot against the ITU, I could have a nice dessert, and 
coffee too. (2005, 249)
The process that led to the final report of the WGIG was a collaborative exer-
cise. A strong leadership role was taken by the Secretariat, led by Switzerland’s 
Markus Kummer. Following four open consultations, the WGIG published 
its report in July 2005 in preparation for the November meeting in Tunis. 
The Final Report was drafted in seventy- two hours at the Château de Bossey 
retreat outside Geneva (McLean 2005). A decision was taken by the WGIG 
together with the WSIS Secretariat to have a short final report transmitted to 
the UN Secretary- General for WSIS- II and a longer version as a Background 
Report. In its report, the group gave more leverage to public policy11 than to 
the technical standardization or technical resource allocation and assignment, 
thus enlarging the space for institutional engagement. In addition to Internet 
stability, security, and cybercrime, it covered intellectual property rights and 
trade- related issues, freedom of expression, data protection, and multilin-
gualism. But it also included issues such as meaningful participation in global 
policy development, capacity building, or consumer rights, reflecting, to a 
large extent, the contribution of civil society participants.
The working definition it provided for IG sought to balance descriptive 
and normative dimensions and be as comprehensive as possible. Reflecting 
the academic influence in the group, WGIG equated IG with ‘the develop-
ment and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, 
in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision- making 
procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet’ 
(WGIG 2005). Inspired by Krasner’s 1983 international regimes definition, 
this wording garnered the support of the working group members and, sub-
sequently, of the WSIS delegations, which agreed to insert it verbatim into 
paragraph 34 of the Tunis Agenda, the ultimate product of WSIS.
In the work of the WGIG, a large fraction of the time and energy was 
dedicated to investigating the position of ICANN, which was financially sup-
porting the group. Not only was the sui generis organization discussed as a 
governance structure that did not give an equal standing to governments, 
but also as an embodiment of a privatized way of operating that needed to 
11 This was arrived at through the ‘Inventory of Public Policy Issues and Priorities’ put forward 
at the first open consultation. It was a list of forty- six issues prepared with inspiration from a similar 
list made by the then vice- chair of the UNICTTF (McLean 2005).
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become more inclusive. As the Internet became widespread in other parts of 
the world, it could no longer have online content primarily in English and 
domain names could no longer be typed with Latin characters only. Support 
for multilingualism and local content was dominant. The final report released 
by the WGIG in July 2005 addressed the need for a restructuring of IG, but 
did not influence the status quo with regards to ICANN.
Drafted at Château de Bossey outside Geneva, with consideration for the 
opinions expressed during the open consultations, the report elaborated on 
an open forum function for all stakeholders and four proposals for public 
oversight arrangements. The members of the group did not reach agreement 
on whether one model would be preferable to the others, and Desai con-
cluded that they all needed to be included as ‘four equally beautiful brides’ 
(Drake 2005). Three of these proposals envisioned an international body 
replacing ICANN or overseeing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) function (thus eliminating the control of the US Department of 
Commerce (DoC)), yet none was formally endorsed in the Tunis Agenda. 
One of the models discussed— an intergovernmental, UN- based ‘Global 
Internet Council’ (GIC)— replacing the DoC oversight and the ICANN 
Governmental Advisory Committee, garnered increasing attention in the fol-
lowing years, as discussed in the next sections of this book. In the various pro-
posals put forward, the management of the root continued to be entrusted to 
ICANN or a globalized version of it (‘World ICANN’: linked to the United 
Nations with a host country agreement), yet the policymaking function 
would generally lie with a GIC, a Global Internet Governance Forum, or an 
International Internet Council. The non- state actors, both for- profit sector 
and civil society, were frequently side- lined in the models proposed, support 
being primarily shown for governments and for the United Nations (Raboy 
et al. 2010, 137).
In negotiating the oversight system, two main visions were consolidated 
(Kleinwaechter 2005). On the one hand, there were the supporters of the ‘do 
not fix what is not broken’ slogan— favouring the status quo and arguing for 
keeping ICANN unchanged. On the other hand, there were the proponents 
of a UN treaty, which would have allowed all governments to share responsi-
bilities, oversight, and control. As the WGIG negotiations concluded in mid- 
June, the NTIA issued the US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name 
and Addressing System (on 30 June 2005), making three important state-
ments: first, that the US government intended to ‘maintain its historic role 
in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file’; 
second, that ICANN was the appropriate technical manager for the domain 
names system; and third, that IG should continue to be discussed in mul-
tiple fora, in which the United States ‘will continue to support market- based 
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approaches and private sector leadership in Internet development broadly’ 
(NTIA 2005).
Without the endorsement of the United States and allies, nor that of the 
business sector, the negotiations on an alternative to ICANN did not ad-
vance in the following negotiation rounds for WSIS- II. What became ob-
vious through the work of WGIG was the understanding that the Internet 
was, above all, a political issue with many more stakeholders asking for a seat 
at the table. The way in which the governance of the Internet was articulated 
up until that point came under heavy contestation and that was reflected in 
the interventions at the WGIG open consultations. The latter became, in the 
process, ‘an “obligatory passage point” at a crucial stage in the ordering of the 
global politics of the digital revolution’ (Flyverbom 2011, 117).
Moreover, the WGIG introduced a set of procedures that remained em-
blematic for IG processes: it introduced a multi- stakeholder extra- budgetary 
funding scheme (further pursued in the constitution of the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF))12 and it committed to a transparent process by 
holding open sessions and inviting open comments on draft documents 
(Mathiason 2009). One innovation that the WGIG adopted with inspiration 
from the ICANN meetings was the use of real- time captioning of the dis-
cussions in English. At the Château de Bossey, parts of the final report were 
drafted and fine- tuned collectively, using a projector so that all participants 
could work on the text at the same time (McLean 2005). The WGIG also 
validated the practice of setting up a working group to scope what was at 
stake, reconcile dissenting opinions and views, and propose ways forward. 
The practice of ad hoc groups in charge of finding a mediating position relied 
on legitimacy through expertise and, reiterated in multiple fora, became a 
defining routine in the IG field.
The WSIS Ordering
When the WSIS Summit came to an end in Tunisia in 2005 with the adop-
tion of two outcome documents— the Tunis Commitment and the Tunis 
Agenda— the global ordering that was in flux during the negotiations au-
thoritatively stabilized. The redefinition of the Internet as a sociopolitical field 
(in opposition to technical only) expanded the scope and exposure of what 
became a global public policy domain. A sustained public commons discourse 
surfaced in the contributions of the delegations from developing countries, 
12 The main donors supporting the WGIG— the Swiss, Norwegian, and Dutch governments, 
together with the Swiss Education and Research Network and ICANN— became significant con-
tributors to the IGF.
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countered by an understanding of the Internet as a ‘global facility’ in the eyes 
of the business sector and endorsed by some of the participants representing 
Western governments. Focusing attention on the overarching theme of digital 
divide, WSIS- II discussed themes such as spam (fraudulent and unsolicited 
harmful email), multilingual access to the Internet, and the international 
Internet interconnection charges.13 These three points advanced throughout 
the PrepComs and as part of the WGIG consultations were arguably the most 
heated. A tripartite categorization of stakeholders (governments– businesses– 
civil society) hardened the positions of the key actors, each of which struggled 
with internal heterogeneity.
In the Tunis Agenda, governments agreed on the following distinction of 
roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, which continues to guide the cur-
rent understanding of the shared competences in IG:
 a. Policy authority for Internet- related public policy issues is the sovereign right of 
States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet- related 
public policy issues.
 b. The private sector has had, and should continue to have, an important role in 
the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields.
 c. Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially 
at community level, and should continue to play such a role.
 d. Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should continue to have, a 
facilitating role in the coordination of Internet- related public policy issues.
 e. International organizations have also had and should continue to have an 
important role in the development of Internet- related technical standards and 
relevant policies. (WSIS 2005a, paragraph 35)
The Tunis Agenda also recognized, in paragraph 36, the ‘valuable contribu-
tion by the academic and technical communities within those stakeholder 
groups mentioned in paragraph 35’. This further divided the core communi-
ties contributing to IG, ‘unilaterally relegating all other stakeholders to sub-
ordinate roles’ (Doria 2014, 124). Antagonizing these groups by relegating 
them to the side- lines, the Summit further called into question the extent 
to which technical standards and protocols were responsive to the needs of 
developing countries, in particular in promoting internationalized domain 
name and multilingual local content. The Tunis Agenda understanding— 
refining the wording of the Geneva Plan of Action from 2003— became a 
reference point in all subsequent discussions.
13 To address this discontent, the Geneva Plan of Action encouraged ‘the creation and develop-
ment of regional ICT backbones and Internet exchange points’ (2003, section C2).
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In its IG section, the Tunis Agenda also reflected on the promotion, de-
velopment, and implementation of a global culture of cybersecurity (in co-
operation with all stakeholders and international expert bodies) in paragraph 
39, reiterating what the United States proposed in related discussions in the 
General Assembly (Radu 2013). In the words of Kummer, the ‘Tunis Agenda 
was a “diplomatic compromise”, the beauty of which is that it is full of cre-
ative ambiguity that allows everybody to find something to satisfy their own 
wishes. As the Agenda was based on a decision- making Summit, the text on 
controversial topics such as IPR was carefully balanced in a way that avoided 
going into details that could be divisive and difficult to resolve’ (cited in 
Dutton et  al. 2007, 5). Using the common- denominator approach meant 
that no IG reform proposed by the WGIG was pursued, with the exception 
of the endorsement for the creation of an IGF14 to address Internet- related 
questions in an open format, with non- binding recommendations.
The IGF was aimed at building consensus and shaping the development of 
Internet- related policies in a bottom- up manner, also fulfilling a socialization 
function by bringing stakeholders together for open discussions. Paragraph 
72 of the Tunis Agenda established this forum for multi- stakeholder policy 
dialogue to discuss public policy issues, facilitate exchange among inter-
ested parties, identify emerging issues, and contribute to capacity building 
in developing countries. Organized by a small IGF Secretariat15 based in 
Geneva and reporting to Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN 
DESA), the forum has been convened annually in different locations around 
the world since 2006 under a UN mandate that was originally valid for five 
years, renewed for the first time in 2010. At the WSIS decennial review in 
December 2015, the IGF was renewed for another ten years.
The concession made on the thorny issue of government participation in 
IG processes is summarized in paragraph 69 of the Tunis Agenda:
We further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in the future, to enable 
governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in 
international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day- to- day 
technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international public policy 
issues. (WSIS 2005a)
14 For Mueller (2010, 78), the creation of the IGF ‘was widely understood to be the kind of 
agreement that could get the WSIS out of its impasse; it allowed the critics to continue raising their 
issues in an official forum, but as a nonbinding discussion arena, could not do much harm to those 
interested in preserving the status quo’.
15 It was originally funded through extra- budgetary contributions to a trust fund, with donations 
from governments, international organizations, and various stakeholders.
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This wording led to a dialogue track perpetuated in what was known as the 
‘Enhanced Cooperation process’. Different reactions were triggered by this 
formulation: for some stakeholders, an active participation in the IGF met the 
conditions for an enhanced cooperation. This is why most of the stakeholders 
reporting to the UN Secretary- General mentioned their efforts in the IGF 
process as their contribution to an enhanced cooperation in IG. For others, the 
IGF and enhanced cooperation represented two different processes. It is the 
latter view that the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) endorsed 
when the issue was brought to the fore in 2012.
Once again, behind the separation or unification of the two processes 
stood a firmer decision on the role of the UN system in IG. The enhanced 
cooperation dialogue was mandated by the Secretary- General to his special 
adviser, Desai, tasked to report on progress annually. Subsequently, the pro-
cess was assigned to the UN Commission on Science and Technology for 
Development (CSTD), which started conducting discussions in the frame-
work of the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC) 
chaired by Peter Major of Hungary, active starting in 2013. The group com-
prised twenty UN member states and five representatives from each of the 
four identified stakeholder groups (business; civil society; intergovernmental 
organizations; technical and academic community). Discussion on the ‘en-
hanced cooperation’ track soon stalled over the definition of terms.
While the role of governments at the global level was not settled at the 
WSIS, a tacit agreement was reached that countries retained their rights 
to legislate nationally (Hill 2014). The Tunis Agenda did not debate the 
mechanisms already in place at the national level, be they legislative or ex-
ecutive. In terms of new mechanisms, the WSIS consensus was limited to 
encouraging the establishment of a national implementation instrument that 
would contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. Mainstreaming links 
between ICTs and development at various levels, the Tunis Agenda called on 
regional intergovernmental organizations to work with other stakeholders to 
implement activities, exchange information and share best practices.
Role of the United Nations
The WSIS permanently transformed the IG field by crystallizing the UN par-
ticipation in its processes. First and foremost, it clarified the facilitator role 
to be played by a number of UN agencies. In the Tunis Agenda, responsibil-
ities for action lines were entrusted to different UN agencies: UN DESA— 
development, e- government, international cooperation; ITU— cybersecurity, 
infrastructure, enabling environment, capacity building; WIPO— copyright; 
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UNESCO— access, science, e- learning, cultural and linguistic diversity, 
media, information ethics. Through WSIS, various UN organizations de-
fined their interests more clearly with regard to the Internet. ITU, WIPO, 
and UNESCO linked their mission directly to the Internet, whereas bodies 
such as UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) or UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) saw the Internet policymaking debates as 
tangential to their mission.
Second, a formalized reporting system was set in place. Assigning respon-
sibilities created a debate, with concerns being put forward regarding the 
very definition of the implementation and follow- up mechanisms for WSIS. 
Whether the process would result in new institutions or expanded mandates 
for certain international organizations and governments, and whether multi- 
stakeholder participation would be preserved were highly disputed. The need 
for a reporting and implementation system was stressed in the recommenda-
tions of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the GA, tasked to examine the inte-
grated and coordinated implementation of and follow- up to the outcomes of 
the major UN conferences and summits on socio- economic topics. The work 
of the ad hoc group happened around the same time as WSIS- I and resulted 
in the UNGA 57/ 270B resolution adopted in July 2003, recognizing the re-
sponsibility of the UN system to assist governments to stay fully engaged in 
the stocktaking process.
The WSIS stocktaking process started in August 2004 following a deci-
sion taken at the first meeting of Phase II preparations for Tunis. Given the 
overlapping mandates of several UN bodies, the stocktaking exercise was 
seen as an opportunity to coordinate and harmonize efforts across the UN 
system. To arrive at a full picture of the different activities and responsibil-
ities undertaken by various entities, the ITU Secretary- General, in coordin-
ation with the WSIS Executive Secretariat, sent a letter to WSIS participants 
to invite them to fill in a questionnaire regarding the field of activities and 
actions they contributed to in line with the eleven themes of the Geneva 
Plan of Action.
The negotiation of follow- up measures was as political as the definition of 
IG, going from the proposal of concrete implementation activities and the 
creation of a new organizational mandate to coordinate these to the vague text 
of ‘a request to the Secretary- General of the UN to submit a report on imple-
mentation activities of the WSIS decisions’ in a draft from August 2005. After 
a new round of negotiations, an agreement was reached to entrust ECOSOC 
with overseeing the system- wide follow- up. ECOSOC’s subsidiary body, the 
CSTD was further mandated to evaluate progress on implementation and 
follow- up and to propose initiatives for improving their efficiency. In this 
process, the CSTD— with an agenda, mandate, and composition decided on 
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by ECOSOC— was named focal point and given the ultimate responsibility 
over the follow- up process.
The ITU, on the other hand, remained in charge of the stocktaking pro-
cess, following the organization of the first meeting on this topic in October 
2004. In the understanding of the time, stocktaking consisted of compiling 
the information regarding the different activities and initiatives undertaken 
by various actors in connection with the themes of the Summit. Participation 
in this exercise was voluntary, and the ITU took the lead in publishing an 
annual report based on data related to the themes identified in the Geneva 
Plan of Action. The Tunis Agenda also introduced a quantification approach 
with strong reliance on data, indicators, and indexes for monitoring the evo-
lution of the information society. It pointed to the periodical evaluation of 
problems identified at the WSIS, noting that different levels of development 
and national circumstances need to be taken into account. The Partnership 
on Measuring ICTs for Development was one of its outcomes, providing a 
measurement of the efficiency of the implementation measures through the 
ICT Opportunity Index and the Digital Opportunity Index. Building on 
paragraphs 109 to 110 of the Tunis Agenda, the ITU organized, together 
with UNESCO, UNCTAD, and UNDP, the annual WSIS Forum, the lar-
gest global meeting for ICT4D, annually held in Geneva.
On the question of coordination and harmonization of activities in the 
UN system, the Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) was established 
by Kofi Annan in April 2006 within the UN Chief Executives Board for 
Coordination (CEB). The UNGIS consisted of twenty- eight UN bodies and 
organizations facilitating the implementation of the WSIS outcomes and co-
ordinating the mechanisms for national and international implementation 
established in the Tunis Agenda. They initiated a process of annual meetings 
to identify priorities and coordinate activities and joint initiatives, consoli-
dating cross- sectoral cooperation and strengthening the role and visibility of 
the UN on information society matters.
At the end of the WSIS, it became clear that the institutionalization of 
an emerging and highly politicized field was well underway, with the in-
volvement of the regional and international organizations. Not only was the 
Internet fully integrated in global governance processes, it also became a vis-
ible point of contention between developing and developed countries over 
participation in the creation of rules for the Internet, which progressively 
blurred the boundaries between traditional sectors of regulation. The process 
laid the foundations for a developmental angle to be added to the evolution 
of the Internet. The organization of the WSIS brought together different UN 
bodies working at the intersection of technology and development, it consoli-
dated the role of the ITU, and mandated follow- up procedures though which 
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a number of organizational mandates were extended. The Tunis outcome 
documents and UN General Assembly Resolution 60/ 252 further resolved 
to conduct an Overall Review of the Implementation of the WSIS Outcomes 
in 2015, a process discussed in the Post- Snowden Fault Lines section below.
WCIT- 12
Soon after the conclusion of WSIS- II, the ITU met for its 2006 
Plenipotentiary meeting in Antalya and decided, among others, to convene 
a World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012 (WCIT- 
12) to discuss the revision of the 1988 International Telecommunication 
Regulations (ITRs) treaty in light of the changes in the international envir-
onment. The ITRs served as a global treaty binding signatories to comply 
with general principles for worldwide interconnection and interoperability of 
existing communication services and facilitate the availability of international 
telecommunication services and networks. It said little about the Internet, 
which was in its infancy at the time.
In the lead- up to the WCIT- 12, core frictions emerged between stake-
holders and interest groups on state involvement in Internet regulation. The 
United States16 and many supporters of the multi- stakeholder practice voiced 
concerns that the revised ITRs posed threats to an open Internet and called 
for opposing the alleged UN intent to govern and regulate the Internet and 
related attempts by member states to impose governmental leadership via this 
treaty. On 22 September 2012, the US House of representatives unanimously 
approved a resolution urging the US government not to give the ITU control 
over the Internet. A broad coalition of non- state actors, including civil society 
organizations and large Internet companies, mobilized against the WCIT- 12.
Amidst these tensions, the ITU Secretary General Hamadoun Touré 
(2012) repeatedly stated that the WCIT- 12 would not address the Internet, 
yet a number of documents among the 1,275 revision proposals submitted 
by member states referred directly to the Internet. The Russian proposal was 
worrisome to many:  ‘member states shall have equal rights to manage the 
Internet, including in regard to the allotment, assignment and reclamation 
of Internet numbering, naming, addressing and identification resources 
and to support for the operation and development of the basic Internet in-
frastructure’. The talks around amending the ITRs were also prominently 
16 At the meeting in Dubai, the US delegation was one of the most numerous, consisting of 
100 individuals, of which forty belonged to the private sector and ten to civil society organizations.
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contested for increasing the jurisdiction and legal control of the ITU over the 
Internet (Blackman 2013). The WCIT- 12 included, apart from the revision 
of the treaty, discussions around the adoption of a non- binding resolution 
for fostering an enabling environment for the greater growth of the Internet, 
which affirmed a strong and continuous role for the ITU in IG, stating that 
‘all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international 
Internet governance’.
The concern that dominated the meeting— the potential intergovernmental 
control of the Internet— was by no means new. Since 2011, non- Western coun-
tries put forward various proposals to bring network governance into state- led 
global or regional frameworks:  India, Brazil, and South Africa pushed for 
the creation of a UN Committee for Internet- related Policies (CIRP), while 
Russia, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan called for an International Code 
of Conduct for Information Security, drawing on an older Russian proposal 
submitted to the UNGA on information security (Radu 2013). The latter 
included a call for the creation of ‘a multilateral, transparent and democratic 
international management of the Internet’, reiterating the WSIS wording 
from negotiation drafts. The ITRs conference revived this discussion around 
intergovernmentalism versus multi- stakeholderism in the governance of the 
field and divided participants over the extent to which the treaty covered the 
Internet (Radu et al. 2014).
When more than 1,600 delegates from 151 member states met in Dubai 
on 3 to 14 December 2012 for the UN- sponsored meeting to amend the 
ITRs, the talks epitomized ideological struggles and conflicts between dif-
ferent socio- economic and representation models. The text of the treaty was 
satisfactory to many developing countries, as it covered, among others, means 
to foster transparency and competition for international mobile roaming 
charges, to reduce electronic waste, increase accessibility to international 
telecommunication services for persons with disabilities, and ways to facili-
tate access to international optical fibre networks for landlocked and small 
island developing states. At the same time, the preamble made reference 
to the commitment of member states to uphold human rights obligations 
in the implementation of the new ITRs.17 The stakeholders opposing the 
WCIT negotiations questioned not only the legitimacy of the ITU to oversee 
security- related issues, in particular in the context of the provisions regarding 
cybersecurity (Article 5A) and unsolicited bulk electronic communica-
tions (Article 5B), but also the fact that participation in the discussions was 
17 Paragraph 2 of the preamble reads: ‘Member States affirm their commitment to implement 
these Regulations in a manner that respects and upholds their human rights obligations.’
132 WSIS Decade & Public–Private Partnership Thirst
132
relatively limited (observation and advisory role) and voting was restricted to 
states only.
In the revised ITRs, Article 5A bound states to ‘endeavour to ensure the 
security and robustness of international telecommunication networks’, which 
raised concerns about limitations on content that signatory countries might 
pursue, thus legitimizing potential infringements on human rights. In this 
case, the negotiations revealed older tensions between the approaches of 
Russia, China, and the United States on information security, which pre-
viously surfaced in the UN General Assembly. The revised Article 5B of the 
treaty, stating that ‘Member States should endeavour to take necessary meas-
ures to prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communica-
tions and minimize its impact on international telecommunication services’, 
was seen as a possible avenue to interfere with content online, for example 
in order to limit freedom of expression. Similar concerns surrounded the 
wording of the preamble, which contained a provision upholding the right of 
access of member states to international telecommunication services.
Given these fault lines, consensus was impossible to reach at the WCIT- 
12 and majority voting was used instead. Out of the 144 delegations with 
voting rights, eighty- nine were in favour (including Russia, China, Arab 
states, Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and 
many African states) and fifty- five were against (including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, EU member- states, Australia, Japan, India, 
Kenya). The possibility was left for other states to join the new treaty later. 
Figure 2 shows the block of countries opposing the treaty, revealing a split 
along the developed– developing country dimension in the vote of the na-
tional delegations.
The split in the votes was described as a ‘digital Cold War’ (The Economist 
2012; Mueller 2013), with countries divided into two camps led by the 
United States and Russia. A similar grouping of states could also be observed 
five months after the WCIT, on 16 to 18 May 2013, when the ITU hosted 
the World Telecommunication/ ICTs Policy Forum in Geneva, a non- binding 
meeting facilitating exchange and information sharing on emerging telecom-
munication regulatory matters for states and sector members. The revised 
2012 ITRs entered into force on 1 January 2015, allowing for the new rules 
and the 1988 ones to operate alongside. Against this background, a number 
of IG processes (inter alia, the decennial review of the World Summit on 
Information Society) were perceived as potential battlefields for the definition 
of future IG mechanisms.
In the ICANN space, 2012 is remembered for the new expansion of the 
DNS. Applications for the new generic top- level domains (gTLDs) were 
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be put forward in scripts other than Latin as Internationalized Domain 
Names, and be used for a variety of purposes, from business to community- 
oriented, including brand names or geographic strings. Policies to guide 
the application process had been in the making since 2005 in ICANN’s 
Generic Names Supporting Organization, but the launch of the applica-
tions was met with a lot of criticism, this time by the private sector. In 
2011, a coalition of seventy- nine corporations organized under the US 
Association of National Advertisers signed a petition against the new gTLD 
programme. Since 2014, their interests were channelled by the Coalition 
for Responsible Internet Domain Oversight, comprising seventy- nine com-
panies and 102 associations.
Notwithstanding concerns regarding the protection of trademarks in do-
main name registrations and fears of confusing and predatory registrations, 
the new programme attracted a total of 1,930 applications at the end of the 
registration period and ICANN held a prioritization draw in December 2012 
to move forward with independent third party expert processing. By October 
2013, the first four new gTLDs were delegated,18 followed by 475 more be-
fore January 2015. A string delegated in February 2015, .sucks,19 brought the 
debate to a new level, opposing freedom of expression entitlements to suspi-
cions of exploitation and coercion of brand holders.
Numerous underlying tensions in the IG space came to the surface be-
tween 2010 and 2012. States- or corporations- driven apprehensions over 
Internet ruling profiled more clearly the new interests at stake, whether it 
was agenda- setting power, policymaking, or direct influence over institu-
tional processes. The Pandora’s box was opened again in 2013, when con-
fidential documents leaked by Edward Snowden showed the pervasiveness 
of the surveillance apparatus of the United States and its world- dominant 
national security agenda. The Snowden revelations brought to the forefront 
the cooperation between the US federal government agencies and Internet 
companies, overriding user privacy in pursuit of national interests. Beyond 
the specifics of the US intelligence- gathering practices under the PRISM 
mass surveillance programme, the disclosures marked a turning point in 
pushing for a more transparent and more accountable governance structure 
for the cyberspace.
18 The strings delegated on 23 October 2013 were: 游戏(xn- - unup4y)— Chinese for ‘game(s)’, 
сайт (xn- - 80aswg)— Russian for ‘site’, онлайн (xn- - 80asehdb)— Russian for ‘online’, ةكبش (xn- - 
ngbc5azd)— Arabic for ‘web/ network’.
19 The domain .sucks belonged to Vox Populi, a Cayman Islands based registry which allegedly 
charged a premium for brands to defensively reserve anything related to their name.
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Post- Snowden Fault Lines
A deep rift formed in IG in mid- 2013. On 5 June, the British newspaper The 
Guardian started publishing a series of articles about the secret collection of 
data by the US National Security Agency (NSA) and subsequently disclosed 
the wide scope of the PRISM surveillance programme. The data came from 
classified government documents leaked by Edward Snowden, a computer 
security specialist and former NSA contractor, who left the United States to 
seek temporary asylum in Russia. Three international media outlets— the US- 
based Washington Post, the British Guardian, and the German Der Spiegel— 
analysed the documents released by Snowden and reported that thirty- five 
world leaders had their phone communications tapped (including Brazil’s 
President Dilma Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel) and that 
the NSA surveillance capabilities had also been used in monitoring the com-
munications of foreign companies like Huawei in China and Petrobras in 
Brazil (Globo 2013). According to the Washington Post, the NSA collected 
around 5 billion phone records every day (Gellman and Soltani 2013a) and 
97 billion pieces of data in March 2013 alone. Part of the information was col-
lected by tapping directly into the unsecured connections of Google, Yahoo!, 
and Microsoft data centres around the world (Gellman and Soltani 2013b).
It was not the first time confidential documents from the US administra-
tion were made public, generating reactions worldwide. Prior to the Snowden 
revelations, Wikileaks held the headlines for most of 2010 by publishing 
footage from the 2007 Baghdad airstrike, complemented, a couple of months 
later, by the Iraqi War Logs. In July, they released around 77,000 documents 
compiled in the ‘Afghan War Diary’ and in November the organization leaked 
diplomatic cables of the US State Department, generating a massive outcry 
from political leaders. The documents were disclosed by Chelsea Manning 
(born Bradley Edward Manning), who was soon after convicted on multiple 
charges and served time at a maximum- security facility in Kansas, United 
States.20
Manning’s revelations showed the power of the Internet in disseminating 
information, yet Snowden’s classified documents revealed the global ram-
ifications of the US surveillance apparatus. Alongside the NSA, the British 
Government Communications Headquarters and Communications Security 
Establishment Canada also engaged in extensive spying on individuals and 
20 Manning was released in May 2017, after her sentence was commuted by President Obama in 
January 2017 to 7 years of confinement since her arrest.
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on political organizations. The US- driven discourse on Internet freedom, 
promoted in particular by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton lost its 
credibility when the Snowden leaks went to press. There was a sharp contrast 
between the free flow of information discourse and the practices of the NSA. 
Back in 2010, Secretary Clinton argued that:
Information freedom supports the peace and security that provides a foundation for 
global progress. Historically, asymmetrical access to information is one of the leading 
causes of interstate conflict. When we face serious disputes or dangerous incidents, 
it’s critical that people on both sides of the problem have access to the same set of 
facts and opinions. (Clinton 2010)
For the IG communities already divided over the roles attributed to each in the 
Tunis Agenda, the Snowden leaks provided an opportunity to call for reform, 
in particular to restore trust and increase collaboration towards transparency 
and accountability. The minimization of the role of the US government con-
stituted one of the dividing lines, resulting in a transfer of the oversight role 
of the Department of Commerce over IANA. On 7 October 2013, the tech-
nical bodies in charge of managing global resources— ICANN, the IETF, the 
WWW Consortium, the Internet Architecture Board, ISOC, and all five of 
the regional Internet address registries— issued a common statement to call 
for ‘accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards 
an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, par-
ticipate on an equal footing’ (ISOC 2013). This was also echoed in an EU 
press release dated 12 February 2014, calling for the ‘establishment of a clear 
timeline for the globalization of ICANN and the IANA functions’, as well as 
‘strengthening the multi- stakeholder model to preserve the Internet as a fast 
engine for innovation’.
Following the revelations, Brazil and Germany drafted a UN General 
Assembly resolution on ‘the right to privacy in the digital age’ adopted unani-
mously on 18 December 2013. The resolution affirmed that ‘the same rights 
that people have offline must also be protected online, including the right to 
privacy’ and called upon member states to review their procedures, practices, 
and legislation on the surveillance of communications, their interception and 
collection of personal data, including mass surveillance, with a ‘view to up-
holding the right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementa-
tion of all relevant obligations under international human rights law’ (UNGA 
2013). The initiative also stirred a related process within the Human Rights 
Council, which appointed, in July 2015, the first Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy.
Building on its efforts in the UN, Brazil hosted the April 2014 Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on Internet Governance, known as NetMundial, 
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announced after a tête- à- tête between the Brazilian President and ICANN’s 
President and CEO Fadi Chehadé. Prior to the meeting, a proposal was made 
to hold online consultations drawing on the successful experience of the 
Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (Marco Civil), a law that 
was drafted collaboratively over many years using an online platform to gather 
inputs from a wide range of stakeholders. Upholding the multi- stakeholder 
principle, NetMundial was innovative in its approach to assigning an equal 
number of slots for the four groups of interests identified:  governmental, 
business, technical and academic, and civil society, offering a rowing micro-
phone for interventions in the plenary discussions.
NetMundial concluded with a negotiated final statement outlining IG 
principles and a roadmap for further action. The anti- surveillance focus was 
toned down in the negotiations (Radu et  al. 2015), yet the document be-
came emblematic as it recognized the evolving roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders, a heated debate post- WSIS. Part of the discussions focused on 
ICANN and the NTIA announcement from the month before of its intent to 
finalize the privatization of the IANA functions, started in 1998. Following 
the meeting in São Paulo, the NetMundial Initiative was launched in Geneva 
in August that year by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), 
ICANN, and the WEF, hosted by the latter. The initiative pursued very broad 
objectives that did not translate in concrete actions and came under criticism 
for its limited legitimacy and opaque procedures around the selection of its 
steering committee participants. It subsequently refocused on capacity devel-
opment and lost visibility.
Around the same time, preparations for the decennial review of the World 
Summit on Information Society (referred to as WSIS + 10) intensified. The 
fears that the process would be less open than it had been in 2003 and 2005 
were confirmed as the negotiations remained primarily intergovernmental. 
With the involvement of a number of UN bodies, and prominently the back-
ground work of the CSTD, the decennial review was completed with an 
evaluation of the progress made since 2005 and a GA High- Level Meeting, 
held at the UN headquarters in New York in December 2015. The merging of 
the WSIS priorities and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda 
were in focus, presenting many similarities to the Geneva Plan of Action 
and Tunis Agenda. While ICT- related goals were not listed among the SDGs 
(with the exception of Goal 9c regarding improved access), the Internet was 
discussed as an enabling platform for achieving the Agenda 2030 goals.
Importantly, throughout the WSIS + 10 negotiations and in the submis-
sions of the different national delegations, consensus emerged around four 
key issues:  digital divide— mentioned by all but three of the submitters 
(ISOC 2015a)— Internet access, child online protection, and support for 
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multi- stakeholderism (broadly understood). While the first two issues rep-
resented areas in which significant progress was still needed, the latter were 
new items compared to the 2003 to 2005 WSIS discussions. The multiplicity 
of governance mechanisms acknowledged and evaluated ahead of the decen-
nial review— stressing the multi- stakeholder component— revealed many in-
stances of self- regulation and collaboration across sectors.
However, as in the past, the most heated discussion was around the ‘roles 
and responsibilities’ of actors, where no agreement could be reached. The 
final wording upheld the formulation included in the Tunis Agenda, rec-
ognizing that ‘the management of the Internet as a global facility includes 
multilateral, transparent, democratic and multi- stakeholder processes, with 
the full involvement of Governments, the private sector, civil society, inter-
national organisations technical and academic communities, and all other 
relevant stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities’ (paragraph 
57). The long- negotiated outcome document, which received public input at 
different stages (with many contributions from civil society), made only one 
reference to surveillance in paragraph 46, as member states failed to agree on 
a more precise wording.
Mechanisms of Governance
The patchwork of international rules that emerged throughout the WSIS 
decade pointed to a clearer understanding of shared responsibility for Internet 
policymaking. More diverse and increasingly private sources of authoritative 
decisions were profiling, followed by regulatory responses at the national 
and international levels. Beside the hybrid configurations, a redefinition and 
scaling up of the public domain could be observed in the process. The much 
denser regulatory pressure during this period was driven by ideological, dip-
lomatic, and technological developments. The governance arrangements thus 
formed— summarized in Table 5— relied much more on discursive and op-
erative modelling than on hard law, making the voices of non- state actors 
better heard. Some of these were traditional players which acquired a signifi-
cant responsibility for Internet regulation over the years; others were new-
comers to the process and demanded self- regulation or an equal footing in 
the deliberations. As more international institutions introduced specialized 
mandates or expanded existing mandates to address the realm of IG, their 
political standing was called into question and status- quo maintenance drew 
supporters closer together.
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(continued )
Table 5 Governance arrangements (global and regional) for the period 2005– 15 
(based on a total of 212 instruments recorded in the dataset)





7% 2009 SCO Agreement on Cooperation in the 
Field of International Information Security
2013 WIPO Marrakesh Treaty
2014 African Union Convention on Cyber 
Security and Personal Data Protection
Court 
judgments
9% 2012 ECHR judgment Ahmet Yildirim 
v. Turkey
2014 CJEU judgment Costeja v. Google





11% 2010 Broadband Commission for Digital 
Development
2005, 2010, 2013, 2015 UN Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunication 
in the Context of International Security
2014 Global Commission on Internet 
Governance




14% 2007 Global Cybersecurity Agenda
2013 OSCE Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs) Stemming from the Use of ICTs
2014 Facebook’s Free Basics




6% 2011 Boston Consulting Group E- Intensity 
Index
2014 ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index
2014 Internet Traffic Monitoring Data Sharing 
(TSUBAME project)
Modelling Discursive 33% 2009 CoE Prague Declarations on A New 
European Approach for Safer Internet for 
Children
2011 Deauville G8 Declaration
2013 UNESCO Sakhalin Declaration on 
Internet and Socio- Cultural Transformations
2014 UN Resolution on Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age (A/ RES/ 69/ 166)
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Table 5 Continued
Globally, the WSIS decade can be seen as the ‘golden era of regulation’ 
(Levi- Faur and Jordana 2005)  for the Internet. Governance instruments 
aimed at limiting and constraining— rather than merely shaping— the behav-
iour of other actors became the norm across all Internet subareas. The overall 
increase in the number of dedicated instruments for this period (212 recorded 
in the database, compared to seventy- four in the previous period) attested to 
the high salience of the field, which matured into an institutional domain 
open to political contestation. Modelling mechanisms employed during the 
WSIS decade— primarily discursive, but also operative— constituted 53 per 
cent of all formal instruments in use by relevant actors. In the wake of the 
2013 revelations by Edward Snowden— evidencing the depth and extent of 
the NSA surveillance— the dominant position of the United States came 
under fire explicitly or implicitly in many statements. The operative measures 
that complemented the high- level speeches or declarations aimed at guiding 
the development of policies in developing countries or introducing soft law 
principles in the routines of various organizations.
In parallel, the rights agenda consolidated. Early references to it dated 
back to the 2003 WSIS Declaration of Principles which affirmed the im-
portance of maintaining and strengthening rights— in particular in connec-
tion with development and freedom of expression. While that document 
remained vague about implementing this vision, later efforts to turn that 
into reality materialized first at the national level and subsequently at the 
regional and global levels. Access to broadband Internet was first declared a 
right in Finland in 2010. A year later, a report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, concluded that disconnecting people from the 
Internet was against international law and constituted a human rights vio-
lation (La Rue 2011).
Mechanisms Instruments % Examples
Operative 20% 2005 WB ICT in Education Toolkit for 
Policymakers, Planners & Practitioners
2008 GSMA Mobile Alliance Against Child 
Sexual Abuse Content
2011 Consumers International A Guide to 
Developing Consumer Protection Law
2013 CoE Model Framework on Net 
Neutrality
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Time and again, fears of Internet fragmentation via data localization prac-
tices were also understood in terms of human rights: in response to the NTIA 
surveillance leaks, there were repeated calls by government leaders to keep 
their users’ data on national territory. The human rights framing, used ex-
tensively both before and after the Snowden revelations, grounded a number 
of discussions that cut across subfields, such as net neutrality. Ambiguously 
defined, the human rights discourse remained open to a plurality of political 
articulations, opening certain positions up for change and reinterpretation. 
This stood in sharp contrast with the securitization discourse solidifying in 
the cybersecurity arena around the same time.
With no mentioning of human rights, China’s prioritization of the ‘cyber 
sovereignty’ approach meant that everything happening on the networks in-
side its territory would be subject to national rule. By 2008, the decade- long 
development of the Great Firewall of China was completed and a new form 
of censorship was in place, limiting access to certain foreign websites and 
close control of cross- border Internet traffic. This was further enhanced via 
legislative action to stimulate the growth of the domestic Internet industry by 
limiting the presence of Western services21 or by the introduction of explicit 
provisions for foreign companies to respect domestic regulations. The last 
step in the process of developing an own Internet was the implementation 
of the National Public Security Work Informational Project (or the Golden 
Shield Project) for online content monitoring via surveillance and filtering. 
Two policies implemented by Xi’s government on anti- rumours and real 
name registration brought an ever- tighter control to the 560 million Chinese 
Internet users recorded in 2015. Harsh content controls were also introduced 
across the Middle East following the wave of Arab Spring protests in 2010 to 
2012 and further expanded into authoritarian states in both Africa and Asia, 
in most cases implemented on Western technology (Deibert 2015).
Against this background, the strong emphasis on placing the Internet high 
up on global agendas and in strategic frameworks (14 per cent of all instru-
ments recorded in the dataset) derived primarily from the creation of a global 
market based on the free flow of information. Improvements in connect-
ivity speeds and mobile Internet made online transactions faster and more 
convenient. Be it for raising or disbursing resources, the Internet became 
a top global priority. Paradoxically though, financial mechanisms attached 
to Internet initiatives have varied in their success and the global Internet 
agenda has mostly been built discursively. The SDGs, part of the broad 
21 China developed its own version of popular services:  Youku (YouTube), Weibo (Twitter), 
Renren (Facebook), WeChat (WhatsApp).
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intergovernmental UN framework known as Agenda 2030, did not include 
the Internet22 among its seventeen goals, but considered it a key enabling 
platform for achieving the targets.
At the end of 2005, half of the world’s population— mostly in developing 
countries— was not yet connected to the Internet (ITU 2015). Programmes 
like Facebook’s Internet.org (later renamed Free Basics), initiated in 2014 to 
connect hard- to- reach populations in developing countries at no cost for the 
user, saw a halt and a redesign amid protests for limiting access to only a few 
Facebook- sanctioned services online and violating net neutrality via its zero- 
rating agreement23 with mobile operators in the target areas. Many activists 
accused the company of introducing a ‘two- tiered Internet, on which new 
users could get stuck on a separate and unequal path to Internet connectivity, 
which will serve to widen— not narrow— the digital divide’ (Hern 2015); 
Facebook’s main competitors did not back the initiative. The programme 
was banned by the Indian regulator on net neutrality grounds in February 
2016; however, it expanded and became operational in a number of African 
and Latin American countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya and South 
Africa, Colombia and Bolivia).
Like the Indian example shows, national regulation became overall more 
powerful vis- à- vis corporations towards the end of the WSIS decade, though 
wide differences persisted in terms of local regulatory capacity. The other 
route of Internet decision- making implementation was via the judiciary. In 
this period, 9 per cent of all authoritative decisions about the Internet came 
from courts. Gradually, the role of the judiciary in Internet policymaking 
strengthened, culminating with two key decisions of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) at the end of the WSIS decade: the introduction 
of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in 2014 and the 2015 invalidation of the Safe 
Harbour scheme for data transfers.
In the landmark case C- 131/ 12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, the 
CJEU established that, based on their right to erasure, individuals can ask for 
their personal information to be de- listed from search engines. Accordingly, it 
imposed an obligation on Google to act on the potential removal from search 
results of items that are ‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or ex-
cessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed and in the 
light of the time that has elapsed’ (CJEU 2014), when the person concerned 
so requests.
22 With the exception of Goal 9c, which refers to expanding Internet access.
23 The zero- rating model consists of providing Internet access to certain websites free of charge 
as part of a user’s data plan.
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In practice, the CJEU judgment delegated to the company the case- by- 
case, human review of links for potential deletion, entrusting Google with 
a first decision on the matter; in case of dissatisfaction, the complaint could 
go to court, thus having the search engine’s decision as a first step in a longer 
legal process. In the implementation of the ‘right to be forgotten’, Google 
acquired quasi- judicial powers, adjudicating on the display of personal in-
formation, which constituted the core of its business model (Chenou and 
Radu 2017). To comply with the court decision, Google opened an online 
delinking request form on 29 May 2014 and received 12,000 deindexing re-
quests in the following 24 hours. From September to November 2014, it held 
consultations with the newly established Advisory Council (made up of in-
vited experts) in seven European capitals. One year after the CJEU judgment, 
Google received 253,258 de- listing requests with a total of 918,699 links to 
be evaluated. Of these, 58.7 per cent were not removed.
In 2015, EU’s highest court decided that the Safe Harbour agreement— 
which regulated data transfers to non- EU countries based on a guarantee 
of ‘adequate protection’— was invalid, since it failed to ensure it in the case 
brought forward by the young Austrian lawyer and activist Maximilian 
Schrems against Facebook Ireland Ltd. His complaint, filed with the Irish 
Data Protection Commission, followed the suspected involvement of the 
company in the PRISM mass surveillance programme and requested the 
prohibition of further data transfers from Ireland to the United States. The 
CJEU decided on 6 October that government interference and lack of legal 
remedies for individuals who seek to access data about themselves on specific 
services meant the United States had lower privacy standards than the EU, 
thus triggering negotiations around a new transatlantic data transfer scheme.
The value- laden rules imposed in the two Court cases discussed showed the 
power of courts in reversing authoritative decisions from earlier periods of time, 
be they company practices or transatlantic agreements. With an embryonic 
Internet industry, the EU redirected its efforts towards carving out new spaces 
for regulation in data control and data protection (Radu and Chenou 2015). 
Europe’s Digital Single Market, announced by the Juncker Commission in 
May 2015, aimed to create EU- wide regulation for e- commerce, telecommu-
nications, and digital marketing, eliminating the national barriers and ren-
dering the European market first in digital economy. With over 500 million 
Internet users with the highest purchasing power around the globe, the EU 
was, around the late 2000s, well- positioned to assume a strong digital regu-
lator role by designing legislation and norms that were gradually adopted by 
many more countries outside its jurisdiction.
Governance throughout the WSIS decade was thus enacted though struc-
tural elements that directed, constrained, or defined action and partnership 
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frameworks. Although not in focus in previous decades, efforts to closely 
monitor and sanction came to characterize the period in which the Internet 
became a truly global medium. Such developments revealed that the enforce-
ment capabilities generally associated with international institutions did not 
vanish, but were in fact complemented by benchmarking initiatives and com-
parative rankings.
Variation of governance mechanisms across subfields was a constant in the 
data analysed here. A clear focus on two areas of regulatory action emerged 
throughout the WSIS decade. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the the-
matic grouping and distribution of instruments in the six areas of interest 
analysed throughout this study. One- third of the instruments recorded deal 
with security, primarily cybersecurity, child online protection, and cyber-
crime. Another third address civil liberties, in particular privacy, data protec-
tion, and freedom of expression. Often presented as a trade- off, cybersecurity 
and online personal freedoms remained top of the agenda following the 9/ 11 
attacks in the United States and subsequent attacks in Europe. The frequency 
and high impact of online disruptions took centre stage in the work of many 
institutions. The ITU launched its Global Cybersecurity Agenda in 2007, at 
the same time as its cyberpeace discourse, which lost visibility shortly after.
Internationally, the first cyberattack to paralyse a country happened in 
2007 in Estonia, when governmental and bank services were inaccessible for 
several days due to distributed denial of service attacks, allegedly coordinated 
from Russia. In 2010, during the Russian– Georgian war over the independ-





















Figure 3 Variation of governance mechanisms across subfields (2005– 15)
Note: total does not add up due to multiple cases in which an instrument covers several subfields
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of communication at strategic points in time (Radu 2013). Pertinent cyber 
actions throughout the WSIS decade could range from probing the limits of 
cyber defence at the state level or in the private sector, to signalling power 
positions, and finally to inflicting damage. At the global level, responses 
came primarily under the form of ad hoc security governance networks and 
public– private cooperation. Existing transnational governmental networks— 
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and the G8— started developing dedicated 
programmes and units; new forums for discussion have also emerged:  the 
2011 London Process initiated the biennial series of Global Cyberspace 
Conferences and led to the creation of Global Forum on Cyber Expertise 
(GFCE);24 the Munich Security Conference has included dedicated cyber ac-
tivities since 2012.
Many other governmental initiatives focused on a broad understanding 
of cybersecurity and national capabilities, in particular as more and more 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Computer Security 
Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) were established for national- level co-
ordination. Originally, the threats posed to Internet security were solved in-
formally, without making appeals to other institutions, due to the localized 
nature of risks and their low impact. This changed with the rise of cross- 
border attacks and the limited expertise available, primarily concentrated 
within firms and closed communities of scientists (Schmidt 2014). While 
companies were often called in to work alongside state institutions in cyber 
crises, only governments could legally pursue perpetrators in the few cases 
in which attribution could be assigned. While intergovernmental cooper-
ation on cybersecurity increased, other governmental initiatives, such as the 
Freedom Online Coalition, profiled themselves as fighting the downsides of 
securitizing and monitoring information flows. It is noteworthy that there 
was often overlapping membership in some of these divergent initiatives.
The civil liberties focus, captured in the human rights agenda and re-
inforced after the Snowden revelations, materialized in concrete efforts to 
design internet rights charters, such as those developed by the Association for 
Progressive Communication and the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition 
in 2013, which merged concerns for freedom of expression, access, and ac-
cessibility with privacy and security protections, as well as political participa-
tion and cultural and linguistic diversity. Soft regulation and self- regulatory 
tools also included significant references to rights, in particular at the level 
24 The GFCE acts as a global platform to share experiences, identify gaps, and strengthen cyber 
capacities worldwide. Its membership comprises fifty countries, international organizations, and 
companies.
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of guiding principles. Going in the opposite direction, the CJEU decision 
against Google on the ‘right to be forgotten’ aimed at regulating dominant 
actors’ behaviour in the market (Chenou and Radu 2017) by imposing an 
obligation on them to de- list information when requested to do so. This ‘re-
versibility of authority’ that Hall and Biersteker discussed back in 2002 was 
introduced via courts, but also via soft law.
In this shift to tackle the Internet economy, the discursive repertoires of 
various actors became unstable over time, resulting in institutional ambiguity 
and longer strategic negotiations in the framework of binding instruments. As 
in the case of cybersecurity, the concentration of efforts on digital economy 
showed that the new political tensions were no longer about infrastructure, 
but about the market value of the Internet. Admittedly, in the struggle be-
tween states and the ‘Internet giants’, regulatory measures for information 
intermediaries have included a ‘turn to infrastructure’ (Musiani et al. 2015). 
Noteworthy cases include code remedies for interoperability.25The non- 
linearity of regulation, pushing certain priorities up and others down, made 
institutional ambiguity a permanent feature of the WSIS + 10 process. Global 
strategic agendas were reduced to the minimum common denominator to 
defer controversial choices.
The privileged role of the US administration continued to stir tensions. 
The legitimacy of the US government to set global rules via extraterritorial 
reach was questioned multiple times during the decade. In 2012, when the 
US Congress discussed two anti- piracy bills that triggered global protests, the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA), the first global 
‘Internet strike’ was organized on 18 January 2012. Over one billion Internet 
users worldwide (Sell 2013) were affected by the blackout of websites, con-
sisting of temporarily making their content unavailable and redirecting users 
to a message opposing the proposed legislation. At stake were the regulatory 
over- reach powers granted by these laws and their wide- ranging consequences 
on Internet users worldwide.
In 2013, Microsoft challenged in court the request of the US government 
to turn over the emails stored in a data centre in Ireland of a target account 
linked to a drug investigation, opening a long- lasting inquiry into the extra-
territoriality of law enforcement based on the 1986 Stored Communications 
Act. Meanwhile, Microsoft announced that it would open cloud servers in 
partnership with Deutsche Telekom in Germany, where the privacy laws are 
strict, to avoid warrants of a similar kind. The question of jurisdiction also 
25 This is what the European Commission mandated for Microsoft in the final settlement of its 
antitrust case in 2009 and what the Federal Trade Commission decided in the antitrust settlement 
of Intel in 2010.
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continued to surround the IANA stewardship transition process, announced 
in 2014; at stake was the California- based incorporation of the body created 
in 1998, in a previous NTIA effort to privatize the domain name system.
Moreover, the alignment of the US government with the Silicon Valley in-
dustry interests resulted in a push for regulatory action in the EU. In 2014, the 
EU Parliament discussed a non- binding resolution to break up Google, while 
the European Commission opened an antitrust investigation into Google’s 
search and advertising services. The role of private intermediaries was called 
into question as their financial and political power rose steeply. Their relation 
to governments was also probed, particularly from 2013 onwards. The digital 
business model based on the collection, storage, and third- party sharing of 
personal data, coupled with profiling for targeted advertising, was not the 
main target of regulation, but was subsequently affected by sectoral laws, such 
as those dealing with privacy and data protection.
As regulatory patterns evolved, the conceptualization of rule- making 
broadened. The use of modelling instruments became mainstreamed in the 
activities of organizations with tangential roles in IG. Importantly, during 
the WSIS decade and in particular post- Snowden, the authority of technical 
bodies expanded to public policies issues such as encryption and surveillance, 
whereas privacy and data protection became politically disputed. The con-
tinuous renegotiation of positions observed from 2012 to 2015 embodied a 
struggle over fundamental values and principles for global IG. In the absence 
of a central mechanism for coordinating Internet- related policies, hybrid con-
figurations became the norm, building on the interconnectedness of actors.
Actors
The multiplication and decentralization of sources of authority during the 
WSIS decade brought about new challenges for legitimacy in IG, ranging 
from the protection of critical infrastructure to control over the domain name 
system. Not only did these challenges alter the position of bodies such as the 
ITU or ICANN, but they also defined fundamental choices for institutional 
trajectories. The WSIS decade activated a set of interests that solidified over 
the years and led to institutional mandate expansion, mission overlap, and 
alternative fora. Noteworthy, private intermediaries taking on authoritative 
stances, acting as defenders of human rights online, and calling on govern-
ments to protect individual freedoms were not uncommon in this space.
At the end of 2015, the United States was home to eleven out of the 
fifteen largest Internet businesses, ranked by market capitalization: Apple, 
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Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay, Priceline, Salesforce, Yahoo!, Netflix, 
LinkedIn, and Twitter, followed by China, hosting Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, 
and JD.com (Meeker 2015, 6). This dominance was closely mirrored at the 
IETF meetings, where the Americans and the Chinese became the best rep-
resented nationalities. This reconfiguration was closely linked to the growth 
of digital markets based on e- commerce and the development of new ap-
plications. The Chinese case is particularly interesting as it challenges the 
de- regulatory credo of innovation. Evolving in a tightly controlled space, 
the Chinese companies played a major role in reshaping the Chinese society, 
currently the largest Internet user base in the world.
Operating internationally, they also reshaped standardization proced-
ures for the digital economy, along with other East Asian businesses like 
KT, Samsung, and LG in South Korea, or NTT, Panasonic, and Sony in 
Japan. The world’s largest e- commerce platform Alibaba (founded by Jack 
Ma), the search engine Baidu or Tencent, which developed the mobile 
messaging app WeChat, have not only enhanced competition in the digital 
market, but have also exposed new ways of operating under the restrictions 
of the Chinese government, which blocked services like Twitter, Facebook, 
WhatsApp, Viber, or Line. Moreover, Chinese companies have also restruc-
tured the manufacturing and infrastructure market, providing lower- cost 
options via Huawei or Xiaomi. Rather than undermining state authority, 
market players such as the ones discussed above often joined forces with 
governments.
More than a proof of polycentricity, the diversification of venues and gov-
ernance mechanisms indicated a weaker consensus and stronger contention 
over key issues in IG, particularly after the Wikileaks and Snowden revela-
tions. Concerns about the long dominance of US actors— governmental or 
private— in IG were articulated by both developing countries and non- state 
actors. In addition to the efforts by emerging powers to situate themselves 
more prominently in the field, alternative venues were created for discussing 
what did not fit the ‘mainstream’ discourse. Noteworthy examples include 
the alignment of positions within G77 and the creation of the Internet 
Ungovernance Forum (IUF) and the Internet Social Forum (ISF). The 
IUF has been held annually alongside the UN- driven Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF) since 2014, and focuses on Internet censorship, freedom of 
speech, surveillance, and privacy. It was first convened in Istanbul with the 
support of a few international (Association for Progressive Communication, 
Article 19, AccessNow, Open Rights Group, Tactical Tech, WebWeWant, 
etc.) and local civil society groups (Alternative Informatics Association, 
Istanbul HackerSpace, etc.). The ISF was a thematic grouping of the World 
 Actors 149
Social Forum (WSF)26 established in Tunis in 2015, proposing ‘Another 
(People’s) Internet’ and aiming to serve as a global space for ‘sharing infor-
mation on endeavours and struggles for democracy, human rights and social 
justice in relation to the Internet, and developing collective action agendas’. 
Its founding document called for opposing surveillance, corporate domin-
ance, and governmental abuse of power. Upon its creation, the ISF was en-
dorsed by more than 100 civil society organizations.
While NGOs pushed for a more open environment and alternative 
opinion, some of the technical bodies remained confined to their traditional 
practices and were slow to respond to reforms. Within ICANN, in charge of 
the management of the Internet domain name and unique identifiers, the 
‘virtually unconstrained power’ entrusted to its Board of Directors was first 
questioned at the beginning of the 2000s (Weber and Gunnarson 2012, 13), 
and subsequently in the work of CCWG- Accountability as part of the IANA 
Stewardship process. For the longest time, its decisions could not be reversed 
even in cases in which they contravened ICANN’s by- laws or other written 
commitments and they could only limitedly be contested. The new process 
of reform started with the transition of the IANA functions, which also in-
cluded an accountability reform, making it mandatory for the organization to 
undergo changes before the oversight from the DoC was completed (originally 
expected to happen in September 2015, prolonged for another year). Other 
technical bodies started to integrate policy experts in their boards and expert 
committees, but their membership did not reflect this diversity: American 
and Chinese male technologists with private sector affiliations constituted 
the large majority.
Watershed moments such as the WSIS, the WCIT- 12, the 2013 Snowden 
revelations, and NetMundial re- affirmed the strong position of governments 
and the divisions within this nominal grouping. There was a lack of agreement 
over security- related matters stemming from basic contestation over locating 
authoritative decision- making, thus calling into question the status- quo re-
lationships among stakeholders. Russia and China refused to sign the CoE 
Cybercrime Convention, but proposed and signed their own information se-
curity agreement in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Group. The 
two powers, along with India, Brazil, and South Africa— also referred to as 
26 The WSF was formed in opposition to the annual World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in 
Davos, and its Charter calls for a different kind of globalization than that ‘commanded by the large 
multinational corporations and by the governments and international institutions at the service of 
those corporations’ interests’ (WSF Charter). The first edition of WSF was held in Pôrto Alegre 
in 2001.
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the ‘BRICS’ grouping— have been very vocal about creating an institutional 
environment in which formal equality among states was observed and power 
differentials were offset. Their demand for neutralizing power imbalances in 
decision- making amounted to a procedural fairness argument, albeit one pos-
sible only in an intergovernmental arrangement.
Yet seeing this period solely as state- dominated is misleading. Rather, it is 
an exemplary embodiment of hybrid arrangements, which transform, in their 
application, the very subjects and objects of governance concerned. Not only 
have there been cross- sector partnerships, but also influential technological 
developments resulting from the cooperation of institutions generally per-
ceived to be in competition, especially over the intergovernmental or multi- 
stakeholder approach. For example, UNESCO collaborated with ICANN on 
the internationalization of Internet domain names. The IETF worked with 
the ISO for developing standards, for example codecs to manage audio and 
video content online, but also with the ITU- T for the development of basic 
protocols (Chenou and Radu 2015). Moreover, the Tunis Agenda mandated 
a set of UN specialized bodies to jointly conduct the follow- up and moni-
toring of the process, either by initiating actions or by convening annual 
meetings for self- reporting purposes.
The blanket cyber- surveillance plan known as PRISM revealed by Snowden 
encouraged many civil society organizations and activist groups, whether based 
in the United States or elsewhere, to take action to raise awareness regarding 
privacy protections and encryption systems. Challenging norms of inclusion 
and representation (Hintz and Milan 2009), grassroots tech groups such as 
Anonymous started profiling themselves more visibly around web- defacing 
operations to contest Internet- related negotiations conducted behind closed 
doors. Public protests around free trade agreements led to the rejection of the 
Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012 and to the halting of 
comprehensive trade agreements in their drafting phase (e.g. Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership or the Trans- Pacific Partnership). Such 
instances of contestation revealed the centrality of the Internet in broader 
economic governance, including the request to uphold the established IG 
principles in new forms of decision- making.
The power of various actors was interest- and mission- driven, but their 
functional positioning had to do with the capacity to take on roles not avail-
able to others in a densely populated policy space. The Tunis Agenda per-
petuated the artificial distinction between public policy and technical issues 
in IG, de facto endorsing the private sector- led management of the Internet 
via its emphasis on maintaining the stability and security of the Internet in 
an unchanged configuration. Yet, leaving international organizations out 
of the tripartite categorization of stakeholders did not accurately reflect the 
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governance configurations emerging. By the end of the WSIS decade, we 
could distinguish among organizations with core, secondary, and tangential 
interests, be it in standard- setting processes or in regulating one or multiple 
areas pertaining to IG writ large. Technical bodies designed specifically for 
Internet standards and protocols or associated functions generally preserved 
that as their core mission.
Within these broad categories that place IG interests at the centre, there 
was variation over time as to where international organizations would pos-
ition themselves. Bodies like the IGF Secretariat are designed with core IG 
interests in mind, whereas organizations traditionally involved in telecommu-
nication regulation went through an expansion of mandates. It was the case 
for the ITU, but also for WIPO, which was among the first institutions to in-
corporate Internet- related matters in its daily work. Starting in the late 1990s, 
it was involved in negotiating different aspects of online intellectual property 
rights, as diverse as the 1998 Universal Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP) for domain names and the 2014 Marrakesh Treaty facilitating 
access to published works by persons who are blind, visually impaired, or 
otherwise print disabled.
For organizations with tangential interests, IG did not require a re- 
conceptualization of the work they were involved in. For example, UNESCO 
presented itself as playing a threefold role in IG:  (1) contributing to legal, 
societal, and ethical aspects of policymaking; (2) participating in discussions 
and assisting in reaching long- term solutions in IG; (3) advocating for safe-
guarding key values like freedom of expression, cultural diversity, and open-
ness in current and future Internet policies (UNESCO 2004). With a less 
sizable involvement, UNIDIR was the convenor of policy debates around 
cybersecurity and use of online resources for terrorist activities— carving out 
an IG space after the stalemate of disarmament negotiations.
The decade in which the Internet knew its largest expansion was set 
against the background of state engagement in the articulation of govern-
ance, both as part of trans- governmental networks and as part of inter-
national organizations. This period also federated the participation of 
non- state actors in international negotiations, with growing legitimacy 
bestowed on them, thus giving birth to large cross- sector coalitions. The 
hybrid nature of such governance configurations also permeated national 
delegations to international congresses, which— more often than not— 
comprised members of industry and civil society. Moves across sectors, 
in particular from government to business and vice versa, a phenomenon 
referred to as the ‘revolving door’, facilitated the spread of ideas in support 
of the status quo. High officials in charge of US information policies either 
started or completed their careers in the private sector. The US DoC and 
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the NTIA are telling examples in this sense, as they extensively consulted 
with the private sector in the development of policies on cybersecurity and 
innovation (McCarthy 2015).
Similar patterns of cross- sectoral moves could be seen with a number of 
early leaders involved in multiple IG fora, shifting from business gatherings 
to UN meetings. These patterns sometimes revealed an individual commit-
ment to a particular issue; other times, engagement was circumstantial or 
position- dependent. In the civil society and technical and scientific commu-
nity, the ‘multiple hat’ phenomenon was extremely common, as most influ-
ential individuals navigated between the public and the private sector in their 
careers and held several affiliations at a time (Chenou 2014).
Anchoring Practices: Ad Hoc Expert Groups
The increasing hybridization of governance processes during the WSIS decade 
played a pivotal role in laying the foundation for the habitual resort to ad 
hoc expert groups. They were supporting the institutionalization of initiatives 
specific to the Internet and signalling the key role of expertise in the con-
struction of this issue domain. Formed on a case- by- case basis, ad hoc groups 
brought together, for a limited period of time, different stakeholders to de-
velop and provide an expert opinion, generally summarized in a final report. 
The underlying tenet in the creation of ad hoc groups was the need to tackle 
problems as they emerged, in a piecemeal fashion, and legitimize courses of 
action and decisions in a technocratic manner. In some cases, establishing 
such a committee became a controversial process, but very few questioned 
the outcomes.
The practice emerged as a common solution in the work of the stand-
ardization bodies in the early days and its statute as a dominant practice 
post- WSIS in Internet- related policy issues at the end of the WSIS decade 
revealed the continuation of informal relations of authority. Out of func-
tional necessity or in search for licensing one answer over many possible al-
ternatives, ad hoc expert groups deployed expertise readily available. A key 
role continued to be played by individuals acting as authoritative commu-
nity voices (Mathiason 2009). Influential members of the technical com-
munity (e.g. Vint Cerf ) and academics- cum- practitioners who were active 
within and around the WGIG, such as Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, Bertrand 
de la Chapelle, Milton Mueller, William Drake, Jovan Kurbalija, or Jeanette 
Hoffman often received invitations to take part in high- level discussions 
and working groups reflecting on the future of the field (Chenou 2014). 
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Shaping processes such as the WGIG or the IGF, Nitin Desai and Markus 
Kummer continued to be at the forefront of UN- driven interactions with a 
plethora of stakeholders (Epstein 2012).
Despite the open nature in the operations of many of the groups formed 
at the time, concerns were raised from the outset regarding the authority en-
trusted in the newly formed committees and bodies. This was best illustrated 
by the heated discussions around the formation of the first Multistakeholder 
Advisory Group (MAG) for the IGF in 2006:
The MAG, an ad hoc creation of the UN Secretary General which is part of the WSIS 
decisions, was supposed to help the secretariat regarding IGF procedures, selection 
process to ensure pluralism and transparency, methodology— not predetermine con-
tent or agenda! This should be the task of the first IGF meeting itself— and the IGF 
should have final say on procedures as well. (Carlos Afonso cited in Raboy et  al. 
2010, 181)
As to the choice of establishing the MAG in the first place, Nitin Desai 
explained that the decision was influenced by discussions with donors. 
Answering a question from the floor during the February 2007 open consult-
ations, Desai noted:
When you have a multistakeholder forum with everybody on an equal basis, the 
very process of constituting a bureau itself is problematic, but even more so when 
there’s no membership. It’s an open door. So then we clarified. We asked this 
question to the people that sponsored. And they said, ‘This is what we had in 
mind’. Because I said, ‘How do I constitute a bureau in an open forum?’ And then 
they explained that this is how it was supposed [to be resolved]. (Epstein 2012, 
footnote 106)
Complementing the emergence of focal points and venues for IG- related dis-
cussions, the creation of ad hoc expert groups became a dominant practice for 
overcoming impasse in IG processes. It followed in the footsteps of WGIG 
and was emulated across a number of institutions, from private to intergov-
ernmental. In the work of the UN Global Alliance for ICT and Development 
(UN GAID), ad hoc groups took the form of Communities of Expertise. 
These were networks convened by UN GAID to bring together motivated 
and capable actors to address specific, well- defined ICT4D problems in a 
results- oriented manner and to identify and disseminate good practices. 
Initiated by a group of at least three organizations, such networks needed 
to be multi- stakeholder, but could take a number of organizational forms, 
from the more exploratory ‘green field’ initiatives to being based at the UN. 
Serving a variety of purposes, this dominant routine was generally limited to 
a functional mandate, narrowly defined.
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Within ICANN, the Country Code Names Supporting Organization 
(ccNSO) established an ad hoc Internet Governance Review group, whose 
mission was to provide an overview of the IG issues and discussions with 
relevance for the work of the cc- TLD community. The review group op-
erated between 26 February 2014 and 12 October 2014. Similarly, the 
Council of Europe established an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Cross- 
border Internet,27 tasked to draft a Committee of Ministers Declaration on 
Internet Governance Principles in 2011. The practice was also adopted by 
the ITU. Following the WCIT- 12, at its 2013 World Telecommunication/ 
ICTs Policy Forum in Geneva, an Informal Experts Group (IEG) was 
convened to approve the text of the draft opinions to the ITU Secretary 
General report. Unlike the other groupings discussed above, the IEG had 
an exceptionally large membership, with 117 participants from member 
states, thirteen from regional and other IOs, twenty- nine from civil society 
and industry, alongside other members from scientific and industrial or-
ganizations. In their work, six draft opinions to the report of the Secretary 
General were discussed, including support for multi- stakeholderism and 
enhanced cooperation.
Beyond the intergovernmental space in which prolonged negotiations and 
time- demanding procedures represented the norm, rather than the excep-
tion, this dominant routine also gained currency in the industry, to mobilize 
support around a cause. This was the case of the WCIT Ad Hoc Working 
Group, an industry- led coalition with members such as AT&T, Cisco, 
Comcast, Google, Intel, Microsoft, News Corporation, Oracle, Telefonica, 
Time Warner, Verisign, and Verizon, active in 2012 around the ITU 
Plenipotentiary meeting in Dubai. On that occasion, particularly compelling 
was also the example of the Ad Hoc Group on Internet- related resolutions 
formed by a group of delegates during the WCIT negotiations. Not- for- 
profit actors embraced the practice as a means to involve political figures 
and bring important social capital to their initiatives. In January 2014, the 
Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House) launched a Global Commission on 
Internet Governance made up of twenty- nine members and chaired by Carl 
Bildt, Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to work for two years on articu-
lating a strategic vision of the future.
A characteristic of ad hoc expert groups is the autonomy in deciding how 
the work would be conducted. Some groups start with a narrowly defined 
27 Its members were: Bertrand de la Chapelle, Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, Christian Singer, Rolf 
H. Weber, and Michael V. Yakushev.
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issue, while others call for a mapping exercise to understand what is covered 
and is not covered adequately by existing mechanisms or institutions. The 
modality of work usually includes face- to- face and online meetings. The ad 
hoc meetings are usually conducted under Chatham House rule28 to en-
courage free discussion and a more relaxed exchange of opinions. Moreover, 
depending on how sensitive the topic under discussion is, experts might 
prefer— for reputational concerns— to avoid a direct association of their 
names with what is publicly quoted.
Most of the expert gatherings established ad hoc would be convened 
by existing organizations or entities and have a political stake. Given their 
temporary nature, the working groups formed in a short time span would 
not challenge the position of the main actors in the IG field, nor would 
they propose radical reforms in terms of how the field was organized. The 
ideological struggle between a semi- privatized Internet model and an inter-
governmental approach to it surfaced less and less in the reports issued by 
the ad hoc groups, despite the increasingly more sizeable mandates they 
were entrusted. An element of this was also reflected in the composition of 
the group, which was not open to public consultations. Senior members 
of the IG community and seasoned leaders with a broad understanding of 
the diplomatic and economic issues at stake constituted the large majority 
of ad hoc groups.
While the IG field had been at first dominated by computer scientists and 
engineers, subsequent developments around commercialization and litiga-
tion brought it closer to the community of entrepreneurs, investors, and 
lawyers. The structuration of the field was further enhanced with the contri-
bution of the security community and with its opening up to a much wider 
audience following the WSIS. But crucial to the evolution of the field was 
the involvement of high- level figures from the political sphere, via explicit 
statements and positions, contributions to global agendas, and multifold 
participation in groups of experts, which became the established practice 
towards the end of the WSIS decade. Deployed as a meaning- making exer-
cise, this anchoring practice led to iterative interactions shaping discourses 
and activities and supporting the enactment of constitutive rules by the 
most powerful. In this mutually enhancing exchange, the Internet became 
a public domain of action, whose global, regional, and national dimensions 
intersected.
28 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House rule, participants are free 
to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that 
of any other participant, may be revealed.
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Synopsis
As a policy field coming of age, the Internet faced a more reflexive turn post- 
WSIS. Concerns for authority, legitimacy, and accountability— expressed by 
different stakeholders— become central to the consolidation of this govern-
ance domain. A number of challenges, stemming from three diverse sources, 
were embedded therein: first, questions were spawn by the modus operandi 
of the sui generis institutions of the field, such as the international technical 
bodies exercising public governance functions for the Internet, in particular 
in connection to ICANN; second, demands for a broader space for regula-
tory intervention resulted from the gradual adaptation of intergovernmental 
organizations and their closer involvement in global Internet policymaking 
via the WSIS process; third, and perhaps most importantly, the role of pri-
vate intermediaries started to be questioned as their financial and political 
power exceeded that of developing countries. Their relation to certain govern-
ments was also probed, in particular after the 2013 surveillance revelations. 
Never before was the centrality of US- based institutions more contested than 
throughout the WSIS decade.
The expansion of the concept of IG also brought in actors that did not par-
ticipate in the early days. Further classification, segmentation, and clustering 
of stakeholders ensued. The institutionalization of representation procedures 
and the clear categorization of stakeholder groups solidified and the contest-
ation that surfaced rarely addressed the WSIS definition of IG. But the strict 
categorization of stakeholder groups into government, civil society, business, 
technical, and academic community did not match the reality of fluid and 
evolving, issue- specific groupings. Nor did it reflect the distribution of power 
among stakeholders.
Like many other institutional innovations, non- binding forums such as the 
IGF offered an experimental venue for testing how IG might be conducted 
with the participation of dominant and marginal actors, with core or tangen-
tial interests. It also offered a vessel for easing the tensions between the two 
dominant governance approaches at the time: intergovernmental and private. 
The involvement of civil society and industry actors at various levels, along-
side governments, and the opening- up of new negotiation arenas was unpre-
cedented during this decade. Emblematic of multi- institutional IG bricolage, 
these dimensions uncovered new patterns and agents of structural change, the 
addressees of such changes and the conflicting sources of authority. But what 
will become permanent and what will dissolve in the near future?
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 Enacting Internet Governance: Power and 
Communities over Time
The previous chapters showed that the nascent order around Internet govern-
ance (IG)— mired in political stakes and built in distinctive phases— matured 
and crystallized as part of a global dialogue. The diversification of approaches 
to governance characterized the World Summit on Information Society 
(WSIS) decade phase of Internet development. Soft instruments, especially 
discursive and operative modelling tools, were deployed to influence the be-
haviour of others in this space, mobilized primarily around cybersecurity and 
civil liberties. Multiple sets of rules and norms discussed across partnerships, 
from the national to the global scale, entangled to shape the Internet as we 
know it today. The key transformation compared to previous decades was the 
understanding that the Internet was ultimately a social and political field of 
action.
In recent years, the underlying business structure of the Internet came 
on the radar of regulators more prominently. The oligopolistic position of 
dominant Internet companies has led to a so- called ‘tech backlash’ in public 
discourse:  a more careful scrutiny of their activities and the imposition of 
financial sanctions. The potential for digital market dominance, be it by 
Western or by Chinese companies, had long been foreseen. In the words of 
Freedman (2012, 115), ‘one thing that has remained constant on the Internet 
is the structure of a “winner takes all” market which systematizes the need for 
huge concentrations of online and offline capital’. The policy responses have 
ranged from imposing stricter taxation rules and defining employment rights 
in the platform economy to sanctioning anti- competitive behaviour and data 
protection breaches. Self- regulatory approaches continue to appeal in newer 
areas of fast technological development such as cloud computing, but all- 
encompassing regulation on issues such as data protection brings about a 
horizontal baseline.
Currently, the trust in the effectiveness and power of multi- stakeholder 
partnerships has diminished. The vision of a public Internet as a force for good 
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and empowerment has grown to be more nuanced. ‘From the Arab Spring 
to the Occupy movements, from Pegida and the jihadists to the European 
Indignados, the contemporary Internet is a space for commodification, a 
vehicle of propaganda, and a tool for political liberation, all at the same time’, 
concluded Smyrnaios (2018, 6). Likewise, the credo of participatory politics 
via social platforms like Twitter and Facebook (Morozov 2013) was strongly 
challenged by the advent of algorithmic manipulation, considered a threat to 
democratic systems. The disclosures of electoral influencing in the campaigns 
leading up to the Brexit referendum and the US presidential elections in 2016 
via algorithms raised concerns that ‘filter bubbles’ and mandated choices re-
structure the public sphere, and in particular the deliberation space, in ways 
previously unaccounted for.
This chapter focuses on locating authority in the field: the first part pro-
vides an analysis of the power drivers in a longitudinal perspective, followed 
by a reflection of the governance dynamics emerging since 2015, with an 
emphasis on the role of dominant Internet companies and influential states 
across multiple sub- fields; the strategies of China and India are then compara-
tively discussed. The second part is dedicated to the formation and perpetu-
ation of the IG community, its characteristics, and decision- making routines. 
It zooms in on the various meanings of the community referent across dif-
ferent bodies, with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) stew-
ardship transition as a case study, and reviews the three anchoring practices 
dominating the field.
Power Dynamics and Authority Locus
The diversification of venues for IG discussion that we witnessed starting in 
2016 did not put an end to the contest over the re- balancing of power in the 
field. Once the debate over the management of critical resources ended in 
September 2016 with the withdrawal of the US government from its IANA 
stewardship function, the global focus shifted to the unfair distribution of 
benefits from the digital transformation, in economic, political, and social 
inclusion terms.
Institutional thickness reached a new height towards the end of 2015, but 
the phenomenon of multiplication and persistence of international bodies 
and global regulation did not necessarily result in increased legalization. In 
the era of cross- sectoral partnerships, soft instruments were preferred to hard 
law. The adherence to rules entered a new stage, with more frequent refer-
ences to sanctions rather than norm coherence. As discussed in this section, 
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rule- based outcomes are continuously sought in IG and the existing global 
governance structures might not provide satisfactory answers.
From 2015 onwards, power positions solidified. A  few Internet com-
panies became more powerful than ever in the field and in the world, 
topping the industry profits ranking and deciding on the future technical 
development of the Internet through their investments. Previously, the 
tensions around the unilateral imposition of rules by one state dominated 
the IG debates; more recently, emerging powers such as China, Russia, 
and India strengthened their national approaches and proposed alterna-
tive governance principles on the global scale. Other countries and re-
gional blocs also increased their regulatory powers and passed a number of 
laws with extraterritorial effects, in particular in the areas of cybersecurity, 
data protection, and privacy. The IG community— made up of represen-
tatives of the various sectors— continued to diversify capturing some of 
these dynamics as they permeated the work of technical bodies and multi- 
stakeholder forums.
A Longitudinal Comparison
Looking comparatively at the three periods identified, from the invention 
of the network to the maturing of a field of action, it becomes apparent that 
the dominant mode of governance (which sets the tone in a specified time 
frame) represents only one alternative amid the many governance configur-
ations possible. Arriving at global regulatory coordination via market and 
state modes, the contemporary IG landscape is unique. Among its most im-
portant transformations was the transition from informal to codified proced-
ures and to solidified institutional forms reflecting the growing assortment 
of international, regional, and national stakeholders. Cybersecurity and civil 
liberties continue to stand out as two key areas in which cyber norms are 
still disputed. In the last decade, most efforts have been directed not towards 
drafting hard law instruments, but towards influencing other actors’ behav-
iour in this space. The effect of modelling has been just as strong through 
codes of conduct and voluntary schemes stirred by actors operating either 
individually or in partnership.
Ideologically, two main positions solidified in IG discussions since the 
1990s. The first one was built around the exceptionalism of the Internet. It 
postulated that a global network revolutionizing daily activities across most 
sectors required a fresh approach, in light of the de- territorialization it fos-
tered. This argument was best expressed by John Perry Barlow in his famous 
Davos message to the governments of the world:
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You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. You have 
no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have 
true reason to fear. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. (Barlow 1996)
On the legal side, that translated into a pursuit of new regulations and ‘cyber- 
laws’ at the expense of adapting the existing legislation to tackle relevant on-
line aspects. This approach has been revived several times throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, going from a complete rejection of the applicability of ‘old’ 
laws (Post 2002) to designing exclusive online guarantees such as the ‘right to 
be forgotten’ (Chenou and Radu 2017). The development of an overarching 
governance system specific to the Internet continues to be an ideal for some 
of the members of the IG community. While more and more organizations 
have come to populate the field, there are only a handful core bodies with 
exclusive attributes for IG. As this study showed so far, the emergence of a 
highly complex field such as IG rests on a variety of forms of action— from 
hard law to discursive or operative modelling— implemented by a plethora of 
new and old institutions.
The second ideological position focused around the need to see the Internet 
as embedded in real law. This approach was built around understanding how 
the network has been anchored in geography and how the responsibilities 
of nation states can be redefined. National, regional, and transnational rules 
sustained the tremendous success of the Internet since the beginning, in par-
ticular as they were covered by the neoliberal mantra prioritizing market de-
velopment. The new economic models fostered by the Internet were closely 
linked to the laissez- faire regulatory frameworks defined by the Pentagon, at 
times accepted tacitly, at times vocally contested by other nations. In recent 
years, the economic and sociopolitical dimensions of the Internet garnered 
unprecedented attention, challenging the leadership of the United States in 
the field through the adoption of stronger national regulation targeting data- 
driven business models.
Making sense of the interconnected code, law, and politics pertinent to IG 
is an ongoing struggle for anyone participating in these processes. It is thus 
crucial to understand how critical levers work at various points in time and 
how they come to define what matters for a community. For instance, in the 
work of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and via its Request for 
Comments (RFCs) practice, standard- making became public— at first out of 
sheer necessity, subsequently strongly re- enacted for accountability purposes. 
This set the tone for a series of developments emulating this model, pushing 
for the open participation of stakeholders across the board, with an implicit 
understanding of who gets to participate at what stage in the process.
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It is thus timely to put into perspective the way in which two dominant 
actors— companies and states— have evolved in the post- 2015 period. Their 
strategies and expressions of power are indicative of the changes ahead and of 
the potential for entering a fourth IG evolution phase, built on a new set of 
principles and introducing novel dynamics.
Private Giants on the Rise
Among the world’s most valuable ten firms, seven are Internet giants: five 
American companies (Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Facebook) 
and two Chinese companies (Tencent and Alibaba). At the time of writing 
this book, Apple became the world’s first public company to be worth $1 
trillion (Johnson 2018). These tech companies have long competed for con-
quering emerging markets and the next generation of Internet users, but after 
a series of failed connectivity experiments, their attention has shifted towards 
crossing new frontiers in Internet services and in artificial intelligence (AI). 
Amazon, Alibaba, and Microsoft are also strengthening their position in 
cloud computing, a new direction of investments dominating the market.
Many of the top ten companies have introduced projects to bring connect-
ivity to underserved areas of the globe, with mixed results. After a controver-
sial Free Basics proposal that was rejected in India on net neutrality grounds, 
Facebook deployed the programme in sixty- three countries around the world 
in partnership with local telecom operators. Despite the explosion of its 
Space X satellite over sub- Saharan Africa in September 2016, the Facebook 
experiments continue with its plane- size, solar- powered Internet drone called 
Aquila. Alphabet’s drone program, Project Titan, was terminated in 2017, but 
work continues for high- altitude balloons in the framework of Project Loon. 
Microsoft tests unused television airwaves (white space) to reach the uncon-
nected with pilot projects in Jamaica, Namibia, the Philippines, Tanzania, 
Taiwan, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Technologies like the fifth generation (5G) of mobile networks are of close 
interest to Chinese companies, which are sending increasingly more rep-
resentatives to related meetings organized by standardization bodies. They 
work closely with the government in the framework of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, one of the largest ever infrastructure projects covering more than 
sixty- eight countries. The initiative comprises a ‘digital Silk Road’ ambitious 
plan to build anything from fibre- optic cables and mobile networks to smart 
cities on the multiple water and land corridors thus created. This is achieved 
with Chinese companies, engineers, and managers, with capacity building 
provided by Chinese experts.
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At the level of Internet architecture, a fundamental change is underway 
in submarine cable investments. A number of hardware, software, and data- 
driven companies have participated in consortia to build a large number of 
the 448 undersea cables in use around the world (at the time of writing). 
Google, for example, invested in six cables since 2008. This space has been 
privately owned since the beginning and the telecom operators paying for 
the deployment of cables set up specific traffic exchange and power sharing 
arrangements in the 1990s. Since 2016, major investors in cables have been 
underway by new players:  content providers such as Google, Facebook, 
or Amazon have joined the submarine connectivity race. More and more 
of these companies are buying important shares in the business or creating 
their own cables: Google owns 63,605 miles representing 8.5 per cent of the 
under cables worldwide, and will soon become the first content provider with 
sole ownership of submarine cables in the industry (BroadbandNow 2018). 
Facebook and Amazon, together with four more partners, jointly build the 
Jupiter cable to link the United States to Asia by 2020. These investments are 
alimenting the cloud computing business, which represents a $60 billion- 
a- year market, continuously growing with Amazon in the lead (33 per cent 
share), followed by Microsoft, Google, Alibaba, and IBM (Lohr 2018).
This change at the level of infrastructure has to do with a better quality of 
service, obtained by moving a copy of the content closer to the user, to avoid 
transit delays. Yet, according to Huston (2016), this imposes a degree of ‘frag-
mentation in the architecture of the Internet as a result of service delivery 
specialisation’ and restructures the market according to new rules imposed by 
the big players. Standard- making may also depend entirely on these private 
content providers turned infrastructure providers in the near future.
Younger Silicon Valley companies, such as Airbnb and Uber, have made 
their fortune in the sharing economy. The second wave of promising Bay 
Area companies built their business around the collection and processing of 
real- time information of demand and supply. In the words of Tom Goodwin 
(2015):
Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most 
popular media owner, creates no content. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has no 
inventory. And Airbnb, the world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real 
estate.
Ridesharing, apartment or home lending, and re- selling are all peer- to- peer 
alternatives to owning the good or the service of interest. The difference 
lies in the use of data to provide added- value and comfort via an online 
platform. ‘Uberisation’— a term derived from the name of an American 
ridesharing company, Uber— is now applied across the board to designate 
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the transition to a new economic model based on digital technologies 
enabling direct exchanges between providers of services and potential cus-
tomers at lower costs. These business models share three main features: a 
prevalence of contractual and temporary employment, a digital platform/ 
app for peer- to- peer transactions, and a rating system for evaluating the 
quality of the service provided.
Examples of companies claiming to take part in the sharing economy 
abound across many sectors: entertainment (Spotify, Netflix, GameFly), trans-
portation (Uber, Lyft, Zipcar), accommodation (Airbnb, HomeExchange), 
labour (Mechanical Turk, SkillShare, TaskRabbit), fashion (Fashionhire, Rent 
the Runaway), etc. According to Parker et al. (2016), the networked business 
model introduces two innovations:  (1) the company no longer creates the 
end product or service, but focuses on making available a common infra-
structure that matches consumers and producers using the knowledge of the 
market and imposing the rules of governance; (2) the producers of value and 
consumers of value come from outside the system. The expansion of the ‘gig 
economy’ model across different sectors introduced a wave a social experi-
mentation indicative of the extensive power of corporations in the digital 
world, equalling or exceeding that of governments.
In a span of six years, the prospects of the sharing economy have been 
critically reassessed. Two dominant narratives have driven the debates on dif-
ferent value propositions: on the one hand, the bright future of automation 
promised further innovation and entrepreneurship opportunities, as well as 
flexible schedules and labour market activation, putting technology at work 
for delivering better products at a lower price. On the other hand, the narra-
tive of medieval exploitation surfaced as an equally strong one: algorithmic 
ratings, consumer evaluations, and temporary tasks delivered on platforms 
led to an ever- expanding, precarious on- demand workforce, primarily under- 
employed (Prassl 2018). The shift from the first to the second narrative has re-
vealed that innovations in the digital economy pose novel and more complex 
regulatory challenges, not only to the policymakers, but also to the com-
panies themselves.
Uber’s enormous exposure to litigation in the majority of jurisdictions in 
which it operates epitomizes broader dilemmas in assessing the effects of busi-
ness models on society. Classifying the sharing economy services as informa-
tion ones (providing the data necessary to link demand and supply) or as 
part of a regulated industry (transport, hospitality services, etc.) has been the 
crux of the matter, as it brings forward the applicable regulatory regime: most 
legal cases are about the employment and labour conditions of those gaining 
a living this way, as well as e- commerce and trade aspects, including competi-
tion, advertising, and licensing. Organizing the digital landscape while fitting 
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the current societal structure has been an ongoing power struggle, in which 
the dominant businesses have predominantly argued for exemption from the 
rules applied to the industries they seek to displace. The gatekeeping function 
of giant technology companies limits access to alternative models of social 
and economic organization, although the Internet infrastructure itself does 
not, in principle, prioritize one over the other.
Alongside infrastructure and digital economy, the third subarea of unpre-
cedented private sector development has been AI. This broad umbrella term 
refers to the latest and most successful wave of machine learning modelled on 
neural networks and deep learning. Deployed for purposes as diverse as ad-
vancements in medical diagnosis and autonomous driving, this technological 
breakthrough allowed a number of start- ups— mainly based in the United 
States, in India, and in China— to build up their profiles. The largest tech 
companies are either developing their own research unit on AI or acquiring 
the smaller companies thriving in the field.
In the data- driven economy and in the functioning of AI, algorithms are 
indispensable. They are deployed across a wide number of services, from tech-
nical ones (e.g. spam filtering and advertising) to those facing the user and 
influencing behaviour:  search engines (e.g. Google search), news aggrega-
tion services (e.g. Google News), news feeds (Twitter Trending, Facebook’s 
Trending Topics), prognosis/ forecast (e.g. Google Trends), news scoring (e.g. 
Reddit, Digg), content production (e.g. Quakebot, Quill). Bias, discrim-
ination, and the secret nature of data processing and algorithms (Pasquale 
2015; Noble 2018)  were originally discussed in the context of search en-
gines and recommendation systems for shopping and for entertainment on-
line, but the debacle expanded to large- scale electoral propaganda and public 
opinion influencing in 2016 and 2017, when data- sharing practices among 
companies started to be scrutinized.
Following the Facebook– Cambridge Analytica scandal, algorithm- driven 
decision- making is currently regarded as a threat to democratic processes, 
highlighting a number of concerns:  the covert manner in which personal 
data is collected, processed, and rendered profitable by companies without 
the consent of the data subjects; the opacity of the data sharing practices in 
the private sector; the increasingly more sophisticated tools applied by self- 
learning algorithms in decision- making. Different from supervised machine 
learning, which predicts an output based on the data input, more responsi-
bility is assigned to a computer program in unsupervised and in reinforced 
learning. The former is often deployed to structure large datasets based on 
pre- defined features, whereas the latter allows the computer to learn how to 
behave in a new environment, based on constant feedback (Article 19 and 
Privacy International 2018).
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In his responses to the US Congress inquiry held in April 2018 on social 
media manipulation during the US 2016 presidential election, Facebook’s 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg made frequent references to a solution his company 
invests in to tackle misinformation on its platforms: perfecting AI to auto-
matically recognize and remove unwanted content. Using algorithms to po-
lice the Web, be it based on user feedback via flagging (Caplan and Boyd 
2016) or in an automated manner, is in no way new to the operations of 
Internet companies. This practice is applied across the board to abide by na-
tional legislation or to address copyright infringement, among others. Yet 
deploying it uniformly for addressing social problems does not epitomize a 
solution- driven, people- centred approach, but reinforces the technological 
determinism credo dominating the Silicon Valley. This may do more harm 
in the long- term.
Distrust in the power of companies to protect their users’ information first 
appeared as a generalized concern around the 2013 Snowden revelations and 
continued with a staggering number of data breaches over the following years, 
resulting in the disclosure or misuse of billions of online personal records. In 
2017 alone, there were 5,207 breaches reported, exposing approximately 7.89 
billion records, an increase of about 24 per cent compared to the previous 
year (Risk Placement Services 2018). Alongside hacks and accidental publica-
tions of data, personal information has also been progressively compromised 
in cyberattacks. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack affected 
more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries, followed by other attacks 
equally disruptive. The vulnerability exploited in this attack on Windows sys-
tems paralysed the National Health System in the United Kingdom, where 
an important number of hospitals were using an older, unpatched version of 
the operating system produced by Microsoft.
The call to restore trust in the Internet, first placed on the global agenda in 
2013 by technical bodies and later by international organizations, was heard 
over and over again. Since 2015, it was in connection with cybersecurity 
norms. What was different this time was the authoritative proposal coming 
from companies to look for solutions together with governments. In add-
ition to voluntary initiatives, corporations like Microsoft or Google provided 
unilaterally drafted norms for a Digital Geneva Convention and for digital 
security and due process, respectively. The role of Microsoft as a norm entre-
preneur was highly prominent in the last two years, due in particular to its 
attempts to socialize the proposal in the UN framework and among industry 
players.
Proposing six security principles back in 2014, Microsoft moved in 2017 
to a more comprehensive approach to limiting the stockpiling of cyber 
weapons, building on the humanitarian conventions (to protect civilians in 
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times of war) signed in Geneva at the turn of the century. At a time when 
the perceived exceptionalism of the Internet sector is increasingly challenged, 
this proposal focuses on treating the industry as neutral in cyberattacks, thus 
permitting user- centred interventions. In his keynote at the UN in Geneva 
on 14 November 2017, Brad Smith, the President and Chief Legal Officer 
of Microsoft concluded his speech with the message:  ‘Cybersecurity needs 
to be a cause for our times; all communities must contribute and learn from 
each other to find solutions’ (Radu 2017). The next step in Microsoft’s ef-
forts was the Cybersecurity Tech Accord introduced in April 2018, a volun-
tary industry initiative committing to protecting users from malicious attacks 
by states and criminals. As of June 2018, the Accord had forty- five signa-
tories, including Microsoft, Facebook, LinkedIn, Nokia, Telefonica, Cisco, 
and Dell. States have so far been reluctant to endorse the Digital Geneva 
Convention proposal.
In the area of AI, a similarly powerful call has been made by industry players 
to governments around the world. In 2017, 116 technology leaders and 
founders of robotics and AI companies from twenty- six countries, including 
Google DeepMind’s Mustafa Suleyman and Elon Musk, the American in-
ventor and engineer behind Space X and Tesla, sent a petition to the UN to 
call for new regulation on the development of AI weapons and an explicit ban 
of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or killer robots. Discussions 
on this are ongoing in the framework of the UN Group of Governmental 
Experts on LAWS, to which 125 countries (all high contracting parties to the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) are participating.
This new exercise of power, coalescing around the introduction of norms 
that can be agreed cross- sector, is indicative of the current search for basic 
consensus and norms around the conduct of war in the cyberspace. As of 
2018, a form of legalization compatible with current business models con-
tinues to be sought by big Internet companies, but also by states, in a space 
dominated by limited means to attribute attacks, informal governance, and 
ad hoc arrangements. The next section turns to the position of governments 
in these discussions, presenting different and sometimes conflicting concep-
tions of power in IG, be it in material or social power terms.
Stronger National Approaches
The growth of the Internet has long been steered by the Pentagon and that 
represented one of the core power contests in IG. Post- 2015, a differenti-
ation of approaches is visible, in particular due to the increased prominence 
of regional groups and developing nations, in the context of the Trump- led 
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withdrawal of the United States from Internet policy. Around the IANA 
stewardship transition, Powers and Jablonski assessed that ‘the United States 
no longer has the diplomatic, military or economic capital to compel inter-
national compliance with its unilateral control over the world’s most critical 
medium’ (2015, 130). Cybersecurity is one of the fields where responsi-
bilities have been re- assessed under President Trump. The position of US 
cybersecurity coordinator, introduced under President Obama in 2009, was 
abolished by the National Security Council in May 2018, when the portfolio 
was delegated to a deputy (Kornbluh 2018).
Importantly, as national governments have defined more clearly their inter-
ests, the interaction with the private sector has changed. Many states have 
increased their cyber capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations 
(Radunovic 2017a) and modelled their relationship with the private sector 
as a delegated authority one. Not only are companies policing the Web on 
behalf of states, but they also execute complete Internet shutdowns at the 
request of governments, a phenomenon ever more common after the Arab 
Spring. The NGO AccessNow (2018) documented 108 instances of black-
outs in 2017, the majority of which took place in Asia and Africa. The reasons 
offered by governments for these intentional disruptions of service or con-
nectivity range from ensuring public safety and limiting mobilization during 
election times to preventing cheating in school exams. In the first half of 
2017, Google, Facebook, and Twitter received a total of 114,169 requests to 
remove content from seventy- eight countries and 179,180 requests for infor-
mation about Internet users from 110 countries (Horejsova et al. 2018, 9).
Acting as a regional bloc, the EU introduced the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) governing the privacy, the protection, and the transfer of 
data of European citizens. The regulation entered into force on 25 May 2018 
and harmonized the data regimes across all member states, setting a standard 
to be pursued inside and outside the European border by both public and 
private institutions. In effect, a number of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
South Korea, or Tunisia have adopted or are discussing the adoption of le-
gislation similar to the GDPR, leading to an expansion of the model to the 
Global South.
Among the GDPR innovative aspects are: the focus on the explicit con-
sent of the user, the right to rectification and erasure of information, as well 
as the right to explanation. The latter mandates that ‘meaningful information 
about the logic’ of automated systems is provided when a request is made by 
the data subject, together with an explanation of the significance and envis-
aged consequences of the processing thus implemented (Articles 21 and 22). 
Conceived as a framework for data minimization, the GDPR imposes an ob-
ligation to report breaches and introduces a two- tiered sanctions regime: for 
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non- compliance with important data protection provisions, businesses risk 
fines imposed by data watchdogs of up to €20 million or 4 per cent of global 
annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is the greater. For 
other breaches, fines of up to €10 million or 2 per cent of global annual turn-
over of companies are envisioned.
In Europe, a strong regional approach was preferred by the Commission 
for privacy and data protection, whereas for other issue areas, such as the 
sharing economy, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) en-
couraged the development of national approaches. The CJEU judgment from 
December 2017 settled the long- standing issue of defining the legal status of 
Uber in an inquiry brought forward by the Barcelona taxi association over 
misleading practices and acts of unfair competition. Declaring Uber ‘a service 
in the field of transport’, rather than an information society one, the court 
decided that member states can regulate this business model as they see fit 
under their local laws. While the GDPR allows derogations by member states 
to fifty different provisions, enabling them to fit their local needs by adjusting 
certain parameters, the crux of it remains a Brussels- controlled regulation 
with extraterritorial effect.
On the surge lately, the trend of extraterritoriality derived from domestic 
regulation has touched the areas of cybersecurity, privacy, and data protec-
tion, as well as freedom of expression. More than thirty- five laws were passed 
since 2015 in thirty- four countries across Europe, Africa, the Americas, the 
Middle East, and Asia- Pacific (ISOC 2018) in these IG domains, a majority 
of which focuses on cybersecurity. This points to a move towards an increased 
securitization of the field worldwide. The international relations (IR) concept 
of securitization, developed by the Copenhagen School and understood to 
mean the process through which an issue is presented as posing an existen-
tial threat to a designated referent object (Buzan et al. 1998), explains how 
discursive politics around an issue might justify extraordinary measures to a 
legitimating audience (Balzacq 2011). Repeated attempts to galvanize sup-
port around cyber norms have led to the securitization of IG as a whole in 
the last couple of years, both rhetorically and in terms of physical changes to 
the network.
Technical modifications of the infrastructure performed in order to 
strengthen security and control at the national level have a considerable im-
pact on the global Internet, engendering the long- feared prospect of frag-
mentation by creating several Internets. China, for example, uses the Source 
Address Validation Architecture for inspecting the source of the data packets 
forwarded on the Internet based on an authenticated Internet protocol 
address that must be authorized, unique, and traceable. This process, using 
network management, control, and malware avoidance techniques, stops any 
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communication from unauthorized addresses. Since 2009, Chinese author-
ities have implemented a real- name registration policy for the country- code 
top level domain .cn, requiring citizens who register domains under .cn to 
provide prior passport identification. Iran and Russia have also announced 
similar plans to build their own infrastructure and impose strict restrictions 
on Internet exchanges.
Internationally, rules for the conduct of cyberwar remain a heated topic in 
state- led forums. Bilateral treaties opposing cyber- espionage and cyberattacks 
have been on the rise, with wide variations at the level of engagement: strategic 
partnerships (Canada– Israel), continuous dialogue (EU– Japan), or memo-
randums of understanding, such as the one between the United Kingdom 
and Singapore (Radunovic 2017b). Inter- governmental cooperation has 
been advanced in the framework of regional cooperation and cybersecurity 
capacity building now has a permanent place on the policy agenda of the 
Commonwealth, the African Union Commission, the European Union, or 
the Organization of American States. In the absence of a global consensus on 
norms of behaviour in the cyberspace, the staggering number of cyberattacks 
and state defence probing exercises have led different coalitions of states to 
design their own set of rules. Participation in internationalizing coalitions 
on security matters is not new, but the focus on cyber aspects has increased 
tremendously over the last three years. At the international level, both China 
and Russia have promoted the cyber- sovereignty principle, understood as the 
right to choose an own path of digital development and to participate on an 
equal footing in international Internet- related decision- making.
On the one hand, Russia has proposed an international code of conduct for in-
formation security, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 and revised 
in 2015 in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
Russia is expected to propose this code again in the UN in September 2018, fol-
lowing the failure of the dedicated UN Group of Governmental Experts to agree 
on language endorsing state responsibility and the right to self- defence. On the 
other hand, NATO recognized the cyberspace as an operational field in 2016; 
the expert revision of the voluntary Tallinn Manual laying down the applicable 
international legal norms in cyberspace was completed in 2017.
At the domestic level, Internet- related regulation used to be addressed as 
part of different ministerial mandates such as telecommunications, economy, 
foreign policy, or defence. For the longest time, these ministries worked in 
silos, without a unified approach to Internet policies and with little or no 
cooperation for deciding or implementing actions together.1 Participation in 
1 A frequently cited exception was Brazil, where the coordination of most Internet- related activ-
ities was primarily achieved via a multi- stakeholder body, the Internet Steering Committee (Comitê 
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ITU and other international meetings lacked a unitary national vision, which 
resulted in adopting incoherent positions across subfields of digital policy 
during international negotiations. This is beginning to change as the Internet 
is placed higher up on the political agenda.
A number of states have also appointed cyber diplomats (the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Finland were among the first) and have 
created specific agencies for IG- related actions (the United States, China) 
aiming to mitigate the lack of consistency in sectoral approaches. A preoccu-
pation for digitization and new technologies has led to concrete frameworks 
and action plans. In 2017, the United Arab Emirates appointed the first min-
ister for AI, the G20 held two summits for ministers in charge of the digital 
economy, and Denmark appointed its first ever digital diplomat in the Silicon 
Valley. IG has been a part of foreign policy for a much longer period of time, 
but the current developments indicate that— beyond an international (re)
distribution of power— tech diplomacy nowadays is supported by domestic 
political structures.
Just like for companies, the next power struggle among states is leadership 
in AI. Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted as saying, in September 
2017: ‘whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the 
world’ (RT 2017). By mid- 2018, twenty- two countries have either started or 
completed a process to define their national AI strategies or frameworks with 
dedicated budgets, including Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Mexico, 
Singapore, South Korea, the UAE, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
In their report on the rise of the so- called ‘techplomacy’ in the Bay area, 
Horejsova et al. 2018 note an increased specialization in the field of diplo-
macy attuned to particular subfields, such as AI or cybersecurity. The current 
diplomatic presence in the Silicon Valley takes various forms, from a dedi-
cated tech diplomat (e.g. Denmark), to consular representation and an innov-
ation centre (e.g. Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands), a state investment 
promotion agency (e.g. Czech Republic), an honorary consul (e.g. Hungary, 
Finland) or a separate branch of government (Japan). However, for the time 
being, most developing countries mediate their relations with the US- based 
tech industry from their embassy in Washington DC.
China and India, the two largest Internet markets by number of users, 
pursued different strategies in their profiling as leaders in the IG field. Both 
countries have seen government- backed progress in Internet technology, yet 
Gestor da Internet no Brasil, or CGI.br). Due to the political turmoil in the country, CGI.br has 
recently come under attack and its approach is likely to suffer changes.
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their approaches reflect different core values and future directions. The ap-
proaches taken by these two countries deserve a separate discussion below.
China and India
Poised to become the second largest contributor to the UN general budget for 
the 2019– 2021 period, China exerts considerable influence in the key UN 
sub- agencies covering Internet- related aspects. India, caught in between a 
multi- stakeholder rhetoric and a state- based approach to IG, has yet to define 
a consistent approach in its international engagement, be it as part of G20, of 
the SCO or of the BRICS— Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Beijing has taken the route of trade and investment policies to influence 
global IG and gained considerable support from other countries via its Belt 
and Road Initiative. Moreover, in the e- commerce preparations ahead of the 
WTO Ministerial in 2017, China has co- sponsored (together with Pakistan) 
a proposal focused on the promotion and facilitation of cross- border trade 
in goods, payments, and logistics services, maintaining an emphasis on the 
development dimension. This vision of e- commerce is favourable to its plat-
forms, currently among the largest in the world. The tech trinity known as 
BAT (Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba) have recently started investing in or ac-
quiring companies in other industries, including retail, sharing economy, or 
fintech (Liu 2018). China is also coming second after the United States in 
international patent applications, the two technology companies topping the 
global ranking being Huawei and ZTE Corporation (WIPO 2018).
India, on the other hand, has taken an inward look and focused on do-
mestic technological upgrades. It opted for open- source technology in 
moving its governmental services online, to avoid dependence on private 
providers and adapt the specifications to the local context. The ‘India stack’ 
collection of digital platforms built by the government, together with the 
digital infrastructure on which it resides, are placed under public oversight. 
To provide an identification system for Indian residents and facilitate access 
to governmental services and social benefits, India introduced Aadhaar, the 
world’s largest biometric ID system which has over 1.2 billion enrollees now 
(Nilekani 2018). The introduction of this system in 2009 was mired in fears 
of privacy breaches, convergence of the data collected across databases, in-
creased surveillance, profiling and targeting, as well as vulnerability to fraud, 
all of which turned out to be real. More recent debacles drew attention to 
the use of Aadhaar by private companies (such as telephone companies and 
banks) and the case was presented in front of the Supreme Court.
A digital national identity card project is also underway in China, where 
Alibaba and WeChat compete for providing it. After passing strict regulation 
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in areas such as social media or gaming, China is experimenting with a so-
cial credit programme, that rewards good behaviour online and sanctions 
unwanted behaviour, defined by the government and implemented with the 
help of companies. The score resulting from public and private records about 
a citizen’s behaviour could be further used to determine opportunities for 
travelling or employment. Voluntary for the time being, the system will be 
mandatory as of 2020.
China’s July 2017 comprehensive strategy entitled A Next Generation 
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan stresses the aspiration to become the 
‘world’s primary AI innovation centre’ by 2030, touching research and de-
velopment, industrialization, talent development, education and skills ac-
quisition, standard setting and regulations, ethical norms, and security. 
Deployments of AI are also tested in the military field, in particular for 
cybersecurity, surveillance, and autonomous drone swarms. For its near- future 
plan, India embraced the ‘AI for all’ approach stressing social inclusion along-
side economic development. While rhetorically adopting a national approach 
closer to a public good vision of the Internet, India has yet to show how it 
can be deployed in a citizen- centred way. Preserving a socio- economic base-
line at a time when its top firms providing technical services to brands all over 
the world— Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services, and Wipro— increasingly re-
sort to automation might bring the country closer to some of the debates in 
Germany, where a ‘third way’ between market economy and social welfare is 
sought in designing the national AI strategy (Hoene 2018).
Preparing to become a ‘cyber- superpower’ as stressed by President Xi 
Jinping, China is harnessing the potential of quantum computing in addition 
to AI. Since the launch of the first ever satellite using quantum cryptography 
communication in 2016 and the opening of the Beijing- Shanghai Backbone 
Network (BSBN), the world’s first long- distance quantum- secured commu-
nication route in 2017, China envisions working closely with its native com-
panies to develop driverless cars, automated medical diagnosis, and smart city 
management systems.
Conventional approaches to power underline the material or the domin-
ance dimension, but the manifold manifestations of power we have noted 
here show them alongside implicit or ‘soft’ forms, such as the ability to shape 
the agenda and the subsequent global discussions, as well as the ability to 
form identities and perpetuate communities over time. As far as the classical 
definition of power goes, the capacity to do something or determine others 
to do it might not tell the full story in IG. The technological breakthroughs 
to come and the new authority dynamics they will incorporate can help us 
develop novel understandings of IG power.
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As it continues to transform, the Internet builds on its now- established 
governance patterns, confirming or dismissing various relations of power. 
This discussion shows how technology and dominant market positions inter-
twine to wield new forms of power, with intended and unintended effects. 
It provides evidence for how a collective representation of a technical project 
(Flichy 2007) is pre- defined politically and later encapsulated into a vision 
integrated across all relevant sectors of society. Beyond states and companies, 
a significant repository of power in the field is the IG community, an agency- 
loaded space where interests come together to be represented, mediated, 
heard, and legitimized.
The IG Community
What used to be a community in the hundreds now spans a few thousand 
people who regularly speak at multiple global events every year, attend most 
of the preparatory meetings, and participate actively in online discussions. 
The Internet community has expanded and diversified significantly after the 
WSIS process. The number of on- site Internet Governance Forum (IGF) par-
ticipants has increased from around 600 in 2006 to more than 2,000 by 2017. 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and 
IETF meetings regularly gather about 2,000 people, a number of attendees 
similar to the annual WSIS Forum. The NetMundial event hosted by Brazil 
in 2014 brought together more than 1,200 representatives of different sec-
tors, whereas the Wuzhen Internet Summit convened by the Chinese Internet 
Information Office had approximately 1,000 participants in 2014 and twice 
as many in 2015. Business- led events like the annual Mobile World Congress 
organized by the Global System for Mobile Communication Association 
(GSMA) in Barcelona every end of February, attract close to 100,000 at-
tendees. The key players from the industry also participate as sponsors and 
send delegates to most Internet gatherings.
Apart from global events, active IG members are generally also involved 
in activities led by regional organizations like the Council of Europe, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, or the African 
Union, and run or participate in the twelve regional and seventy- six national 
IGFs. While the target group for each of these meetings might differ, there 
is extensive overlap of participants, indicating that a core community has 
formed. The ability of participants with different skills and backgrounds 
to contribute to discussions on highly specialized IG topics was enhanced 
over time through better and easier access to resources, demands for more 
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transparency in the process and, in some cases, financial support to attend 
face- to- face meetings.
In the early days of the Internet, following the wording of the RFCs, ‘com-
munity’ was the preferred referent for the grouping of volunteers, enthusiasts, 
and experts closely associated with a particular process. Generally, they were 
joining the discussion in an individual capacity. Currently, the term is used 
to refer to those professionally engaged in the development of the Internet, 
on the policy or technical side, in a wider sense or for delineating constitu-
encies, as in the case of ICANN or Number Resource Organization (NRO). 
In conferences and meetings, it has become customary to use the stakeholder 
grouping to distinguish between participants belonging to various com-
munities (governments, businesses, civil society and technical community, 
academia), often by assigning them different colour name tags. The represen-
tatives of these groups were self- selected in the beginning, yet procedures for 
nominations and approval have been subsequently institutionalized, span-
ning different degrees of formality.
Physical participation in IG meetings that rotate across the globe is highly 
valued, requiring significant commitment of time, energy, and resources. 
Despite the distributed, virtual modalities of work adopted in between meet-
ings, the knowledge- sharing process and its socially situated nature is re-
inforced in face- to- face encounters. This results in a pattern of attendance 
favouring the ‘information rich’, which not only perpetuates, but also increases 
the inequality of power and influence. Moreover, this phenomenon tends to 
favour the over- representation of corporate actors, who are more incentivized 
to participate in physical meetings as part of their lobbying and marketing 
efforts. Despite repeated calls for inclusiveness, the under- representation of 
developing countries in the IG community remained a constant throughout 
the WSIS decade and it has only come to be addressed when formal mech-
anisms of selection were introduced to ensure a balanced representation of all 
regions. The unequal access was partly due to a reliance on volunteer work, 
the mark of native Internet institutions, as opposed to the principle of uni-
form representation of all member states in intergovernmental settings.
With the steady increase in the number of global meetings, patterns of 
participation are more difficult to distil, and it is oftentimes complicated 
to assign one pre- defined sector- based identity to some of the early partici-
pants in IG processes. After the creation of ICANN, when the meaning of 
‘community’ was formalized, categorizations by sector and orientation were 
popular:  for example, business community, non- commercial stakeholder 
community. In its communication related to the IANA stewardship tran-
sition in March 2014, the National Telecommunication and Information 
Administration (NTIA) referred to the ‘global multistakeholder community’, 
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leaving it up to those involved in the process to specify what that might mean. 
Consequently, an intricate process to define the various interests, affected 
communities, and representatives was set in motion, which ultimately led to 
a proposal to form an ‘empowered community’ as a check- and- balance mech-
anism, discussed below.
Communities in the IANA Stewardship Transition
A new governance process was set in motion a month before NetMundial, on 
14 March 2014, when the Department of Commerce’s NTIA announced its in-
tent to transition the IANA oversight function to the ‘global multistakeholder 
community’. The US government contract with ICANN over the coordin-
ation of the Internet’s technical resources specified the former’s stewardship 
role over the domain name system (DNS)— a role entrusted to the NTIA. 
According to this agreement, for any change in the DNS root zone, such as 
the introduction of a new top level domain, ICANN would need a valid-
ation from the NTIA before execution. The NTIA, in turn, would check that 
ICANN’s decision respected its policies and would ask Verisign (the private 
company maintaining the root zone) to implement. Importantly, the fact that 
there had not been any instances of non- approval by NTIA throughout the 
duration of the contract showed the political dimension of the discussion, 
building on the legacy of early- day discontent with ICANN.
What became known as the IANA stewardship transition process was ini-
tially intended to be finalized by 30 September 2015, but was extended until 
September 2016. Similarly to the 1998 process resulting in the creation of 
ICANN, the NTIA established a set of sine qua non conditions for the tran-
sition: first, to obtain a broad community support; second, to adhere to the 
following four principles: support and enhance the multi- stakeholder model; 
maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; meet the 
needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA 
services; and maintain the openness of the Internet. ICANN acted on this 
announcement by issuing a scoping document on 8 April 2014 and fostering 
a month- long consultation on the next steps.
Refocusing attention away from the surveillance debates and back to the 
legitimacy and accountability of ICANN, the IANA stewardship transition 
process involved a large number of active ICANN participants serving in a 
voluntary capacity, as well as a number of observers from different walks of life. 
Of the volunteers, thirty members joined the IANA Stewardship Transition 
Cooperation Group (ICG) and acted as liaisons for thirteen different stake-
holder communities within the corporation. To agree on a final proposal for 
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the review of the NTIA, the coordination body thus formed had the mission 
of compiling the proposals developed independently by the communities 
directly affected by the transition: the Protocol Parameters community, the 
Numbers Resources community, and the Domain Names community. Table 
6 provides an overview of the proposals put forward.
Of these proposals, the most controversial was the naming- related one, 
which linked the transition to a planned ICANN accountability reform. 
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Work on the latter started in May 2014 and led to the formation of the 
Cross- Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability 
(CCWG- Accountability) in October that year. The group divided the work 
into two parallel streams, the first comprising the prerequisites for the IANA 
transition (to be completed before the end of the NTIA contract), and the 
second extending reforms beyond the transition. To establish a clear division 
between the technical and policymaking functions, the proposal submitted 
by the ICG to the NTIA recommended that a separate legal entity take over 
the role of IANA functions operator, back then referred to as Post- Transition 
IANA. When the entity was legally incorporated in California in August 
2016, the name changed to Public Technical Identifiers. Two more com-
mittees were created ahead of the transition, namely the Customer Standing 
Committee and the Root Zone Evolution Review Committee, together per-
forming the oversight function previously entrusted to the NTIA.
Different drafts for the accountability architecture proposed by the CCWG- 
Accountability were developed by the group and were open to public com-
ment at different stages. The last one of them, further refined, proposed that 
a new entity, ‘the empowered community’, be created as a California unincor-
porated association, comprising all existing supporting organizations within 
ICANN, plus the Governmental Advisory Committee and the At- Large 
Advisory Committee— representing end- users. The envisioned empowered 
community, to be consulted before key pronouncements, would have a veto 
power over a number of decisions by the ICANN Board in case of dissatis-
faction. Among these were: the budgets or strategic/ operating plans, changes 
to ICANN standard by- laws and fundamental by- laws, status of individual 
Board members or the entire Board, and Board decision- making related to 
reviews of the IANA functions.
Despite a few legal challenges that made the transition uncertain until 
the day before,2 the process leading up to the removal of the NTIA over-
sight over ICANN concluded on 1 October 2016, when the IANA contract 
between the two entities expired and the new IANA functions set- up was 
introduced. The added- value of the transition process was the initiation of 
a much broader dialogue on the accountability of ICANN. While the min-
imum accountability prerequisites materialized for the transition to happen, 
2 Among the most important of these was the lawsuit filed on 28 September by state attorneys 
general in Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma, and Nevada asking a federal district court to issue a tem-
porary restraining order preventing the contract to expire on 30 September 2016. The arguments 
put forward revolved around considerations for potential freedom of speech risks and disposal of US 
property without congressional approval.
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discussions continue around larger reforms and ways to strengthen ICANN’s 
accountability towards the broader community.
In the IANA stewardship process, the role of the community was re- 
thought and brought forward along new dimensions, unique in this space. 
It remains to be seen what power differentials emerge in the implementation 
of this ambitious project. This way of involving the transnational policy net-
work formed around the technical management of the Internet builds on the 
grand collaboration that has been historically developed by technical bodies 
with volunteer support. Although ICANN remains under Californian juris-
diction, its legitimacy is no longer challenged in the IG architecture.
Various Meanings of Community
The World Wide Web (WWW) expanded and changed tremendously 
through the collective work of public interest groups, originally formed to 
tackle the technical issues emerging from networking. Later on, content and 
software developers employed by companies joined the initial groups to bring 
their contribution to the development of standards. Unpacking the commu-
nity referent for the key Internet institutions shows that business orientation 
has remained strong in technical meetings dedicated to the Internet stand-
ards. In the work of the IETF, anyone could participate in the development 
or proposition of a standard, according to the published rules and procedures, 
by signing up as a volunteer to one of the working groups. However, technical 
expertise constituted an essential prerequisite for effective participation, and 
that indirectly led to an overrepresentation of participants regularly involved 
in its processes.
In recent years, a new significance has been attributed to the ‘community’ 
referent: dominant businesses such as Facebook have started employing it to 
designate the group of people drawing the rules of behaviour on its platforms. 
These standards are established by a ‘faceless’ group made up of content policy 
team members at Facebook in eleven offices around the world (Facebook 
2018). The guidelines are revised regularly and implemented in the content 
moderation activities, including flagging content, filtering, or taking it down, 
tasks performed by combining AI tools, manual reviews, and reports from 
users. The Community Operations team implementing these standards works 
with more than 7,500 content reviewers in forty languages. But in spring 
2018, the Community guidelines were deemed insufficient by many inter-
national organizations and governments, which started scrutinizing the role 
of Facebook in furthering abusive behaviour and hate speech, and inciting 
violence in a number of developing countries (Taub and Fisher 2018). In 
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Myanmar, Indonesia, India, and Mexico, the amplifying effect of hate speech 
on Facebook led to the murdering of tens of people.
Local values representation is the second point of contention towards the 
Facebook community. The unilateral definition of what is and what is not ac-
ceptable online by a company headquartered in the United States is harder to 
sustain as more than 2 billion people use the platform. Facebook’s largest user 
base at the moment is in India, but little of the social and cultural norms there 
appear to transpire in the global policy of the company, despite the reinforced 
presence of Facebook’s public policy team at all major IG events. In designing 
community standards, how much should reflect the community itself and be 
tailored to the local context? Will a global approach, designed by Facebook 
employees, together with invited experts and selected advocacy groups, be 
sufficient to avoid tragedies like the loss of human lives?
The initial Internet community was formed around a number of principles 
defined in a participatory manner by the contributors to the network. Their 
approach had little to do with form- filling and bureaucracy and more to do 
with achieving rough consensus by ignoring extreme views. However, the 
gradual institutionalization of the field resulted in having some of the early 
members in favour of (more) procedural approaches to designating represen-
tatives or appointing the leadership. The legitimacy and accountability dis-
courses, more frequently heard in state- dominated forums, became central to 
the core Internet community, often with regards to the selection of delegates 
for higher fora.
At the outset, core communities were rather easy to identify through their 
membership arrangements and specified objectives, whereas nowadays the 
categorization is no longer as strict. The most active participants in ICANN 
and the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) were also frequent 
speakers at the IGF and have been members of the Multistakeholder Advisory 
Group (MAG). Mueller (2006) provided a detailed summary of the ICANN- 
related appointees in the MAG for the organization of the first IGF:
Two (Alejandro Pisanty and Veni Markovski) are sitting ICANN Board members; 
one (Theresa Swineheart) is an ICANN staff member; two more (Nii Quaynor and 
Masanobu Katoh) are former ICANN Board members; two (Chris Disspain and 
Emily Taylor) represent ccTLD operators; two (Raul Echeberria and Adiel Akplogan) 
represent Regional Internet Address Registries (RIRs). Even the public interest or 
‘civil society’ representatives are long time players in the ICANN sandbox: Adam 
Peake of Glocom, Robin Gross of IP Justice, Jeanette Hofmann of WZ Berlin, and 
Erick Iriarte of Alfa- Redi are all associated with either ICANN’s At Large Advisory 
Committee or its Noncommercial Users Constituency (or both). To that one can add 
an IETF representative, Patrik Faltstrom, often utilised by ICANN as a consultant, 
and the Internet Society’s public policy advocate. (Mueller 2006)
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Twelve years later, the same participants are still highly active in multiple 
Internet processes. While asserting one identity is important within the com-
munity for guiding interpretation schemes, many in the core group wear ‘dif-
ferent hats’, that is, have multiple affiliations. Most of the time, especially in 
less formal venues, they start their introduction by mentioning that. Such 
instances have become widely common and widely accepted in the IG space. 
Independent of their affiliation, they remain highly vocal on IG issues and 
procedures no matter what ‘hat’ they put on. Over time, they have not only 
taken on board legal, social, and technical issues, but have also been involved 
in or contributed to defining the ethics of the community. The boundaries 
between individual and institutional identities are rather difficult to draw for 
some of the charismatic leaders in the broader IG community. Occasionally, 
the positions they take may be contradictory: critics of intergovernmentalism 
often actively participate in the work of the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD) or serve as experts for the ITU.
Among the technical bodies that refer to their communities, two stand 
out: the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the IETF. The W3C has 
introduced the possibility of creating Community and Business Groups open 
to anyone willing to join, free of charge. To lower barriers to individual par-
ticipation, this initiative addresses Web stakeholders that would connect to 
the well- established international W3C community for creating open Web 
technologies. Such Community and Business Groups can be started with a 
short scope statement and a minimum number of supporters; the general 
criteria to abide by are the following: open to all without a fee, publicly vis-
ible, without time limit, intellectual property rights balanced, and tuned for 
transition to standards.
The IETF, on the other hand, has built its identity around the values of 
volunteerism and collaboration, but also informality. Its three meetings held 
yearly are week- long ‘gatherings of the tribes’. The Tao of the IETF, updated 
several times, even included in its 1993 version a dress code paragraph:
Many newcomers are often embarrassed when they show up Monday morning in 
suits, to discover that everybody else is wearing T- shirts, jeans (shorts, if weather 
permits) and sandals. There are those in the IETF who refuse to wear anything other 
than suits. Fortunately, they are well known (for other reasons) so they are forgiven 
this particular idiosyncrasy. (Malkin 1993)
While social interactions are important variables for collaboration, the guide 
for newcomers does more than simply outline the rules. It builds the ex-
pectations of similar practices being preserved in the future by shaping the 
behaviour of leaders selected among their younger attendees. As they are 
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encouraged to volunteer to be part of working groups, observing closely the 
attire of the more senior members has had a long- lasting influence.
When it comes to decision- making, the IETF rule of approving stand-
ards only after having the rough consensus at meetings endorsed on working 
group mailing lists was not emulated in other forums. Decisions regarding 
the public policy aspects of IG remained mostly confined to face- to- face 
meetings, with a minimum use of online collaborative platforms bridging 
the different stakeholder groups (Radu et al. 2015, 5). Although there is an 
intense use of mailing lists and e- participation tools for the exchange of ideas 
and (statement) coordination, they remain limited to the internal workings 
of a specific community (e.g. IG Caucus, BestBits for civil society groups) or 
a specific process (e.g. one of the IGF Dynamic Coalitions, various ICANN- 
related initiatives). A number of attempts to enhance cross- community com-
munication on broad IG discussions— such as the 1net or the NetMundial 
initiative— have been short- lived, failing to engage key actors and substan-
tiate actions in the aftermath of the physical meetings they were created for.
Old- timers and Newcomers
By and large, in the group dynamics, the small number of active participants— 
primarily established players or ‘old- timers’— defines the rules for the larger 
passive membership. Key individuals thus become cultural and social con-
tainers, who produce, perpetuate, restate, or transform discourse. They rep-
resent the locus of power and have extensive leverage over the relationships 
formed with the newcomers, in particular by recruiting some of the younger 
participants, having a say in structuring their access and defining the trans-
parency procedures introduced by the group. Gaining full recognition in 
the community comes after following a well- defined trajectory in the group, 
which generally starts with smaller project involvement and ends with a move 
towards the centre of the community for those most motivated. Along the 
way, a gradual, but steady identification with the community practices and 
acquisition of the jargon and vocabulary becomes the norm.
The expansion of the IG communities is closely linked to the process 
of designing guidelines and codes of conduct for newcomers, as a way to 
bridge the constant tension between the insiders of a shared practice and 
newly arrived members. Modelling becomes the main vehicle for shaping 
the community: as procedures grow ever more complex, most organizations 
introduce (and fund) newcomer programmes, in most cases targeting parti-
cipants from developing countries. Examples of such initiatives include the 
IETF and ICANN fellowships to their meetings and ISOC ambassadorships 
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to the IGF, aiming to bridge the gap between the ‘information rich’ and the 
‘information poor’ and to give a voice to regions and stakeholder groups that 
are underrepresented, but also to immerse novices in the work of these in-
stitutions. ICANN also runs a Community Onboarding programme, while 
ISOC funds travelling of young people to global events via its NextGen pro-
gramme. These activities are supplemented by online courses— like the ones 
ran by DiploFoundation or Internet Society— and opportunities to be in-
volved in regional events. As embedded experiences, these programmes not 
only inform about praxis, but also immerse the newcomers in full- fledged, 
continuous discussions, in particular as they encourage repeated participa-
tion.3 In the process, the newcomers become practitioners themselves.
Early on, in the technical groups, maximizing inclusion was key for ensuring 
that the standards were interoperable and satisfactory for those most likely to 
make use of them. Similarly, the adherence to multi- stakeholder processes has 
since been fostered into community- building processes, for example, in the 
way in which the ICANN and ISOC fellowships are structured— members 
of different communities being funded to participate and spend a week to-
gether in formal and informal settings. The personal relations established this 
way increase the trust different stakeholders have in the people they have 
bonded with informally. Unlike meetings with binding outcomes, the IGF 
and the WSIS Forum running for a few consecutive days provide a more 
relaxed atmosphere conducive to personal discussions and informal consult-
ations. Alongside workshops and sessions, participants can attend tutorials, 
presentations, and, most importantly, hallway conversations concerning ac-
tual decision- making processes at the national, regional, or global level.
It is important to note here that the intergovernmental arrangements no 
longer stand in opposition with the sui generis grouping of Internet organiza-
tions in their standard- setting procedures or in their operation. They often 
collaborate, exchange ideas, and check the activities of other organizations in 
order to improve their inclusiveness and participation practices. Sometimes, 
the same individuals are behind such initiatives as initiators or proposers. 
The development of the Internet’s technical standards and protocols has been 
conducted in an open manner, with the involvement of an expanding com-
munity encouraged to participate at different levels, and bodies like the ITU- 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU- T) have followed suit in 
adopting a similar approach to tutorials for newcomers, while preserving the 
solid role for governments specific to state- led processes.
3 First- time participants in an ICANN fellowship are eligible for two more fellowships to future 
meetings, whereas some of ISOC’s IGF ambassadors are eligible for funding twice.
 The IG Community 183
The interdependence of Internet activities and the increasingly diverse 
backgrounds of those carrying them out gradually made any idea of acting 
in isolation fade away. The complementary skills and knowledge of various 
members, as well as their multi- membership across IG groups were con-
sidered a gain for the community. The expansion of a distributed knowledge 
base and the continuous effort to promote a consistent vision is reflected 
in the shared praxis. Various communities have worked on historicizing 
their experience and have subsequently put in place a wiki or a webpage 
recounting their progress and influence since formation (ICANN’s NCUC, 
Best Bits, etc.).
The need for cooperation to make the network function translated, at the 
community level, into the amalgamation of cultures and mindsets (organ-
izational, sectoral, disciplinary, but also national or regional) in solution- 
oriented activities. The distinctiveness of specific etiquettes of interaction, 
ranging from a rough- consensus approach to extensive diplomatic deliber-
ations over wording, started to blur as an unchanged core group met regularly 
around (negotiation) round- tables in different venues. The resulting system 
of norms and rules is a hybrid incorporating, in a unique mix, diplomatic 
procedures, private logics, and public interest discourses.
Internal Dynamics
Within the community, what becomes apparent is a clustering of members 
according to the meetings they attend— a grouping they would re- assert 
across different venues— further reflecting the close interaction and social ties 
developed over time. ICANN- goers meet three times a year on different con-
tinents, whereas active IGF- ers generally pass through Geneva for an agenda- 
setting consultation before heading to the global meeting in the host country. 
The WSIS Forum and the CSTD meetings are generally scheduled back- to- 
back in May every year, allowing some of the participants to attend both. Key 
members of the community generally take advantage of the IGF schedule 
to reserve Day 0 for strategic discussions, side events, or public forums, and 
similar actions have more recently been taken around global gatherings that 
have not traditionally dealt with the Internet, such as the Human Rights 
Council’s periodic meeting in Geneva.
My immersion in community- building activities over the last eight years 
allowed me to assess, on multiple occasions, two sets of dynamics that became 
constitutive of the IG space. The first was the tacit knowledge that commu-
nity members had about the topics discussed and about each other, visible in 
the limited explanation about the issues at hand and the use of first names in 
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formal meetings. The second was the consolidation and repetition of values 
endorsed by the old- timers.
The absence of introductory preambles and a direct jump into the core 
discussion without extensive details points to the constant communication 
that goes on via mailing lists. In this approach, there is an implicit under-
standing of the knowledge that other members of the group have, their po-
tential contribution, and oftentimes their position in the debate. Moreover, 
the personal relationships, rivalries, and ideological standpoints are clearly 
delineated and well- known to everyone in the group, making it easy to assess 
what coalitions might be formed. As Wenger (1998, 130– 31) remarks, sus-
tained mutual relationships— harmonious or conflictual— represent a mark 
of ongoing interactions; in the IG community, it is not uncommon to start a 
mailing list interaction by referencing, with minimum information, a long- 
standing dispute.
Throughout consultations and meetings in formal venues such as the UN 
headquarters in Geneva, the use of first names was often preferred in lieu of 
spelling out the full name and affiliation for those who have been involved in 
IG processes for a long time: Markus, Bertrand, Bill, Avri, Ayesha, etc. This 
informality made the atmosphere more personal, giving established partici-
pants ownership over particular processes. For newcomers though, the prac-
tice of calling out personal names indicated a nucleus they were outside of; 
understanding who the people called by first name were became a rite of 
passage; it was important to meet them, discuss with them, and eventually be-
come known to them by first name in order to get closer to the nucleus. This 
applied across sectoral divisions, yet it is important to note that in addressing 
government representatives the generic delegation formula was preferred (e.g. 
‘the Chinese delegation’). There were, however, exceptions for the representa-
tives of countries that were most active at the IGF and during its preparatory 
process:  the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, the United States, and 
Sweden, whose representatives were also easily recognized by their first names 
(Epstein 2012, 181).
The second habitual characteristic of the community structuration was the 
solidification of principles put forward by its key members. Among these, 
inclusiveness and multi- stakeholder participation were subsequently internal-
ized by the rest of the community. The underlying tenets of the fast- growing 
Internet community were reproduced in various ways: at recurrent events and 
through newcomer programmes, through local and transnational anchors, 
but also through the reiteration of principles that its most influential mem-
bers upheld. The length of career within the community became a highly 
valued source of authority, compatible with membership across many other 
sub- communities. It is from this position that established members promoted 
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the core values. In their interventions and contributions, the most active in-
dividuals frequently referred back to previous meetings they attended, using 
formulations such as ‘I was there when this was discussed/ I was a member of 
the working group/ I was chairing the meeting’. Such prefaces reflected dif-
ferent knowledge and commitment levels.
The insights of those more regularly involved gained more weight, not 
coming in contradiction with their multiple membership across groups 
endorsing different beliefs. Their ownership claim was rooted in the service 
done to the community on many other occasions and in their proximity to 
power structures across different venues, as well as the privileged knowledge 
they had access to. Importantly, in the IG space, the discussions remained 
open. The boundaries of the group were maintained insofar as formal repre-
sentation was concerned, but the different communities acting in this space 
did not define themselves in contrast with other groups.
Partly explaining this was the far- reaching sharing practice among com-
munity members, not limited to work only. Physical meetings offered op-
portunities to socialize and develop interpersonal relations during lunches, 
receptions, day- long trips planned together. These informal occasions further 
contributed to the adoption of a similar vocabulary and the development of 
a communal knowledge repertoire, which included information about com-
munity members, viewpoints, and expectations. The spaces for interaction 
and the social practices for IG were thus mutually constituted. Socialization 
shaped the extent to which a shared mindset and the idea of a collective future 
were perpetuated. As Cohen observed:
the quintessential referent of community is that its members make, or believe they 
make, a similar sense of things either generally or with respect to specific and signifi-
cant interests, and further, that they think that that sense may differ from one made 
elsewhere. (1985, 16)
Defining a common horizon also meant, in the IG case, an aversion to 
the exclusion of participants based on their affiliation. It was, for example, 
common to have business and technical community representatives regularly 
participating in discussions on the Civil Society Caucus mailing list. In an ana-
lysis of the IGF transcripts for the period of 2006 to 2012, DiploFoundation 
(2015) concluded that the verbal contributions during the annual meetings 
were divided as follows: 34.45 per cent made by government representatives, 
17.23 per cent by NGO representatives, 15.47 per cent by business represen-
tatives, 14.60 per cent by the technical community, 11.68 per cent by IO rep-
resentatives, and 6.57 per cent by academics. Semantically, the contributions 
of all stakeholders but IOs and academia members were similar, revealing 
analogous patterns of word usage by the technical community, business 
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community, and NGOs. This was highly indicative of how relationships have 
been forged at the nucleus of the community and how daily practices em-
bedded shared- learning processes.
Face- to- face learning, the moulding of a common perspective and the ex-
change of good practices at global forums also played key roles in shaping the 
Internet communities in- the- making because they acted as a self- fulfilling 
prophecy, reiterating the core values in which the identities of the community 
were rooted. The flexible, self- organizing, English- speaking, male- dominated 
group that participated in the early days— in ARPANET or in the WSIS 
process— ossified as a cluster of authoritative voices for the maintenance of 
the structures whose creation they contributed to. More than sharing similar 
views on the values to be promoted in IG, the nucleus actively used its high 
profile and influence to advocate for its vision, for example in pleading for-
mally for a renewal of the IGF mandate back in 2014.
To this day, the multi- stakeholder construct remains deeply ingrained 
in the principles put forward for institutional design, as it was the case for 
the creation of the IGF, or for opposing initiatives for not being inclusive 
enough. Recurrent, structured interactions and interrelations define the core 
community and reiterate the principles that unite them, limiting the rad-
ical discourses. In that sense, multi- stakeholder processes are ‘enabling and 
including, but also disciplining’ (Raboy et  al. 2010, 84). Actors construct 
themselves based on their acquired affiliation(s), but also as contributors to 
the community. They often sit on Advisory Boards together, being habituated 
into specialized practices in similar ways. Peer reviewers, often called in for 
collective drafting exercises, are appreciated for both subject- matter expertise 
and immersion in community practices.
Over time, the process of assigning fixed identities taking into account 
geographic and community representation was institutionalized. From the se-
lection of ICANN board members to the WGIG members and to the Board 
of the NetMundial Initiative, the institutionalization of procedures became 
a central discussion in the community. Procedural design consolidated the 
claim to representativeness and gave the community a sense of the prefer-
ences, ideas, and principles selected individuals would stand for, rather than 
providing a clear understanding of the arguments that would be put forward 
in the negotiation. For example, the ample consultation processes taking place 
within civil society groups served a legitimating purpose, alongside the func-
tional approach to selecting speakers and delegates. The nominations were 
usually put forward on the mailing list and there was a transparent candida-
ture process, followed by the expression of support and endorsement from the 
other members of the group, most of the times taking the form of ‘+1’ for the 
preferred candidate.
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Socialized in this practice originally developed by the technical commu-
nity, the younger active members of the core IG community reproduce and 
perpetuate it. As Djelic and Quack put it:
Ultimately, socialization can lead to a transparency of structuring and institutional 
frameworks and thus to ‘invisible’ reproduction. This is probably one of the most 
powerful kinds of stabilization mechanisms, suggesting profound entrenchment and 
generating great legitimacy. (2007, 165)
The discussion above indicates that neither the community, nor the group 
belongingness remains static. The meaning and the accepted forms of com-
munity participation have solidified and institutionalized in the process, 
but are by no means fixed. While deliberate effort was put into community 
expansion— through capacity building programmes, summer schools, new-
comer guides, and the mutual orientation of members— social interactions 
and collective drafting of rules of conduct provided the basis for maintaining 
the core group. The dynamism of the IG nucleus stems, in part, from the 
continuous reiteration of common principles and aspirations. But it is also re-
actionary, as fast responses are required for technical developments and regu-
latory moves. To participate in fluid configurations of governance, the core 
community enacts structures of signification and legitimation by drawing on 
praxis, expertise and lengthy involvement in IG processes.
Anchoring Practices
As discussed in the opening chapter, the IG scholarship has spent consider-
able time focusing on institutions and novel mechanisms at the expense of 
comprehensive analyses of practices. This book breaks away with that trad-
ition by integrating practices as an additional dimension of empirical inves-
tigation, to reveal how actors coalesce around routines and meanings in their 
daily work. Anchoring practices are solidified habits turned into pillars for 
community formation. They represent instances of power perpetuation, re-
inforcing broader governance structures. Each one of the three anchoring 
practices identified here is specific to a period, but it is perpetuated beyond, 
enduring over the years: by 2018, more than 8,400 RFCs had been issued, 
thousands of multi- stakeholder events took place, and hundreds of ad hoc 
expert groups completed their IG work.
Importantly, these three practices are also instances of co- regulatory rou-
tines consonant with broader contemporary governance arrangements. First, 
the RFCs emerged in the early days of the Internet and became authoritative 
in the 1980s to help standardize the first protocols and foster communication 
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within the technical and academic community working on the precursor 
of the Internet. Moreover, they helped embed particular values about how 
things should be done, and what should be prioritized in the process. Second, 
multi- stakeholder routines were championed around the creation of ICANN 
and became dominant in the privatization decade up until 2003– 2005, when 
they were sanctioned in the Tunis Agenda. Third, ad hoc expert bodies were 
more often deployed post- WSIS to legitimize a set of punctual solutions that 
generally did not challenge the status quo. While they all used to depend on a 
few active individuals, the anchoring practices explored here are now formal-
ized and institutionalized. To a large extent, the move towards entrenching 
detailed procedures has shifted the focus from the substance and content of 
debates to the bureaucratic processes around them.
Influential routines generally enact ideological elements. The different 
mechanisms of governance at work become structural conditions for social 
practices framing the rules of the game. In that sense, routine interactions are 
guided by deeper political endeavours— be they reinforcing or breaking away 
with established rules— in daily enactments of governance. In the IG com-
munity, the neoliberal, market- enabling understanding of the space (Flichy 
2007) stood at the basis of the multi- stakeholder discourse. In nascent issue 
domains, where no textbook approach is possible, substantive expertise is 
closely linked to the interaction with the groups which possess and produce 
the expert knowledge. This practice makes it difficult to draw the line between 
the embodiment of an ideological credo and a genuine participatory approach 
to governance, as it conflates various dimensions by legitimizing the presence 
and disciplining the actions of particular actors around the negotiation table.
The creation of ad hoc expert groups speaks to the hierarchy of knowledge 
established in the community. It therefore performs a separation between 
those who possess the expertise and are entitled to speak on behalf of dif-
ferent groups and the rest of the community members. While the selection 
would also be driven by formal considerations such as the representation of 
different geographical areas and sectors, the expectation of having political 
stances represented is taken for granted. The practice has become widespread 
within the EU, with a number of high- level expert groups being formed since 
2016: High Level Group on Internet Governance (2016), on Radicalisation 
(2017), on Fake News (2018), and on Artificial Intelligence (2018). In the 
same vein, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has established a 
Global Commission on the Future of Work, chaired by Ameenah Gurib- 
Fakim, President of the Republic of Mauritius, and by Stefan Löfven, Prime 
Minister of Sweden. The Commission is expected to produce an independent 
report in 2019 on digitalization, jobs and social justice. Most prominent 
among this new set of initiatives is that of the UN Secretary General António 
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Guterres, who appointed in July 2018 a High- Level Commission on Digital 
Cooperation, chaired by Melissa Gates and Jack Ma, for a nine- month- long 
mandate.
Encoding the dominant meanings, anchoring practices are key to under-
standing the evolution of an issue domain, in particular as they embody 
rules which are not codified as such formally. They rely on common know-
ledge, which implies that they ‘do not require the time or repetition that 
habits require, but rather the visible, public enactment of new patterns so 
that “everyone can see” that everyone else has seen that things have changed’ 
(Swidler 2001, 87). The way communities reiterate practices of recognition 
and celebrate their members is a case in point here. Starting in 1999, ISOC 
has been awarding, on an annual basis, the Jonathan B. Postel Service Award. 
The award, presented at an IETF meeting, goes to an individual or organiza-
tion with an outstanding contribution to the data communications commu-
nity. In the selection of the awardee, particular attention is paid to ‘candidates 
who have supported and enabled others in addition to their own specific ac-
tions’ (ISOC 2015b). Similarly, ICANN’s Multistakeholder Ethos Award was 
launched in June 2014 in London to recognize the leaders of the community 
promoting multi- stakeholderism within the organization by serving it— for 
at least five years— in different roles and collaborating across supporting or-
ganizations and/ or advisory committees.
As the call for nominations details, the Multistakeholder Ethos Award ‘rec-
ognises ICANN participants who have deeply invested in consensus- based so-
lutions, acknowledging the importance of ICANN’s multistakeholder model 
of Internet governance, and contributed in a substantive way to the higher 
interests of ICANN’s organisation and its community’ (ICANN 2015). This 
annual practice reiterates the need to strive for consensus in ICANN- related 
activities; but it goes further than that. Just like the ISOC award, it also up-
holds peer recognition as highly valuable, since the nomination and the re-
view of candidate profiles is done by (a panel of ) community members.
Anchoring practices in IG, as evidenced throughout the evolution of the 
field, reflect the merging of two forms of authority: social and epistemic. On 
the one hand, group belongingness entitles certain individuals to take part in 
Internet- related processes. On the other hand, expertise grounded in subject- 
matter knowledge becomes more appreciated over time. Different IG groups 
are both rule- makers and targets of rules. In a nutshell, anchoring practices 
are also an important proxy for ideological cohesion and community support. 
A  plethora of consultation mechanisms and channels of input exist, both 
formally and informally, to bridge the divide between the private and the 
public realms. This provides evidence for the consolidation of a hybrid en-
vironment, in which the boundaries of the community are no longer drawn 
190 Enacting Internet Governance
190
solely in accordance with the position taken by key actors. In part, it is due to 
the reproduction of practices of collaboration that have become the ‘invisible 
thread’ behind the way in which the community is organized.
Synopsis
Nowadays, the Internet presents multiple sites of authority at different levels, 
from national to global. While some of the developments that marked the 
IG evolution post- 2015 were direct continuations of processes started be-
fore, such as cross- sectoral convergence facilitated by Internet technology, 
new concerns surfaced as fresh political and legal endeavours to tackle, such 
as the pursuit of cybersecurity norms or AI. The first part of this chapter in-
vestigated the power dynamics at play post- 2015, putting into perspective the 
key governance transformations.
Dominant private companies, on the one hand, and influential governments, 
on the other, are currently restructuring the debates along realpolitik and eco-
nomic dimensions. Their actions impose, legitimize, and strengthen what appears 
to be a contested re- arrangement of power. Carving out a clear- cut regulatory 
space in a dense institutional ecosystem has long been a national priority, but the 
stakes increased amidst technological innovation and diversification. A product 
of public and private collaboration, the Internet does not cease to be a field in 
search of ethical and legal guiding frameworks as its political standing continues 
to rise. The repeated calls to develop rules, in particular on cyber- operations and 
AI, point to the securitization of a significant part of the field.
Shifting attention to agency, the second part of this chapter brought into 
sharper focus the role of the IG community in structuring a unique field 
of governance. From the introduction of specific guidance for newcomer 
programmes to the perpetuation of decision- making processes and the en-
actment of anchoring practices, the core values passed on reflect the charac-
teristics of the initial group of technical bodies, formalized and politicized 
over time. The dynamics within the community, however, present their own 
patterns and specificities. In this longitudinal perspective, abstract opposi-
tions frequently applied to IG, such as bottom- up versus top- down, public 
versus private, state versus market, took on a new meaning. More than articu-
lating a functional, solution- oriented approach to problems, the community 
patterns identified here are tightly linked to ideological positions, as well as 
social and epistemic authority. The global IG regime is built on both disrup-
tions and continuities and many different legitimation routes open up in its 
restructuring.
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 Conclusion: Reflections on a Global 
Issue Domain
More than half a century after the deployment of the packet switching tech-
nology and twenty- plus years after the rollout of the World Wide Web and 
the rise of e- commerce, the Internet is a constant of modern life. Enticing and 
convoluted, its evolution from a technical experiment in internetworking to 
a ubiquitous presence encapsulates the tensions of globalization in the most 
concrete manner. The global governance of the Internet remains at odds with 
the research traditions of international relations (IR), none of them fully ac-
commodating this new issue domain. As this study has shown, the Internet 
presents us with a ‘bricolage’ picture: different forms and varieties of govern-
ance emerging, with various degrees of institutionalization, at different stages 
and degrees of (re)negotiation, with varying degrees of success in addressing 
global concerns.
The prime objective of this analysis was to unpack the complexity of 
Internet governance (IG) and present a new analytical perspective for exam-
ining its genesis and structuration as a domain of global governance. This 
perspective, derived from the constructivist approach to IR, places IG amidst 
a changing global order and takes into account the broader context in which 
the debates over global rules regulating the network of networks are framed. 
Whether we discuss cybersecurity or an ethical framework for artificial intel-
ligence (AI), it is the characteristics of the governance system in place that 
shape future decision- making processes.
The dataset constructed for this study— consisting of 311 governance 
instruments— provided a unique entry point for mapping and assessing 
the mechanisms and actors in the field. Spanning more than four decades, 
the governance instruments recorded here were assessed in interaction with 
external driving forces and with power positions specific to the field. The 
enactment of governance in this issue domain was further deconstructed 





community forming around IG. This holistic account, grounded historically, 
helps us understand the totality of debates constructing the Internet.
In the periodization exercise, three phases were identified as key to the 
evolution of the field. For each of these stages, specific governance patterns 
surfaced: (1) the early days of the Internet were dominated by informal gov-
ernance and focused on technical standards (1970s to 1994); (2) the global-
ization of the Internet was closely linked to an increasing role of private actors 
and the salience of the market- oriented approach (1995– 2004); and (3) the 
decade of global regulatory arrangements (2005– 15) brought hybrid config-
urations to the fore, privileging cross- sectoral partnerships. Post- 2015, new 
power trends indicate a stronger position of a limited number of companies 
and states, clashing more frequently over the fundamentals of governing the 
field. Across various subfields, whether related to infrastructure and critical 
resources, cybersecurity, legal issues, digital economy, ICT for development 
(ICT4D), or civil liberties, legacy configurations and specific patterns of com-
munity development predefine the terms on which governance is exercised.
This chapter presents comparatively the findings of this research covering 
more than four decades. An evolutionary perspective is offered for the IG 
community- building practices and internal dynamics. The empirical analysis 
brings us back to normative questions related to the creation of systems of 
global rule and opens a theoretical reflection on the constitution of IG as a 
global power field. The remainder of this chapter explores implications be-
yond this issue domain for the research agenda proposed here and potential 
future directions.
Findings
Originally designed as a technological facility for the use of academics and 
researchers, the NSFNET became the backbone of the global network which 
is currently an integral part of our social life. Coupled with a deregulatory ap-
proach, the worldwide development of the Internet led to a strong focus on 
legal, economic, and developmental aspects, subsequently reaffirmed at the 
UN- organized World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 
2005. The fast and substantial growth of the issue domain was fomented by 
technical developments and by an unprecedented institutional expansion. As 
the network grew manifold, the range of actors interested in its governance 
diversified; from the small group of individuals operating in loose structures 
at the outset, we nowadays have a highly diverse set of actors and a formalized 
system of rules (re)defined in numerous settings.
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Illustrative of this transformation is also the rising number of governance 
mechanisms applicable to the Internet, as summarized in Table 7. These take 
three main forms: legal enshrinement, institutional solidification, and mod-
elling. In the last decade, the majority of these were specifically designed for 
the Internet. As for their binding power, the predominance of soft law in-
struments over hard law is hardly surprising:  treaties and conventions are 
generally signed by governmental actors and are not open to new(er) actors 
in the international system, such as civil society groups or businesses. In IG, 
there has been intense political contestation surrounding legally binding 
agreements, revealed, for instance, in the lengthy negotiations around the 
specific wording of the WSIS outcome documents in 2003 and 2005, but 
also in 2012 at the World Conference on International Telecommunication. 
For the majority of concerned stakeholders, preference appears to be given to 
modelling activities, be they discursive or operational, in order to influence 
Table 7 Overview of IG issues, instruments, and mechanisms over time



















































the behaviour of other actors in this space. This deliberate choice signals their 
positioning in a field under construction in which priorities change fast.
The extent to which soft and hard law mechanisms coexist brings forward 
two important insights: the first is the fact that the logics of action pertaining 
to different actors involved in IG constrain the design of new rules; the second 
is the reality of multiple governance negotiations held simultaneously in dif-
ferent venues with minimum interaction across. The latter results in contest-
ation at various levels, ranging from street protests (as in the case of ACTA) to 
the initiation of UN resolutions. Among the most salient issues in Internet- 
related discussions and governance actions, cybersecurity was a constant pre-
occupation for the main actors. It is in this area that all the different types of 
governance instruments were concentrated over the last two decades, but the 
search for cyber norms is not yet over. A securitization approach continues 
to be noticeable post- 2015, especially as some initiatives involve more closely 
the private sector or are indeed proposed by companies. A  similar level of 
concern could be observed in the 1990s for legal and economic develop-
ments, or for the promotion of civil liberties in the WSIS decade, setting the 
foundations for the structuration of the field.
Since its early days, authority remained embedded in horizontal structures 
such as technical communities, and in hierarchical ones, creating a decentral-
ized system with one point of final control: the US government. Gradually, 
the hierarchical relations reconfigured as more and more governments started 
to participate actively in ruling the network by introducing domestic changes 
or by defining mandates inside international organizations and establishing 
specialized bodies.
Developing countries versus developed countries, smaller business players 
versus market dominant ones, and governments versus corporations are di-
chotomies that still apply to IG, adding to the specific tensions inherent to 
the maturation of the field. As this book shows, the rules designed for the 
Internet cannot be secluded from power plays, ultimately resulting in a cer-
tain variability of authority structures and exhibiting a hybrid character.
In addition to divergences over technical challenges, such as the need to 
maintain a unique, reliable, and resilient network, conflict over an appro-
priate model of IG has been recurrent, demonstrating the perpetuation of 
the high political stakes attached to this domain. The informal management 
of the Internet at the outset nurtured a culture of consensus that became 
dominant in the technical community. Negotiations on Internet matters 
outside these bodies remained, however, circumscribed to ‘politics as usual’, 
introducing a diversity of perspectives grounded in socioeconomic and power 
logics that have over time permeated the discussions on infrastructure, stand-
ards, and management of critical resources. The global rise of the commercial 
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network and related controversies in the late 1990s led to a formalization of 
practices and subsequently to their institutionalization. The anchoring prac-
tices discussed here— Request for Comments, multi- stakeholder participa-
tion, and ad hoc expert groups— reinforced the power distribution on two 
levels: the first was the global ordering reflecting who gets to govern and on 
what terms; the second pertained to the specific praxis among active IG parti-
cipants, delineating volunteers from professionals, experts from non- experts, 
and last but not least, reaffirming categories of stakes.
This book’s historical approach uncovered the way in which personal inter-
actions played out in the construction of a governance regime for the precursor 
of the Internet, ARPANET. The individuals with a critical role in sowing the 
seeds of institutional design remained highly influential throughout the fol-
lowing decades, either as community leaders or as corporate actors. Among 
these, Steve Crocker, Jon Postel, Robert Kahn, and Vint Cerf led a series 
of institutional developments that left an authoritative legacy. Similarly, the 
small group of people involved in negotiating the creation of ICANN be-
came highly influential in discussions at WSIS and continues to form the 
core of the IG transnational network. Elements of informality continue to 
structure this issue domain, and ad hoc formations remain a constant, be it in 
the specialized work of technical bodies or as part of expert groups in various 
policy processes.
With the growing importance of the field emerged a set of tensions which 
called into question the fragmented approach to IG rule- making. Two main 
alternatives were debated: on the one hand, the private- sector led processes 
were strongly supported by the United States, which retained an authori-
tative role; on the other hand, the intergovernmental option increasingly 
came to the fore as governments sought to strengthen control beyond the 
national level. A basic point of divergence for power dynamics has been the 
position of the US government. Providing the funding for the development 
of ARPANET and, subsequently, the NSFNET, the US administration de-
signed a private regime for the management of unique identifiers and the 
Internet addressing system. In the process, it retained oversight over a critical 
part of DNS management, namely the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA) function. This tension underlined the negotiations at WSIS and, 
post- Snowden, globalized the debate.
On critical Internet matters, the position of the state (fluctuating between 
central and marginal) among market- based governance modes and hybrid 
configurations has brought new perspectives to the fore. For scholars of glo-
balization, the longitudinal perspective presented here is particularly relevant 
as it demonstrates the reversibility of authority from governments to non- 
state actors, which is not only possible and deliberate, but also unfolding 
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in ways previously understudied. The undermining of democratic practices, 
under discussion following the 2018 Facebook– Cambridge Analytica scandal 
(around algorithmic manipulation of voters in the Brexit referendum and 
US elections in 2016), or the future of AI systems are just two of the many 
elements that restructure the debate around defining societal priorities before 
pursuing market and technological ones. Via institutional solidification ef-
forts, these choices lead to path dependency and become a permanent feature 
of global governance.
Rather than fostering an array of separate initiatives, a relatively cohesive 
community coalesces around an ever- growing scope of IG. A  stable group 
of experts, helping to spur interest in transborder solutions, has formed over 
time and continues to meet to enact governance in all its forms, from pro-
viding guidance in policy processes to moulding the next generation of com-
munity leaders. Generally grouped according to the stakeholder categories 
sanctioned in the Tunis agenda, participants in these processes are agenda- 
setters and legitimizers of discursive modelling actions, encapsulating unique 
expertise and know- how. By 2015, the majority of actors involved in IG acted 
in more than one policy field and community representatives regularly en-
gaged in multiple governance processes simultaneously. The public– private 
restructuring of the digital markets (observed at the structural level) had a 
corresponding effect at the community level, bringing together a growing 
number of interests.
Understanding New IG Trends
The standing of IG grew over time from a technical area to a ‘new foreign 
policy imperative’.1 Yet a consensus of key stakeholders on issues of im-
portance to the development of the field continues to be avidly sought. 
Policymakers are now confronted with cross- sectoral concerns combining 
socioeconomic, political, and ethical dilemmas simultaneously, for example 
in addressing the challenges of the sharing economy or in advancing digital 
rights. Cybersecurity and data protection continue to be critical points of 
deliberation, while technology- driven transformations, such as the Internet 
of Things (IoT) and AI, have imposed a wider public debate. If the three 
historical phases showed us that changes in the scope, size, and scale of the 
network were enthusiastically welcomed, the fourth period we see emerging 
might be driven by scepticism. Can and should this mature phase reached by 
1 As referred to by Hillary Clinton (Jamart 2014).
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the Internet be sustained? Should the fundamentals be reconsidered? The first 
insights post- 2015 bring mixed evidence.
The unprecedented level of global interconnectedness we have reached 
due to the Internet continues to be perceived as one of the main drivers of 
global governance, but the capacities of the current institutional patchwork 
to deliver on transborder challenges are called into question. Alongside other 
global governance challenges, such as international migration flows, water 
scarcity, or climate change, the collective management of Internet resources is 
premised on a cohesive vision pursued by a diverse, cross- sectoral leadership 
group. Nowadays, efforts by governments and international organizations to 
define governance norms are regularly paralleled by civil society and business 
sector actions aimed at modelling behaviour, exchanges, and responsibilities 
at the global level.
For the first time in the history of the Internet, an increasing number of 
tech companies have revenues that exceed the GDP of many countries; un-
precedented cross- border influence in negotiations comes with this newly- 
acquired financial power. The friction between governments and industry, 
or the so- called ‘techlash’, started to profile itself as a tension likely to define 
the fourth phase in the development of the Internet. While the companies’ 
responsibility to abide by national laws goes back a long way, recent techno-
logical developments such as encrypted apps or self- learning algorithms have 
reframed the debate from ‘who should govern’ to ‘how and on what terms’ 
could the field be governed. On their side, legislators turned to monetary 
sanctions and laws with extraterritorial provisions for ruling on key matters, 
while the top companies decided to explore new investment opportunities in 
areas of no regulation. As Chapter 6 discussed, internationalizing coalitions 
promoting the Chinese or the Russian understanding of ‘cyber sovereignty’ 
are increasingly more vocal in IG spaces, where alternatives to the status quo 
continue to be sought.
Amidst these transformations, the power of multilateralism, which con-
stituted a foundation for the neoliberal regime established in the 1990s, ap-
pears to weaken in IG processes. Three recent instances of failure to achieve 
consensus in different subareas attest to that and are indicative of dominant 
tensions. In light of more influential roles played by the business sector in 
IG, be it at the level of infrastructure or content, and the stronger national 
approaches adopted recently, will the Internet move closer to or further away 
from being understood as a global commons?
In the area of cybersecurity, the search for global norms becomes ever 
more intricate. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, meeting in its fifth working group since 2004, failed 
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to find a common ground for rules of state behaviour in the digital space. 
After defining the global cybersecurity agenda, and socializing the principle 
of international law applicability to cyberspace in its previous reports, the 
group met in 2016– 17 to discuss how neutrality, proportionality, the right 
of self- defence, and other concepts from international law could apply to 
cyberconflicts. Despite the progress made on cyber- capacity building by the 
twenty- five UN member states participating in the negotiations, the process 
unearthed major disagreements over state responsibility, dispute settlement, 
and the potential militarization of cyberspace.
The main positions delineated in these debates reflected the deeply en-
trenched disagreements between the United States, Canada, and European 
countries, on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other, with 
developing countries placed in the middle. As discussed in Chapter 6, on the 
margins of this UN process, a proposal for a Digital Geneva Convention was 
put forward by Microsoft, representing a first attempt by a private actor to 
define an overarching set of norms for the field of cybersecurity, oriented not 
only at companies, but also at states. So far, this proposal has received limited 
support, but a related, voluntary industry Tech Accord has been signed by 
forty- five firms.
In the sphere of digital economy, the eleventh WTO Ministerial 
Conference held in December 2017 in Buenos Aires ended without a 
consensus on redefining e- commerce rules. The memorandum of under-
standing dating back to 1998 remained in place. The consultations leading 
up to the meeting were particularly heated, revealing a clear perception 
of unequal distribution of the digital transformation benefits. Some 
developing countries proposed that the issue is tackled as part of the Doha 
development round negotiations once they are set on track, while others 
found it necessary to have agreement on other important matters first, 
such as access to infrastructure, capacity development, and digital skills 
(Geneva Internet Platform 2017).
Beyond selling and buying goods online, the issues put forward ahead of 
the negotiations touched on the free flow of data, removal of localization 
demands, and technology transfer requirements. All of these raised concerns 
among IG civil society groups, which argued against a potential expansion of 
the WTO mandate into regulating issues such as privacy and cybersecurity. 
The second instance of contestation emerged around the lack of legitimacy 
that intergovernmental venues have for Internet- related decision- making, re-
iterating the need for a more inclusive approach with the participation of dif-
ferent stakeholders. Following the WTO Ministerial, work on an e- commerce 
reform continues both informally and formally, as plurilateral solutions have 
started being discussed by WTO member states.
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The third recent process that ended without a consensus was conducted 
within the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC) hosted by 
the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD). 
Derived from the WSIS process, enhanced cooperation represented a Gordian 
knot in IG discussions since the introduction of the Internet Governance 
Forum (IGF), that many saw was a venue for exercising precisely that. Other 
pundits assessed the need for a separate track of negotiations. The WGEC 
was consequently entrusted to find a definition for enhanced cooperation 
in its meetings in 2013– 14. A new iteration of the working group, this time 
comprising twenty- two national representatives from different regions, five 
representatives each from business, civil society, academic and technical com-
munities, and international organizations met five times between September 
2016 and January 2018. The goal of these diplomatic negotiations was to 
agree to advance a set of recommendations on public policy issues to the 
UN General Assembly through its Economic and Social Council. Two unre-
solved matters blocked the consensus: (1) proposals for the creation of a new 
institutional mechanism; (2) proposals for addressing enhanced cooperation 
within existing bodies, like the CSTD/ UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) or the IGF.
At the core of the disputes was the idea of governments exercising con-
trol over international Internet public policy issues, which was opposed by 
Western countries and Japan, as well as by the majority of non- state actors 
involved in the process. The supporters of this proposal included countries 
such as Cuba and Saudi Arabia, which refused compromise on a middle- 
ground solution such as continuing to discuss Internet- related matters within 
the CSTD (Olufuye 2018). The enhanced cooperation track of negotiations 
broke down over the nature of the mechanism envisaged to take it forward 
and its different interpretations by UN member states, but its significance 
goes beyond this single process.
At a critical junction for IG, this reflective turn towards key evolutionary 
matters for the field, such as establishing definitions or creating new institu-
tional venues, is reminiscent of the WSIS tensions in 2003 and 2005. The 
demand for a body in charge of Internet- related matters with equal- footing 
representation for all states, tabled several times since 2010, remains a fun-
damental rift in IG. In the three processes discussed above, the growing gap 
between the priorities of advanced economies and the Global South has 
become more obvious. The Chinese, Russian, Cuban, Iranian, and Saudi 
Arabian governments have repeatedly blocked consensus- driven deliberations 
in global venues. Other meetings, built around multi- stakeholder values, 




Ensuring a stable, functional, and reliable use of the Internet became a 
completely different endeavour in 2018. Institutional and stakeholder diver-
sity represents a key characteristic of contemporary Internet governance, but 
it does not go uncontested. The opening up of technical bodies to civil society 
has been a welcomed development, in stark contrast to the disputes over the 
participation constraints imposed in intergovernmental processes. In recent 
years, legitimacy, but also accountability have come more prominently to the 
public fore. The new dynamics formed around the strain of final decision- 
making in Internet public policy show that long- standing concessions may 
still be overturned. The alternative route pursued in the absence of global 
consensus is intervention outside an established framework, in informal set-
tings, and among like- minded groups.
The search for global norms and rules for the Internet continues. As some 
processes have shown their limitations, others emerged to foster the su-
premacy of national approaches or, on the contrary, the vitality of the pluralist 
environment with multiple stakeholders represented. From basic connectivity 
restrictions to algorithmic injustice and invasive AI tools, the future IG strug-
gles will make the definition of the field ever more challenging. IG is affected 
by national and transnational developments, but it also continues to impact 
development in others fields, such as global security, finance, or the environ-
ment. Absent new institutional reforms and innovations at the global level, 
the search for an inclusive power- sharing arrangement solely within IG is not 
likely to be successful.
Theoretical Implications
The genesis and structuration of a global field of action can be compared with 
the construction of a unique architectural site, which needs to preserve both 
its functionality and its appeal over time. Laying the foundations without a 
perfect understanding of what comes next and how the complete work would 
look like is the task at hand in the constitution of IG as a global domain. This 
analysis has shown that the tools available for construction are mostly defined 
by those who would be involved in the building process, based on a range 
of design choices partly inherited from other governance systems and partly 
developed as unique adjustments. While the genesis of a field might be the 
result of contingency and spontaneous action, its long- term structuration is a 
political endeavour par excellence.
The evolution of a global power field is governed by internal dynamics 
and responses to external factors, determining its salience. By definition, the 
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latter is irregular and relative to other policy fields. In turn, a nascent field 
influences or steers broader global changes, placing it in a dialectic relation 
with other, more- established policy areas. This reciprocity is central to con-
ceptualizing an emerging domain on a broader governance spectrum. The 
interaction of powerful actors in this space can be disentangled by observing 
various phases in the evolution of a field, which might reveal common vi-
sions or contestation instances. For domains in the making, the structuration 
phase is open- ended and we can only speculate about its potential demise. It 
is worth exploring as we advance a research agenda on new global governance 
fields.
A structural constructivist understanding of the process of differentiation 
allows us to distinguish between different phases in the constitution of a new 
issue domain without neglecting the role of human agency. The Bourdieu- 
inspired analysis offered here presents individuals and institutions as inter-
connected and takes anchoring practices as a starting point for understanding 
how systems of rules are perpetuated. Governance articulation brings into 
focus pluralist explanations of authority and legitimacy, as various decision- 
making processes (generally driven by a few actors) overlap. Yet, to understand 
the different phrases in the evolution of a field, it is necessary to first disen-
tangle the origins of governance and the structural conditions they enable.
Among the many insights derived from this study, three stand out as highly 
relevant for laying the theoretical foundations for understanding the lifecycle 
of new issue domains. The first is the drive for self- organization at the gen-
esis stage, followed by adaptation and co- evolution in a more complex in-
stitutional arrangement. The second is the fluidity of developments and the 
vulnerability to changes, intrinsic to an emergent field of governance; unlike 
more established domains of action such as international trade, new fields are 
susceptible to a wide range of external variation, which may affect the power 
distribution among players. Third, while the demarcation line between dif-
ferent mechanisms of governance is constantly redrawn via changing political 
relations, the attention paid to defining principles for rule- setting emerges as 
a constant. Significant effort is put into designing codes of conduct, shared 
norms, and practices that inhibit the current balance of power or, as it is more 
often the case, uphold it.
Beyond the IG specific insights covered in this research, one question re-
mains: Do the meanings derived here contribute to the development of an 
integrated framework for understanding global issue domains? As this study 
shows, the design of a governance system for an emerging issue domain is not 
the result of intent only. Contingency and technological advances also play 
an important role in the evolution of the field. Integrating the technical and 
the policy side of the discussions— a merger observed more frequently after 
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the WSIS Summit of 2003 and 2005— leads not only to a diversification of 
governance approaches, but also to the expansion of the field as a whole.
An emerging issue domain has a lifecycle of its own. Rather than developing 
linearly, new policy fields are built around underlying tensions that may be 
displayed continuously or only surface in crisis moments. This ordering in- 
the- making implies steering of processes, but also ‘rowing’, or the perform-
ance of specific functions for economic, social, political, environmental, 
administrative, or adjudicative purposes. The central role of states, empha-
sized by students of IR and IG, continues to inform global politics, but it 
is no longer the only authoritative source of power. As the number of actors 
involved in global governance grows steadily, defining their roles and agreeing 
on the basic rules for their engagement is the priority.
A new area of investigation in IR, issue domains that are by definition 
global— like the Internet— pose a set of distinct challenges to the theorization 
of governance. Not only are they fragile realities of global governance, but 
they also (re)present distinctive, partial spheres of authoritative rule- making. 
Early work on environmental, financial, or health governance provided useful 
reflections for tackling emerging policy issues, but their insights remained 
rather scattered. The practice- based theoretical turn, drawing on European 
critical theory and in particular on the work of Bourdieu, added the dimen-
sion of praxis to solving contemporaneous puzzles rooted in nascent fields of 
governance. This book took on the challenge of exploring what constitutes 
IG, how it emerges, and how it gets (better) articulated over time.
As posited in Chapter 1, the lack of a systematic focus on comprehensive, 
longitudinal analyses of the evolution of issue domains has obscured founda-
tional subjects of inquiry, such as the emergence and articulation of govern-
ance. A permissive agenda spanning different theoretical paradigms, the IR 
literature has offered, so far, only limited empirical studies on the workings 
of global governance, the ‘who’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ questions remaining insuffi-
ciently addressed. To build a stronger conceptual and empirical link between 
governance enactment and the forms it takes, this study unpacked the global 
structuring for new issue domains, distinguishing between different evolu-
tionary phrases.
An inward look at a global domain reveals a fragmented picture, with 
subfields developing their own specificities and institutional configurations. 
The conceptualization of the issue domain itself is partly the result of the 
governance patterns and power dynamics forming over time. From key 
decision- making to daily routines, points of control and inherent tensions 
around them drive both the cross- sectoral arrangements and the definition 
of spheres of authority. To explore the interaction at the heart of develop-
ments, the three- dimensional framework of analysis proposed here was highly 
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valuable: mechanisms, actors, and practices each reveal a crucial aspect for the 
formation and evolution of the field.
This study made four important contributions to IR and public 
policy: first, it helped close the gap between the conceptual and the empir-
ical evidence for the origin and articulation of governance; second, it inves-
tigated the evolution of the Internet taking into account the underexplored 
dimension of dominant practices, alongside mechanisms and actors; third, 
it showed how continuity and change can be explained in a longitudinal 
analysis of over forty years; fourth, it laid the foundations for a new research 
agenda focused on the constitution of new issue domains. To take the latter 
forward, a comparison with governance patterns in other global domains 
(such as climate change, health, or global financing) could provide a useful 
avenue for assessing similarities and differences, unique features, and iso-
morphism instances. It would also help us grasp, in a more comprehensive 
manner, what challenges emerge for legitimacy and accountability in global 
governance when new policy fields become permanent features of the inter-
national system.
Future Research Directions
Theorizing the lifecycle of an issue domain in the making is an incomplete 
endeavour. In contemporary governance, just like in policymaking, we follow 
moving targets:  the Internet is an eloquent example of that. The attention 
given to an issue domain varies in time, and may range from being assigned 
a global priority status to its obsolescence. The consolidation of a global in-
stitutional architecture and the political salience accorded to IG, as contested 
as it may be, indicates that the demise of this field is nowhere in sight. The 
reforms, adjustments, and adaptations it may undergo in the near future will 
determine which system of rules can effectively address the challenges facing 
users, governments, international organizations, business actors, civil society, 
and technical bodies.
This book investigated the collaboration and contention emerging over 
time in structuring a unique field of governance, providing a timely account 
of ongoing debates and their origins. Using many of the conceptual and em-
pirical tools set out in the earlier discussion, complementary analysis can go 
deeper into theorizing the constitution of other new issue domains on the 
international agenda, such as global health, international finance, health, or 
environmental governance. The exploration of highly complex, cross- sector 
and cross- organizational policy arenas is a much- needed contribution to 




At the outset, I noted that we lack a coherent theoretical approach to grasp 
the evolution of issue domains beyond fragmentary glimpses at key develop-
ments in specific policy areas. When analysing nascent issue domains, new 
opportunities emerge to unpack complexity and revisit theoretical founda-
tions in IR. Regime theorists came closest to defining the conditions under 
which a domain of governance is constituted, but presupposed an agreement 
on norms and principles comes first. This longitudinal analysis of Internet 
governance showed that principles and values may remain subject to debate 
as work gets completed in a number of subfields.
A study employing both historical and empirical grounding helps us re-
fine explanations for the continuity and change trajectories observed in inter-
national affairs. The research agenda proposed here could be further pursued 
by concentrating efforts in two directions. To begin with, the dimensions ana-
lysed in this book (cross- sectoral mechanisms, actors, and dominant practices) 
provide the first inroads and are limited to IG- specific dynamics. They could 
be further expanded to better capture informal relations that are authorita-
tive. Second, more comparative research is needed, in particular for issue do-
mains for which we can locate genesis around the same time. Unquestionably, 
such comparisons would provide a fruitful ground for furthering the theor-
ization of global governance.
What this book has shown is the complex constitution of a convoluted 
system of global rules. It has thus opened the door for a fascinating, multi-
faceted inquiry into governance processes in- the- making. The decentralized 
nature of the Internet has been mirrored in the intricate configurations for 
its governance, but also in the attempts to override it. Collaboration, com-
petition, and contestation lie at the core of this new domain of power and 
continue to drive its development.
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